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ABSTRACT

For decades urban planners and political scientists have attempted to deal with the
problems associated with urbanization. Rapid population growth and the fragmentation of
our metropolitan areas have caused ongoing and ever-increasing problems such as air,
water, and land pollution; high crime rates; disparities in quality of education; a persistent
racial divide; and traffic congestion, to name only a few. One solution, regionalism,
gained grand-scale political support in the mid-twentieth century only to decline in the
1980s with the Reagan administration. In the 20 years leading up to Reagan's policy of
devolution, the national government was invested in fostering multi-jurisdictional
relationships. These cooperative councils of governments were to develop comprehensive
regional plans for future regional development while attempting to resolve existing urban
issues through region-wide initiatives. However, with devolution, regional councils lost
their authority and the federal revenue stream dried up; as a result, regional planning and
cooperation fell out of favor.
Since the mid-1990s, there has been an enormous re-growth in regional
partnerships and academic interest in regionalism. Today's voluntary partnerships find
theoretical footing in the 'new regionalism,' a movement that has gained momentum with
a number of state and local governments, federal agencies, and scholars. In spite of this
support, regional efforts are, and have always been, difficult to establish and maintain for
a variety of political and economic reasons. Regionalism in the 1970s occurred, for the
most part, because of the federal government's infusion of funding and authority in the
regional council (Atkins and Wilson-Gentry, 1992; Grigsby, 1996). With devolution, that
funding and authority was revoked. So why are local governments cooperating on a
vu

regional level today? To answer that question, researchers have begun to explore existing
regional councils in search of key determinants of their formation and ongoing
participation. Suggested_motives include a history of regional cooperation (Ostrom,
1998), and the pressure of an unmet need that cannot be resolved by council members
acting independently (Olberding, 2002). To determine the extent towhich the federal
government is again playing a role, this research seeks to reintroduce the influence of
federal funding to the list of key determinants.
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CHAPTER 1: THE NEW REGIONALISM AND OUR FEDERAL DEMOCRACY
Introduction

Since the 1920s urban planners and political scientists have sought solutions to
the problems associated with urbanization. Rapid population growth in our metropolitan
areas have caused ongoing and ever-increasing problems such as air, water,, and land
pollution; high crime rates; disparities in quality of education; a persistent racial divide;
traffic congestion; the rapid consumption of open spaces, and many other issues (see, for
instance, Peirce, 1993; Ross and Levine, 1996; Vogel, 1997; Rusk, 1999). One solution,
regionalism, garnered grand-scale political support in the mid-twentieth century only to
decline in the 1980s due to the opposing policy preferences of the Reagan administration.
In the 20 years preceding Reagan's policy of devolution, or the turning back of programs
and powers to the states, the national government was invested in fostering multi
jurisdictional relationships to develop comprehensive regional plans for future
development while attempting to resolve existing urban issues through region-wide
cooperative initiatives. With devolution, regional councils lost their authority and the
federal revenue spigot dried up; as a result, regional planning and cooperation fell out of
favor (Grigsby, 1996; Lester and Lombard, 1998).
Since the mid-1990s, there has been an enormous interest in the renewing of
regional partnerships coupled with revived academic interest (Calthorpe, 2001; Downs,
1994; Markusen, 1995; Orfield, 1997; Pastor et al, 2000; Rosenbaum and Mermel, 1995;
Rusk, 1993,1999; Savitch and Vogel, 2000; Swanstrom, 1995, 2001; Wallis, 1994;
Wheeler, 2002; to name a few). Today's voluntary partnerships find theoretical footing in
1

the 'new regionalism,' a movement that has gained momentum with a number of state
and local governments, federal agencies, and scholars. In spite of this support, regional
efforts are, and have always been, difficult to establish and maintain for a variety of
political and economic reasons (Bollens, 1997; Norris, 2001; Olberding, 2002).
Regionalism in the 1970s flourished, for the most part, because of the federal
government's infusion of funding and authority in the regional council. With devolution,
that funding and authority was revoked. So why are local governments cooperating on a
regional level today? In an effort to answer that question, researchers have begun to
explore existing regional councils in search of key determinants of their formation and
ongoing participation. Suggested motives include a history ofregional cooperation
(Ostrom, 1998), and the pressure of an unmet need that cannot be resolved by council
members acting independently (Olberding, 2002). To determine the extent to which the
federal government is again playing a role, this research seeks to reintroduce the
influence of federal funding to the list of key determinants.
This study is accomplished through the systematic study of existing regional
councils in the United States as identified by the National Association of Regional
Councils, their parent organization. Survey data reveals that regional councils in the
United States are once again heavily dependent on federal funding for their annual
budget. Moreover, there is strong evidence to suggest that regional councils are willing to
change their objectives to "follow" federal funding opportunities, an indication that
regional needs might be set aside, as in the 1970s, for federal initiatives. Finally, the most
frequent type of regional council, the Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO), is also
the type that receives the most federal funding as a percentage of their overall annual
2

budget. MPOs were moved from the position of advisory agency to holding
transportation program approval powers in 1991 with the Intermodal Surface
Transportation Efficiency Act. Their powers were further expanded with the
Transportation Equity Act (1998). Through these Acts, MPOs have become central
figures in state planning in transportation and regional economic development, but in
other areas, as well. "(The) U.S. DOT became a player in welfare-to-work issues,
brownfield programs, empowerment zones and enterprise communities, housing, and
other similar activities" (Eclner and McDowell, 2002: 21). Finally, while survey
responses reveal that citizen participation in regional efforts is generally satisfactory to
regional council directors, the ways in which participant input is used likely has little
impact on regional decisions. What is the significance of these findings?
Whether regional councils are dependent on federal funding, rather than state or
local funding, is important for a number of reasons: 1) in the 1970s, COG dependence on
regional funding turned out to be their "Achilles heel," leading to the near demise of
regional efforts with the 1980s devolution. Today's regional council dependence on the
federal government may reposition regionalism on a political fault line; 2) dependence on
federal funding can shift the focus of regional efforts away from innovative solutions for
specific needs to federal goals and initiatives. Additionally, conditions of grant funding
that require citizen participation may actually serve to limit forms of participation,
resulting in less-than-meaningful interaction between councils and citizens; 3) a high
degree of federal funding, coupled with mandates and rules as conditions of grant
funding, means that the national government is again playing a heightened role in the
development and decision-making on the local level, a condition that effectively blurs the
3

constitutional lines of federalism; 4). National intervention into regional and local issues
can strain relations between states and the national government, and states and their
regions. Certainly, national intervention caused such problems in the 1970s as states were
often left out of regional plans; 5) Under the new regionalism, regional councils are
envisioned to be voluntary associations of existing governmental entities brought together
to address regional needs. But if some councils are enjoying high levels of authority as
they are positioned by the federal government to serve as regional agencies, another layer
of government has been created - the regional layer. Depending on the level of authority
that these regional councils possess (approval of funding applications, programs,
consultation power, power to punish, power to tax), these regional layers of government
could become like those in the 1970s, a condition that brought controversy and frustration
under federalism. Three key research questions are proposed:
1.

Is there evidence that federal funding is a political force that has prompted
the growth and strengthening in authority in today's regional councils?
To what extent are regional councils responding to and dependent on
federal funding? Is one council type or objective positively related to
federal funding?

2.

What level of authority is granted to those councils that respond to federal
funding or programs? How do council objectives relate to levels of
authority? Does a particular objective category enjoy more authority than
others? Is there a relationship between federal funding and a particular
type of authority?

3.

To what extent are citizens involved in regional efforts? Is there a
relationship between a particular funding source and participation?
Between a particular objective and participation? Are councils that receive
more federal funding less likely to engage in meaningful citizen
participation?

This research suggests that the regional councils of today look much like those of the
1970s in their levels of federal funding, authority, and their focus on federal goals. The
4

data show that more than half of the survey respondents call themselves MPOs; 83% of
the regional councils claim transportation as one of their top three objectives; and over
half (52%) claim that transportation is their top objective. Most regional councils are
reliant on federal funding for over half of their annual revenue. There is a significant
relationship between federal funding and high levels of authority and those councils that
claim transportation as a top objective are also those will the most authority. Finally, to
further demonstrate the role of the federal government in regional efforts, the data show
that those councils that claim transportation as their top objective are the least likely to
have citizens participate as board members, part of the most meaningful level of citizen
participation according to Arnstein (1969).
Background

Regional cooperation is hardly a new idea. For nearly 75 years, regionalists have
pointed to intergovernmental cooperation as the solution for urban ills. Metropolitan
regionalism was the preferred solution from the 1940s to the 1970s "for dealing with
urban development and the increasingly evident social disparities reflected in the
geography of the metropolis" (Mitchell-Weaver, 2000: 854). In the 1960s, cooperative
governments were formed and these councils of government (COGs) were charged with
the oversight and approval of local government applications for federal assistance (ACIR,
1972; Wikstrom, 1977). A relationship grew between COGs and the federal government
that brought comment from Michael Reagan: "Federalism - old style-is dead. Yet
federalism- new style-is alive and well and living in the United States. Its name is
intergovernmental relations" (1972: 3). This relationship between the national
5

government and regional entities frequently excluded state governments leading to tense
intergovernmental relationships, both between states and their regions and states and the
federal government, bringing into focus the questionable constitutionality of empowered
regional councils of government. By the 1970s, federal funding provided regional
partnerships with over 70% of their annual revenue (Atkins and Wilson-Gentry, 1992).
During the Nixon administration, declining federal funding, councils' primary
source of revenue, forced intergovernmental cooperation into retreat - a retreat that
gained momentum with the Reagan administration's policy of devolution. Both
administrations believed in scaling down "big government" and returning power to the
states (Wright and Stenberg, forthcoming). With devolution, regional councils went into
decline. Regional councils were forced to dissolve or seek alternate means of support. To
that end, many councils survived by narrowing their focus from regional to local, as
council directors sought to fill niche needs for which they were able to charge user fees
for service provision (Atkins and Wilson-Gentry, 1992; Riverstone and Kelly,
forthcoming). By charging fees for provision of services, some councils were able to
generate much needed replacement revenue. Even so, many were forced to downsize,
change missions, and/or change objectives in order to survive (Riverstone and Kelly,
forthcoming). Between 1980 and 1990, the number of regional councils fell from 670 to
435 (Ross and Levine, 1996: 357).
Nevertheless, in the mid-1990s, regionalism reemerged in the literature as well as
in reality with an increase in numbers of councils. Mitchell-Weaver (2000) cites three
reasons for the rebound:

6

1.
2.
3.

The socioeconomic and fiscal disparities between urban centers and their
outlying areas had "reached a critical level" and demographic trends
promised things would only get worse.
Global economic competition threatened the economic base of central
cities while suburbs and edge cities enjoyed new investments and
industrial growth.
Urban sprawl was undermining the "sustainability of the physical
environment of large urban communities" (851).

Scholars believe that some form of regional partnership is the answer to the ills of
governmental fragmentation, defined as a "metropolitan area(s) . . . divided into many
smaller jurisdictions with no government possessing the power to look out for the good of
the entire region. No local jurisdiction is required to look after the effects of its actions on
other jurisdictions" (Ross and Levine, 1996: 310-13). By grouping jurisdictions together
in voluntary cooperative efforts, these scholars believe that many urban ills can be
resolved (see, for instance: Barnes and Ledebur, 1998; Cisneros, 1995; Downs, 1994;
Foster, 1997; Lindstrom, 1998; Orfield, 1997; Peirce, 1993; Rusk, 1993, 1999; Walker,
1995; Wallis, 1994).
Unfortunately, regional partnerships are difficult to achieve and maintain (see, for
instance, Bollens, 1997; Norris, 2001; Olberding, 2002). Council members are frequently
faced with requests that are neither politically feasible nor prominent on their local
agenda (Bollens, 1997). As a result, an actor may remove himself by dissolving his
association with the council or by adopting an uncooperative stance rather than
committing his or her scarce resources to regional activities. As a solution, some believe
that cooperative governance efforts require "multilevel intervention, using state and
federal powers to reinforce local moves in the direction of regional co-operation and
consolidation" (Mitchell-Weaver, 2000: 851). While certainly legitimate, state
7

intervention into local matters has its share of problems (Martin, 1965; Sanford, 1967)
federal intervention into local matters is even more problematic- especially if, as in the
1970s, state and local liberties are subordinated to a federal agenda.
Regional cooperation, if truly cooperative, does not undermine state or local
liberty. Put another way, if regional efforts are coerced, as they were with early COGs, or
if states are acting because "they must (e.g., cooperative planning in order to receive
federal transportation dollars)" (Norris, 2001: 561), then important constitutional
questions, not dissimilar to those raised in the 1970s, emerge.

Since the 1990s, there has been a resurgence of regional councils in the United
States. This research posits that the reemergence of regionalism, both in the literature and
in the growth of regional councils, is a likely result of new federal funding opportunities
that have a regional component. In other words, this research explores the extent to which
regional councils are again a product of federal initiatives. Several questions emerge: Are
regional councils today, as they were in the 1970s, dependent on federal funding for
survival? If so, are they now, as they were in the 1980s, vulnerable to policy shifts and
funding reductions? What does that portend for the long-term health ofregionalism?
Does the intertwining of national aid and regional efforts, once again, warrant
examination under federalism?

Purpose of this Study

The purpose of this study is to determine the extent to which current regional
efforts are driven by federal funding and how that relationship impacts federalism as
8

defined by our Constitution. For theoretical footing, this research looks to the new
regionalism.
The new regionalism is concerned with creating partnerships "between existing
levels of government" to address "environmental, equity, and economic goals" (Wheeler,
2002: 267). We would expect regional councils to address local needs, have the authority
to resolve local issues, and - to ensure local responsiveness - to have a high level of
citizen participation. Several questions are addressed: What motivates modern regional
councils? What are their objectives? Are citizens offered the opportunity to participate?
Do citizens respond to these opportunities and how does their participation affect regional
efforts?
The new regionalism assumes voluntary cooperation between existing levels of
government to accomplish goals such as the positioning of the region in the global
economy and economic development (Norris, 2001). Is this what is occurring in today's
regionalism? Are these arrangements truly voluntary, or are they the product of
conditions of federal funding, a situation that suggests less voluntary arrangements?
Finally, because scholarly interest in regional councils has been limited in the past 15
years, and because regional councils could return to the status they enjoyed in the 1960s
and 1970s, it is important to explore existing councils, to understand what they are doing,
and from whom they receive their funding.

The Chapters
Chapter Two describes the history of federalism in the American democratic
system: its origin, major movements in history, and the importance of the local
9

government to democracy. Chapter Three discusses urbanization and the problems
associated with urban growth and decline.
Chapter Four is a literature review and historical survey of the regionalism since
the 1970s to today, beginning with the formalization of COG power. Finally, some
aspects of modem COGs are examined with the help of a preliminary random survey
conducted in 2002 (Kelly and Riverstone, 2002). Chapter Five is a description of the new
regionalism as a theoretical framework for regional efforts.
Chapter Six details the data and methods used in this study. A survey of all
regional councils in the United States was conducted. In this chapter, the survey tool and
its implementation is described and the study's research questions are posed. Chapter
Seven offers statistical findings and a discussion of those findings. Chapter Eight
contains a summary, conclusions, and suggestions for future research.

10

CHAPTER 2: OUR FEDERAL DEMOCRACY
This research discusses the role of the national government in regionalism.
Fundamental to that question is whether the national government has the constitutional
right to involve itself in state and local business in the first place. The nature of the
relationship between the nation and the states is foundational to this research as we call
into question the national government's role in regionalism via its programmatic
prescriptions and mandates that emerge as conditions of grants-in-aid.
Fundamental to the question of federalism is how the powers of government
should be divided between the central, or national, government and its peripheral, or state
and local, governments. "Constitutionally the issue is framed in legal terms: Which
jurisdiction has power(s) to do what, with what degree of discretion or autonomy?"
(Wright and Stenberg, forthcoming). In other words, which layer of government is
responsible, should be responsible, for what service or function? (Fesler, 1973: 4).
Woodrow Wilson called our attention to our "systems within systems" highlighting the
fact that within our larger national construct there are other constructs: "town(s), cit(ies),
state(s)" that deserve "like strength and an equally assured healthfulness, keeping each
unquestionably its own master and yet making all interdependent and co-operative
combining independence with mutual helpfulness" (1887: 221).
In America, federalism, or the division of power between our national
government and the states, is rooted in the moment of our country's founding, and is a
powerful source of controversy that has marked our political landscape from the Articles
of Confederation, to the Constitutional debates, the Civil War, the New Deal, Devolution
11

in the 1980s, and to this day (Huntington, 1959; Diamond, 1961; Warren, 1968; Beer,
1993). When we talk about federalism and regionalism, the question that emerges is the
extent to which the national government should, through conditions of grants-in-aid,
preemptions, and mandates, insinuate itself into the states' rightful domain. However,
before discussing the national government's role in regionalism, we need to understand
federalism's origin and how it has changed over time, the significance of localized
decision-making, and the problems associated with federal intervention into local issues.

Although bounded by constitutional framework, there have been many
fluctuations in the division of powers between the national and state governments. These
fluctuations are the product of our living Constitution, wherein our Founders neither
operationalized nor completely defined their theoretical construct. (Carroll, 1982; Heady,
1987; Krislov and Rosenbloom, 1981; Waldo, 1980). Anderson notes that the
Constitution "did not spring forth perfect, complete, and self-explanatory; most likely it
never will be complete and perfect" (1955: 66). Rather, the Constitution was written to be
a "practical document," an "instrument of action" (Leach, 1989) that would meet the
changing needs of a growing and diverse nation. Both constitutionally and extra
constitutionally, our Founders established our structures for governance in three features
unique to America: federalism, separation of powers, and judicial review. However, the
actual workings and theoretical underpinnings of such features were left largely
undefined, and so remain somewhat open to debate. Nevertheless, The Federalist
provides some insight into these structures: "The Federalist papers are the undisputed
starting point for understanding (1) the provisions of the Constitution, (2) the rationale of
12

three framers (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay) for those provisions, and (3) the main
arguments, pro and con, used in the adoption process" (Wright and Stenberg,
forthcoming). For our purposes, we tum to Federalist 32 and 39. Separation of powers
and judicial review will not be discussed here; rather, we focus on federalism in the
following discussion.
Federalism, the structure of governance that is central to this research and the
"cardinal question" of our constitutional system (Wilson, 1908), was left undefined and
was only understood as the need to divide governmental power between the states and the
nation such that the various powers would be shared, leaving the "national government's
jurisdictional reach . . . highly restricted-exercising only those powers delegated to it by
the U.S. Constitution" (Shannon, 1990: 18). It was agreed that a central government
would be in place while at the same time leaving "the center of gravity of American
government (with) the states" (Storing, 1981: 23).
Following the grand scale financial and social conflict that challenged the
independent states under the Articles of Confederation, the Federalists believed that an
"energized national government" was necessary for the survival of the nation (Bailyn,
1967; J3enson, 1960; Holcombe, 1950; Lienesch, 1983; Roche, 1961; Wood, 1969)
Nevertheless, the dominance of England's tyrannical unitary system loomed large in
memory causing many others, the Anti-Federalists, to protest an empowered, centralized
government (Wright and Stenberg, forthcoming).
Perhaps it was the vagueness of Articles IV and VI of the Constitution that felt so
threatening to the Anti-Federalists. These Articles offer little more than hints regarding
the Framers' intended intergovernmental arrangements. Thus, Hamilton had to "reassure
13

people that . . . 'consolidation' would not mean complete homogenization" (Wills, 1982:
172). That reassurance came in the form of federalism - a compromise meant to bridge
the divide between those who wanted a strong centralized government and those who
feared it.
Insight into the mechanics of federalism lie less within the Constitution than
without, and even then federalism remains somewhat indistinct. In the face of Anti
Federalist arguments and protests, Hamilton and Madison set out to "sweet talk" the
ratifying states. Hamilton writes as "Publius" in Federalist 32:
an intire [sic] consolidation of the States into one complete
national sovereignty would imply an intire [sic] subordination of
the parts, and whatever powers might remain in them would be
altogether dependent on the general will. But. . . the plan of the
Convention aims only at a partial Union or consolidation . . .
(emphasis added)
Madison, also writing as Publius, appealed to the people by explaining that, while greater
centralized power was necessary, the states would maintain authority "within their
respective spheres" (Federalist 39). According to Madison, "the residual sovereignty of
the states was in fact greater than the sovereignty of the national government" (Woll,
2002: 60). This "residual sovereignty," later secured in the Tenth Amendment, is the stuff
that has prompted a 200-year competition over realms of authority regarding national and
state powers. Finally, Madison notes that the new constitution is "neither wholly national
nor wholly federal" (Federalist 39). Rather, the new government would be a combination
of the two, pointing to the shared powers of the national and state governments. The
Tenth Amendment (1791) further supported states' rights by asserting, "the powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
14

reserved to the states respectively, or to the people." The states would take the dominant
position, delegating particular responsibilities to the federal government. However, as
Walter Berns points out, if states truly felt secure in their position as dominant federal
actors, they would not have needed the Tenth Amendment (1961: 130). The addition of
the Tenth Amendment was an indication of the states' precarious position and perhaps set
"the agenda for future controversies that would escalate both sooner and later . . . " (Wright
and Stenberg, forthcoming).
Some believe that federalism was meant to be a temporary measure, a
compromise between the Founders and the states, "a more or less temporary arrangement
in the course of building a genuine national government" (Storing, 1981: 37). Even if this
is true, the notion of shared but divided power has become deeply ingrained in the
American political culture and, intentional or not, federalism has been accepted as the
foundation of our governmental structure.

Federalism and the States

In the years since the Constitution was ratified, America has experienced a
number of power shifts between levels of government, often due to economic fluctuations
and the policy solutions adopted by Congress, perhaps most notably with the Industrial
Revolution and the New Deal. These power shifts have been briefly outlined in Table 2.1.
Dual Federalism loosely spans the years from our nation's founding to 1933, with

Franklin Delano Roosevelt's first year in office. Wright and Stenberg note that 17901890 was a period of"emergent federalism" (forthcoming), that is, a period of time
wherein America developed its federalist roots. The result of their 100 years' effort was a
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Table 2.1: The Evolution of Federalism in America
Power
Precipitated by
Period
Years
Seat
1 789-1 933 States
Carry over from Articles of Confederation.
Dual
People looked to their states for services and
policies.
National government focused on delegated
powers while states decided domestic policy
issues.
Cooperative

1 933-1960

Shared

New Deal. Nation "acknowledged" lack of
authority in public health, safety, and welfare.
Used taxing powers to help states achieve shared
goals.

Cooptive

1 960-1 980

Nation

Increased centralization through the years
leading up to the Great Society program.
National government asserts through grants-in
aid.

New or Fa�ade

1980-1 992

Nation 
turning
back to the
states

Reagan's devolution. Administration of some
grants to state and local governments with few
strings attached. Centralizing tendencies
continue through mandates.

Revived?
More Fa�ade?

1 992Today

Nation turning
back to the
states?

Several Supreme Court decisions in favor of
Constitutional "dual sovereignty" beginning
with New York v. U.S. ( 1992) then United States
v. Lopez and Printz v. United States.
Implications still unclear. Republican majorities
in both houses of Congress.
Sources: Wright and Stenberg, forthcoming; Dye, 2005: 1 12-18.
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period that they define as "mature federalism," a period that is characterized by a
"fixed . . .. distribution of powers between the federal government and the states" (Saffell
and Basehart, 2005: 42).
Fundamental to the period of Dual Federalism is the compact theory, formulated
by John C. Calhoun (Saffell and Basehart, 2005). The compact theory rested on the
position that the states were sovereign entities that had joined together to form a national
government that is beholden to the states for its power. In other words, the states were the
primary or dominant actors in the federal system with the power to "nullify. . . or veto . . .
laws passed by Congress that affected them" (43). Operating within their respective
spheres of authority, states were the overseers of "important domestic policy issues education, welfare, health, and criminal justice" while the national government
"concentrated its attention on the "delegated" powers-national defense, foreign affairs,
tariffs, interstate commerce, the coinage of money standard weights and measures, post
office and post roads, and the admission of new states" (Dye, 2005: 113).
The Industrial Revolution and the institution of the federal income tax in 1913
would mark the beginning of a movement toward national supremacy, supported by a
number of Supreme Court decisions under Chief Justice Fuller (Wright and Stenberg,
forthcoming). Using the "doctrines . . . (of) reasonableness and liberty of contract, the
Fuller Court made the due process clause of the 14th Amendment the lever for an hitherto
unprecedented expansion of federal judiciary supervisory power over the legislation and
action of the states" (Schmidhauser, 195 8: 139). The position of the Court in the years
leading to 1917 was decidedly nation-favored. "The Court, it appears, was launched on
the way to confirming the maturity of federalism by giving wide latitude for selective
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national actions and imposing a more limited, restricted role for the states" (Wright and
Stenberg, forthcoming). Nevertheless, even with the Court's bent toward approval of
national action, "Federal domestic programs in the late 1920s were so limited that state
spending was double federal spending" (Saffell and Basehart, 2005: 43). A brief retreat
(1917- 1937) from Court approved national action occurred before America moved into
the period of Cooperative Federalism (Wright and Stenberg, forthcoming).
Cooperative Federalism spans (again loosely) the years 1933- 1960. The product
of the centralizing changes that occurred during Dual Federalism, coupled with two
World Wars, the Great Depression, the "shift . . . (of) financial resources to the national
government" (Dye, 2005: 1 13) via the national income tax, the New Deal policies, a
variety of fiscal tools including grants-in-aid programs, and "direct aid to cities
(bypassing the states)" (Wright and Stenberg, forthcoming) meant an erosion of the rigid
or "fixed" line between national and state realms of authority and responsibility. Wright
and Stenberg note: "by 1922 over 60% of all federal receipts came from the income tax"
(forthcoming). With a stream of revenue flowing to Washington, the national government
was able to initiate new programs to further its goals and policy preferences.
Interestingly, the very first grant program was initiated in 1914, the year
following the institution of the income tax and soon after, the national government was
involved in a number of domestic arenas such as "agricultural extension ( 1914), highway
construction ( 1916), vocational education ( 1917), vocational rehabilitation ( 1920),
maternal and child health (192 1), and forestry (1924)" (forthcoming; see also: ACIR,
1978; Council of State Governments, 1949; Key, 1937; MacDonald, 1928). National
intervention into traditional state powers escalated during the Great Depression as states,
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cities, and charities were unable to meet the needs of the homeless and the unemployed
(Saffell and Basehart, 2005: 43). The New Deal programs, beginning in 1933, meant a
tripling of "federal domestic spending . . .in the years leading up to World War II" (43).
The Supreme Court was supportive of New Deal policies after 1937. Prior to that
year, the Court was largely controlled by conservative justices, none too keen on building
a strong central government (43). Roosevelt appointed the first of what would eventually
be eight justices in 1937. Soon after, New Deal legislation began to meet with Court
approval. By the tum of the decade, "The New Deal Court had effectively announced the
constitutional demise of federalism as a limit on the power of the national government"
(Shapiro, 1990: 66).
Rather than having different spheres of authority, as under Dual Federalism,
Cooperative Federalism is characterized by a sharing of authorities. Federal size and
power increased, but that increase in power meant that the national government took an
active role in state business, a role that was often welcome as states were unable to
manage the growing needs of their citizens. "State and federal agencies undertook joint
projects and power was shared, even as the role of the federal government expanded"
(Saffell and Basehart, 2005: 44). Nevertheless, the commingling of the federal and state
fiscal systems had a lasting effect: "The states became in effect, although not in form,
agents of central government in the prosecution of activities deemed by Congress to be
clothed with a national interest" (Key, 1937: 367-8).
Cooptive or Coercive Federalism spans the years 1960-1980. Martha Derthick
writes of this period: "For a student of federalism to make sense of the events (of this
period) is no easy task" (1987: 67). The grants programs of the previous era had taken
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root, resulting in "big government" and big spending; "Federal aid tripled from 1952 to
1961 (reaching $7.3 billion)" (Saffell and Basehart, 2005: 44). The growth in federal
grants programs meant a growth in conditional requirements such as approved plans of
action and spending, federal audits, and matching funds; at the same time, direct federal
aid to local governments gained momentum. "From 1965 to 1969 federal aid to state and
local governments nearly doubled, to $20.2 billion . . . In many cases, states were bypassed
and aid went directly to cities, counties, school districts, and nonprofit organizations"
(44). "By 1980 about 30 percent of all federal aid bypassed state governments, compared
with 8 percent in 1960" (45).
The national government imposed itself into every possible aspect of state and
local life, and folks began to resent its stronghold. "By. . . 1964. . . virtually all problems
confronting American society - from solid-waste disposal and water and air pollution to
consumer safety, home insulation, noise abatement, and even "highway beautification" were declared to be national problems" (Dye, 2005: 116). The power of the purse
translated into the power to control as grants programs became increasingly restrictive
and dismissive of state and local agendas. Nevertheless, "From a fiscal standpoint the
shower of federal dollars . . . was sufficient to tum the eyes of many observers and
participants, especially state and local officials, into a fixed gaze on Washington" (Wright
and Stenberg, forthcoming). The lure of federal funding proved too tempting to ignore,
even at the expense of state and local autonomy.
At the same time, the Supreme Court became more powerful as its decisions in
Civil Rights cases both expanded national powers and shored up the Court's authority
(Saffell and Basehart, 2005: 44). In a prescient essay, Landau (1965) "projected the
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effects of [Baker v. Carr] as accelerating the decline and atrophy of federalism in the
United States largely because it would foster the increased nationalization of many
issues" (Wright and Stenberg, forthcoming). Certainly this was the case. By the end of
this period, "The Supreme Court no longer concerned itself with the reserved powers of
the states, and the Tenth Amendment lost most of its meaning" (Dye, 2005 : 116).
New Federalism emerged as a response to big government. Spanning the years
1980-1992, the movement that had began to brew in the late 1960s, that is, a call for "a
more balanced configuration of federal aid- a shift from categorical/project grants
toward block grants and revenue sharing" (Wright and Stenberg, forthcoming) began to
take hold. With Richard Nixon's administration came the call to tum power back to the
states, to cut red tape, and to establish general revenue sharing, giving "state and local
governments greater discretion and flexibility in spending federal funds" (Saffell and
Basehart, 2005: 44-5). Nixon's administration was able to establish "three new block
grants" during its tenure (45). Nevertheless, coercive federalism persisted throughout
Nixon's term, and into Carter's (and beyond) where "categorical grants remained
dominant, and the federal government maintained direct access to local governments"
(45). In 1980, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations reported:
"American federalism . . .is in trouble. The federal government's influence has become
more pervasive, more intrusive, more unmanageable, more ineffective, more costly, and,
above all, more unaccountable" (1980: 1). It was only with Reagan that "the first
substantial effort was made to reduce the tide of centralization that had been growing
since the 1930s" (Saffell and Basehart, 2005: 45).
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Reagan's plan for devolution meant quick changes in national spending: aid to
state and local governments was cut by nearly $6.5 billion within two years of Reagan
taking office (45). "About sixty categorical aid programs were dropped, and more than
seventy-seven others were consolidated into block grants" (45). Hoping for more drastic
measures, at the 1982 State of the Union address, Reagan stated:
In a single stroke we will be accomplishing a realignment
that will end cumbersome administration and spiraling
costs at the federal level while we insure these programs
will be more responsive to both the people' they are meant
to help and the people who pay for them.
Big dreams met with lack-luster response in Congress and the Reagan Administration
settled for relaxed regulations on "grant applications and evaluation" (46).
The mixed results of Reagan's policy initiatives are legion: massive federal
deficit, burdens placed on state and local governments as funding was reduced or
eliminated for needed program areas, and a great increase in federal regulations and
preemptions (Wright and Stenberg, forthcoming; ACIR, 1993; Zimmerman, 1991). On
the other hand, state and local governments were given more responsibility, more power,
and were forced to become more innovative and professional as they sought to bridge the
divide between current service levels and reduced federal spending (Bowman and
Kearney, 2002).
When President Bill Clinton took office, he also donned the cloak of devolution
proclaiming: "The era of big government is over" (State of the Union Address, 1996). His
moderate campaign position brought good response from the American electorate (Dye,
2005). Nevertheless, "once in office, Clinton appeared to revert to liberal policy
directions rather than to pursue the more moderate line he had espoused as a "new"
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Democrat" (209). Mandates and preemptions continued to be the norm with several
pieces of legislation serving as examples such as the Handgun Violence Prevention Act
of 1993 (the Brady Act) and The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1993. In that same
year, Vice President Al Gore introduced the National Performance Review (NPR) which
"proposed more than 100 recommendations for change in federal-state relations" (Saffell
and Basehart, 2005: 46). While the goal of the NPR was to solve the problems of grant
fragmentation, red tape, and move government into an era of customer-friendly service
provision, "it did not envision a basic restructuring of intergovernmental relations. In
fact, the number of categorical grants increased in 1993-94, and proposals were made by
the president to expand the federal role in areas such as health care and education" (47).
With Clinton's "sagging" ratings and the urging of the Republican majority in Congress,
some measures were taken to curb the power of the national government, although these
measures were not as drastic as the Republican Party had hoped. Nevertheless, the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 and welfare reform in 1996 did pass. Even so,
scholars generally agree that "the Clinton administration's reinventing government
programs . . .. produced little increased discretion for state and local governments (and that)
Although cooperation continues between the states and the federal government, Kincaid
(2002) suggests that it is 'under conditions often dictated by Congress and presidents "'
(47; also see Wright and Stenberg, forthcoming).
A final period is mentioned here: Revived Federalism spanning the years 1992 on.
It is questionable whether this period actually exists or if, via the fa�ade of state-centered
political speak and several Supreme Court decisions, centralization, or Cooptive
Federalism, continues unhampered. Nevertheless, the possibility of "revival" is germane
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to this research. Through a number of Supreme Court cases, federalism has the
appearance of "modest revival" (Dye, 2005: 118) beginning with New York v. United
States in 1992 wherein the Justice O'Connor spoke for the majority saying that Congress

could not force states to bury their nuclear waste, that a direct order to do so violated state
sovereignty. In US v. Lopez (1995), the Court found that Congress's Gun-Free School
Zones Act was unconstitutional "because it exceeded Congress's powers under the
Interstate Commerce Clause" (Dye, 2005: 119). Chief Justice Rehnquist "even cited
James Madison with approval" (119) extracting a quotation from Federalist 45: "Those
powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and
defined. Those which are to remain in the state governments are numerous and infinite."
In Seminole Tribe v. Florida (1996), the Court "ruled that the Eleventh
Amendment shields states from lawsuits by private parties that seek to force states to
comply with federal laws enacted under the commerce power" (119), and in Alden v.
Maine (1999), the Court extended the same protection to states from lawsuits by

individuals seeking to force states to comply with federal mandates (119). In Printz v. US
(1997), the Court went so far as to say that the national government "may neither issue
directives requiring the states to a�dress particular problems, nor command states'
officers, or those of their particular subdivisions, to administer or enforce the federal
regulatory program" (521 U.S. 890).
These cases appear to signal a revival of federalism but, as Dye points out, the
decisions were closely divided with 5 to 4 majorities (2005: 120). Wright and Stenberg
note: "scholars as well as state and local leaders generally agree that, with notable
exceptions, the Court has usually reaffirmed national power and weakened the 10th
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Amendment" (forthcoming). That, coupled with a long history of national government
involvement in state and local business, leaves the question of revived federalism on
shaky ground. Recent measures, including President Bush's 2001 education reform which
"required all states, in exchange for federal dollars, to test students annually so that their
educational progress could be monitored" (Fiorina, et al, 2005: 75) and imposed penalties
for schools that fell behind, indicates that federalism is no longer safely tucked beneath
the Republican wing. Additionally, anti-terrorism measures that were mandated after 9/1 1
placed great fiscal strain on state and local governments as these requirements were un
or under-funded (76). Following the implementation of national security measures to be
carried out by state and local governments, "Members of Congress from both parties
declared the initial budget to be insufficient and complained that Bush was slow to
request adequate funding" (Krane, 2003: 5).
Other policy areas hint at increased national intertwining even while the
Republican Party dominates the White House and both chambers of Congress - even
while state empowerment remains the conservative catch phrase. "Whereas in the past
one could expect Republicans to defend states' rights and Democrats to advocate federal
action, these positions have become quite inconsistent" (44). Certainly this was seen with
Bush's No Child Left Behind Act, a clear movement away from principles of federalism.
Additionally, in a pro-federalism stance, the Democratic Party stood on state's rights
principles in their right-to-die argument concerning the removal of a feeding tube in the
2005 Terri Schiavo controversy (Long, 2005). When the Republican Congress quickly
passed a twelfth-hour measure allowing federal courts to review the case, the Democrats
stepped in to defend the Florida legislature's refusal to pass legislation that would have
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prevented the removal of Ms. Shaivo's feeding tube. Using Krane's words: "(T)his
emerging alteration of each party's position on the roles of national and state
governments undercuts long-standing policy positions. . .. " (44). Things are changing, in
other words, and we do not yet know whether federalism is revived or simply continuing
its lengthy decline.

The question that has remained constant throughout these eras has been the degree
to which the federal government has the constitutional right to exert itself into state
business in the first place. As stated before, James Madison wrote: "The powers
delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined.
Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and infinite"
(Federalist 45). He goes on to write, "The powers reserved to the several States will

extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives,
liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and
prosperity of the State." Nevertheless, powers that were then assumed exclusively
reserved to the states are now virtually nonexistent (Posner, 1998).
Today, the federal government is involved in nearly every aspect of state and
local policy through preemptions, mandates, and regulations that are often included as
conditions of much-needed grant funding. Posner writes: "When the entire spectrum of
federal intergovernmental regulations is examined, it is difficult to identify a major state
or local service that has not been touched by one or more federal mandates" (1998: 4).
Mandates, commonly thought to be "direct orders imposed by the federal government"
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also include grant conditions, crosscutting requirements, crossover sanctions, and partial
preemptions in its definition (4).
Martha Derthick writes: "The essence of the grant system is that it entails the
achievement of federal purposes by proxy'' (Derthick, 1970: 197). She goes on to say:
In studying American federalism, the analyst is forever
asking whether the glass is half-empty or half-full. That is the
appropriate question as the century turns, and the answers are to be
found more in the day-to-day operations of intergovernmental
relations than in either Supreme Court decisions or executive
orders. It requires a blind eye to call ours an era of devolution. But
even with two sharp eyes, it is hard to detect a plain answer.
Everywhere one looks, the answer remains murky and many-sided.
(2000)
To see where the federal government ends and state and local governments begin is
nearly impossible. Berman says: "To some extent, both states and localities have become
instruments of the federal government in implementing various federal programs" (2003:
21).
Grant conditions are no less mandates than others, and all mandates raise
questions of federalism. "Grants often require major commitments of state resources,
changes in state laws, and even constitutional provisions to conform to a host of federal
policy and administrative requirements" (13). While some argue that states have the
ability to opt out of funding if requirements are too great, others counter that the
voluntary refusal of funding is often not an option "if the grant program is too large for
state and local governments to tum down" (13) "particularly for the larger grants such as
for highways or Medicaid" (4). In some cases, "onerous conditions are added some time
after state and local governments have become dependent on the program" (1 3).
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Additionally, there are considerable political implications in turning down available
funding; state and local leaders are unlikely to tum down revenue that they will then have
to ask citizens to replace. Further, budget shortfalls make all funding opportunities more
attractive to revenue-starved state and local governments, even opportunities that carry
burdensome conditions.
The relative inability to tum down federal funding means that state and local
governments have to tolerate greater federal influence than federalism supports.
Moreover, federal influence increases when the national government is in an "easy
budget situation" (Shannon, 1990: 23). At that time:
additional federal aid dollars (with expenditure strings attached)
flow into the state-local sector at a faster rate than do additional
dollars from state and local sources. Thus as federal aid becomes a
progressively larger share of state and local budgets, federal
influence over the state-local sector expands. Conversely, in a
period marked by many years of "tight" federal budgets, federal
aid becomes a progressively smaller fraction of state and local
budgets and, as a result, federal influence on state and local policy
makers tends to decline although not as rapidly as the fall-off in
federal aid. Why? Because federal expenditure strings are
"stickier" than the federal aid dollars that accompany them. (23)
It is in this influence and the residual "stickiness" that we find an erosion of state and
local innovation, a decline in local responsiveness, distortion of state and local priorities
as they bend to the federal agenda, and a general fiscal dependency, the likes of which
meant the near annihilation of regional efforts in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Grigsby,
1996).
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The Importance of Local Governments

In the past several decades, American government has been measured repeatedly
against Alexis de Tocqueville's writings (1835) on individual freedom and local liberty
(Kincaid, 1999: 215). Tocqueville's predictions regarding centralization have proven
especially prescient (215). Toqueville was sure that prosperity, and democratic principles,
such as uniformity and equality, required centralization (211). True to prediction, the
centralizing effects of America's drive for equality has led to "big government" through
social welfare policies, rights protections, broad interpretations of Congress'
constitutional powers, et cetera (215). But, writes, Kincaid, Tocqueville understood that
centralization in Europe "served only to establish a tyrannical sovereignty of the whole
people over local citizenries . . . (to) systematically abolish local liberty and the rights of
self-government of local communities, municipalities, and provinces . . . " (211). Certainly
Tocqueville saw the beginnings of these "tendencies" in the 1830s, even more would he
see them today (211). The rise in "big government" has "sparked a vigorous debate as to
whether centralization is atomizing American society, destroying local liberty, and
debilitating republican citizenship" (215). There is a counter to big government:
devolution. Yet, devolution sparks yet another debate: Given history, to what extent
should states and local governments be empowered under federalism?
We know that American citizens hold local governments dear. The ability of local
governments to "regulate private activities in order to protect the public health, safety and
morals" (Gray and Eisinger, 1997: 365) of its citizens "is sacrosanct in the U.S. And,
there is absolutely nothing new about this conclusion" (Norris, 2001: 566). Even so, most
of today's observers believe that a strong central government is necessary for the survival
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of our democratic nation (e.g. Dye, 1990; Beer, 1993; Greve, 1999). This is believed to
be true for a number of reasons including the ongoing need to shore up operations on the
state and local levels - again, a need driven by democratic principles (Kincaid, 1999:
211).
Posner reports that economists feel that federal intervention via grants and
mandates is necessary "to overcome the distortions in public services for programs whose
benefits or costs cannot be fully captured by individual states or localities" (1998: 6).
Additionally, scholars have pointed to several other state-level deficiencies: States are
considered "indecisive," "antiquated," "timid and ineffective," "not willing to face their
problems," "not responsive," and "not interested in cities" (Sanford, 1967: 1). "These
half-dozen charges are true about all of the states some of the time and some of the states
all of the time" (1). To address the problems associated with state reluctance or
inabilities, the national government has long extended a helping hand.
While Wright and Stenberg point out that "direct national-city
contacts . . . (antedate) the 1930s" (forthcoming), it was the 1960s that began to see a real
relationship develop, only to bloom in the 1 970s (forthcoming). Wellborn and Burkhead
note that, "Perhaps the most important change (as a result of the Johnson administration)
was the enlarged scope and penetration of national power. A multitude of
intergovernmental programs were enacted that thrust the national government into much
closer and more intimate involvement in the operations of subnational governments"
(1989: 1).
If faith in the states was shaken by their unresponsiveness, it was not abandoned.
Rather than seek to remove the states altogether (Wright and Stenberg, forthcoming), the
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norm was to attempt to reframe traditional federalism, allowing for more interaction
between the nation and states and, interestingly, the nation and local governments. For
example, Martin (1965) rebuked the states and called the relationship between the nation
and local governments "the expanded partnership" (109). The need to reframe the new
relationship in a palatable way, to not stir up controversy in an already "tense and
pressurized. . . period" was recognized by scholars (Wright and Stenberg, forthcoming).
Nevertheless, the American people, unconcerned about the implications of modified
relationships, called for national aid. Abrams writes:
The people don't give a damn about 'intergovernmental
relations.' It smacks of the excuse for inaction. The people
want bread, not excuses. The people want jobs, not
intergovernmental explanations. The people want
opportunity for their children, not intergovernmental
expiations of guilt. (1969: 378)
While there have certainly been benefits in the nation's intervention as America
has sought to find solutions to urban ills, it is the state's responsibility, under federalism,
to respond to their local governments and their citizens. The American Assembly asserts:
"By virtue of their position, state governments possess the power, and the obligation, to
attack all of those problems which in sum equal the urban crisis" (1970: 3).
At the same time, in a federal democracy, policies and governance should be
rooted in local liberty allowing:
individuals in small civil communities to participate
together in defining and addressing their common needs
and aspirations and, thereby, to learn how to express their
self-interest - as rightly, rather than wrongly or selfishly,
understood - in ways that defend individual liberty and
republican citizenship against the atomizing, enervating
effects of a mass democracy driven toward centralization
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and uniform legislation by popular clamoring for equality.
(Kincaid, 1999: 211)
Liberty, as viewed by Tocqueville, requires a level of human freedom that cannot be
achieved under the domination of a strong central government (Kincaid, 1999). That said,
there are a number of problems associated with too much localism. Local governments
have, historically, been proven unwilling or, more likely, unable to deal with the
problems associated with urbanization. If local governments cannot, and state
governments cannot or will not solve the problems associate with urbanization (or any
other pressing problem), should the national government step in? Perhaps the modem
nature of federalism then is to find the power balance that will ensure just uniformity
while allowing states and local governments to operate with the greatest degree of
discretion possible.
Our system of federalism provides a stratified structure that insinuates divisions
of power and responsibility between the states and the federal government. Over time,
that separation has been alternately weakened, marbled, and reasserted, depending on
national leadership and immediate need. Local governments, the root of liberty, have
ridden the wave of federalism, gaining and losing powers with the ebb and flow of
federal involvement and state empowerment.
Today, the status of state and local power is not easily defined. On one hand there
seems to be a trend toward devolution - state to local devolution (Staeheli, Kodras, and
Flint, 1997) and the, perhaps, chimaera of nation to state devolution; on the other hand
there seems to be a shoring up of national control via legislation, mandates, preemptions,
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and conditions of grant funding. At the same time, there are ongoing urban problems that
cannot be, or have not been, adequately addressed under existing governance structures.
When we speak of the role of the national, state, and local governments in solving
regional problems, it is important to understand the history and magnitude of
urban/regional issues and the past attempts of the varying levels of government to resolve
them. The following chapter discusses the history and causes of urbanization and its
associated problems as well as the need for citizen involvement in the formulation and
implementation of regional solutions.
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CHAPTER 3: URBANIZATION AND ITS PROBLEMS

This research studies the impact of the federal government on matters of regional
importance. It is impossible to faithfully discuss regionalism without examining the
primary cause of regional issues: urbanization and sprawl. While urban centers and their
suburbs have long been treated as two separate areas, each with its own problems to be
solved independently of one another, regionalism seeks to foster coordination between
these and other contiguous areas in an effort to solve urban problems and position the
entire region as a player in the global economy (Wheeler, 2002). In this chapter,
urbanization and its problems is explored to provide the foundation for our later
discussion of regionalism.
Urban problems are no longer thought of as belonging to a core city, no more than
sprawl is thought of as a problem belonging to the suburbs (Rusk, 1993, 1999; Peirce,
1993; Downs, 1994; Wallis, 1994; Cisneros, 1995; Walker, 1995; Foster, 1997; Orfield,
1997; Barnes and Ledebur, 1998; Lindstrom, 1998). Rather, the connection between a
region's component jurisdictions has been brought into relief as "twenty-five years of
'benign neglect', in terms of both urban and social policy, have exacted a very real
historical cost on metropolitan America" (Mitchell-Weaver et al, 2000: 851). Scholars
call for federal and state intervention to "reinforce local moves in the direction of
regional co-operation and consolidation" (851). A strong front has been forged in
academia and a variety of think-tanks to promote intergovernmental strategies (e.g. Katz,
1994; Orfield, 1998; Brennan and Hill, 1999; Brookings Institution, 1998; Ford
Foundation, 1999; US HUD, 1999; Immergluck, 1999; Katz and Allen, 1999; American
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Planning Association, 2000; Mitchell-Weaver et al, 2000) to address the problems
associated with urbanism, problems that blossomed in the mid-1900s.

After World War II, middle- and upper-income families steadily migrated from
central cities to outlying suburban areas. At the same time, poorer people from rural areas
were migrating into metropolitan areas, generally to central cities; where they chose to
reside depended largely on economic class. As a result, suburbs experienced grand-scale
economic growth and central cities declined (Saffell and Basehart, 2005: 17- 19).
In 1950, only about 25% of the total population lived in our nation's suburbs
compared to the 50% who reside in them today. Also, in 1950, there were 150
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) in the United States and 56% of America's
population lived in them (National Research Council, 1999: 23-24). The Census Bureau
states that a county qualifies as an MSA if it contains a city with a population of 50,000
or more or if it contains an urbanized area of at least 50,000 in population and a total
metropolitan population of at least 100,000. By the year 2000, MSAs grew to number
353 with 80% of America's population residing in them (24). Since 1980, nearly 90% of
America's population growth has occurred in the nation's forty largest metropolitan areas
(24).
This exodus is widely accepted as the origins of the ongoing economic blight that
continues to burden many central cities (see, for instance, Ross and Levine, 1996; Vogel,
1997; Rusk, 1999). Causes for ongoing urban problems include governmental
fragmentation, continued sprawl, fiscal and socioeconomic "disparities between
metropolitan centers and their outlying settlement clusters" (Mitchell-Weaver et al, 2000:
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851), and competition between core cities and their suburbs (2000). Resulting urban
issues have manifested in the form of air, water, and land pollution; increased crime rates;
disparities in quality of education; a persistent racial divide; traffic congestion; and the
rapid consumption of open spaces, to name only a few persistent problems (Saffell and
Basehart, 2005). Ross and Levine list metropolitan issues: 1) "racial imbalance," 2)
"income and resource imbalance," 3) "the protection of privilege," 4) "increased business
power," 5) exploitation of central cities by suburbs, 6) "problems of housing affordability
and homelessness," 7) poor land use planning and environmental impacts, 8) "problems
in service provision" resulting from a denial of economies of scale (1996: 310-13). Peirce
mentions loss of low skilled jobs, declining wages, increased dependency on welfare,
"large neighborhoods of the abject poor," minorities with "little stake in the present
system," dilapidated housing, "waves of homelessness, AIDS, the carnage of street- level
gunfights for drug turf' (1993: 20). Mark Hughes, in a lecture at the Woodrow Wilson
School of Public and International Affairs, said: "There are levels of depopulation in
urban America that on other continents would require war, famine, or pestilence" (1992).
Academics have written that central cities have been unable to deal with the "dire
state of things" (Peirce, 1993: 21) for a number of reasons including:
Cities' narrow geographic limits; racism and white flight; new
technology making it easier for businesses to operate in remote
locations; shriveling tax bases; inefficient, politically manipulated
city workers. . . state and federal governments' indifference to urban
social renewal. . . (and the loss of) positive role models (for city
youth). (Peirce, 1993: 21)
Neil Peirce writes of urban decline in his book, Citistates. Citing Hartford,
Connecticut as an example of the problems that affect central cities, Peirce reports:
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Each morning thousands of suburbanites drive to the insurance
company towers of downtown Hartford, befouling the city's air
and using city streets and resources. Each evening they retreat,
taking with them the income to support their safe and prosperous
towns. (1993: 19)
While suburban areas are often thought self-sufficient--hence, relegating central city
problems to their city govemments--there is evidence that a connection exists between
central cities and their suburbs (e.g. Peirce, 1993; Ledebur and Barnes, 1993; Voith,
1992; Savitch and Vogel, 1993; Rusk, 1999).
Peirce describes the conditions in Hartford Connecticut and finishes by saying,
"Hartford does not, of course, live apart from its region" (1993: 19). Understanding the
connection between the component parts of a region is an expanded view that has been
difficult to sustain, but is necessary for the long-term health and vitality of all. In other
words, it behooves the jurisdictions that surround a declining central city to pay attention
to that city's demise and work together for the common good of all. The belief is that the
health and vitality of the metropolitan region is one that depends on the vitality of all of
its parts (Ledebur and Barnes, 1993). The extent to which that economic connection
exists varies in the research, as do prescriptions for action (Ledebur and Barnes, 1993;
Voith, 1992; Savitch and Vogel, 1993; Rusk, 1999; Glastris, 1992; Ostrom, 1971, to
name a few). Nevertheless, cooperation between central cities and their suburbs remains,
at best, piecemeal, largely due to the real political and priority differences from one
jurisdiction to the next (e.g. Bollens, 1997; Norris, 2001; Olberding, 2002).
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The Role of Citizen Participation

If citizens are paying attention to government at all they are certainly not
regionally focused. Rather, few citizens see the big picture - the region, the state, a group
of states, the nation - and where they fit into that larger community (Peirce, 1993).
Instead, citizens tend to think in terms of the layer of government that is closest to them,
the one that provides the most immediate services and programs (Gray and Eisinger,
1997; Norris, 2001). And rather than view government as a vehicle for societal good,
citizens experience government in terms of "allocations" and lengthy waits in line; they
see themselves as "customers" or "taxpayers," ultimately leading to "a sense of isolation
and discontent" (King and Stivers, 1998: 57).
Political philosophers like John Stuart Mill and Alexis de
Tocqueville argued that one of the chief benefits of direct
citizen involvement in government was that ordinary
people would come to see how their own lives were
interwoven with the lives and fortunes of others and be able
to raise their sights from what they themselves received
from government to the overall good of the community.
When people think of themselves as consumers or
taxpayers and have no say in how things are decided, there
is little prompting for them to take the high road and put the
public interest ahead of their own private wants. (57)
This narrow focus is a problem for regionalism because regionalism requires, demands,
one to acknowledge the condition and needs of the greater community (Rusk, 1993,
1999). Therein lies so much of the difficulty in forming lasting voluntary regional
partnerships. Folks in the suburbs cannot see their connectedness to the central city.
Citizens of one jurisdiction cannot grasp why water pollution two jurisdictions away
affects them, or why they need to be concerned about the economic hardships of their
neighboring jurisdictions (Peirce, 1993). Because of this, generating the political will to
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establish voluntary regional partnerships is highly problematic (Peirce, 1993; Rusk, 1993)
people simply cannot see how regional issues relate to them (Lyons and Engstrom, 1973;
Lyons and Scheb, 1998).
Nevertheless, any attempt to ease the pains of urbanization will likely fail without
citizen participation and a high level of citizen buy-in during the decision-making process
(Ross and Levine, 2001). With buy-in and citizen involvement, hard political decisions,
such as revenue sharing agreements between two jurisdictions with large economic
differences, will be shared with citizen participants, rather than shouldered by one
politician who is dependent on a silent constituency for continued support. Since regional
cooperation relies on voluntary cooperation and regional partnerships are known to be
difficult to achieve and sustain (e.g. Rusk, 1993; Olberding, 2002: 482), citizens must be
educated on the need for regionalism and should be made to feel as though they are part
of the on-going process (King and Stivers, 1998: 12-18).
Efforts to discover a decision-making method that finds traction in the solving of
urban problems have been many (see, for instance, Bennett, 1990; Rebrenovic, 1996;
Thompson, 1996-1997; King and Stivers, 1998; Ross and Levine, 2001). Citizen
participation has moved beyond the age of placation when "local officials. . . pursued
citizen participation only to the extent necessary to appease local communities" or when
bureaucrats sought citizen participation "to satisfy federal guidelines" (Ross and Levine,
2001: 197). . Today, most politicians and academics believe that citizen involvement is not
only important but also necessary to a democratic society and the "dissatisfaction of
aggrieved publics has led to a search for new techniques for citizen involvement in
political and administrative decision making" (196-220).
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Interestingly, the 1970s, grants-in-aid programs required a high degree of citizen
participation. "By the late 1970s, 155 of the nearly 500 federal grant programs available
to state and local governments required some form of citizen participation; these 155
programs accounted for over 80% of federal grant expenditures in fiscal year 1977"
(Lipsky, 1976: 198-201). Conservatism from the late 1970s throughout the 1980s meant
less money for states and cities which ultimately resulted in a decline in citizen
participation (198). Without the money to respond to citizens' demands, fewer
municipalities asked for input (198). Why ask if you cannot properly respond?
Nevertheless, citizen participation has survived. "Most of the citizen participation
requirements" remain in "federal aid programs" and many cities have active citizen
participation in local politics (198-199). The extent and type of participation vary.
It is important to note that the mode of citizen participation is extremely important
(Arnstein, 1969; Conner, 1988). Federal requirements to engage in citizen participation as
a condition of grant funding can, in fact, act as a limitation on meaningful participation.
In other words, if grant recipients are limited to certain forms of participation (i.e. public
meetings or published notices), and if they are told how to use the products of that
participation, then they will follow those requirements and prescriptions rather than
searching for more meaningful modes of interaction with their citizens. Before discussing
more meaningful modes of interaction, it should be noted that, no matter what form
participation takes, "a way of making a decision. . . is of no use when a decision has
already been made" (Mathews, 1994: 182). Federal requirements that serve as conditions
of grant funding oftentimes reduce the world of possibilities such that real choices are
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limited and information gathered through public participation is rendered
inconsequential.
Sherry Arnstein (1969) writes that citizen participation goes beyond educating
and even consulting with the public, as education may come too late for citizen input and
citizen opinions gathered through surveys, meetings, and hearings can be ignored.
Arnstein situated these and other types of citizen participation onto a ladder by which one
can evaluate participation's meaningfulness (1969: 216) and that ladder is presented here
in Figure 3.1. In Amstein's levels 1 and 2, the public is informed to suit the needs of the
governmental entity, and to soothe the fears and grumbling of the citizenry. In levels 3, 4,
and 5, citizens are brought into meetings where information and advice is collected, but
citizens have no power to ensure their influence. It is only in levels 6, 7, and 8 that real
citizen participation is experienced (Arnstein, 1969). Meaningful participation includes
an element of power that is shared with local officials, delegated in specific program
areas to a citizen board, or given as final authority over program areas for ultimate
decision-making and allocation of resources (Ross and Levine, 2001, 199-202).
Desmond Conner offered a response to Amstein's ladder. His ladder, based on
cooperation rather than confrontation (the prevailing relationship between citizens and
bureaucrats in the 1960s), "advocates joint problem solving and effective service
provision . . . Hence, today, citizen participation often emphasizes education, information,
consultation, feedback, joint planning, and mediation" (1988: 202). Movement beyond
education, information, and consultation to include feedback, joint planning, and
mediation is movement toward more meaningful citizen participation (202).
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Figure 3.1: Arnstein's Ladder of Participation

Dating from ancient Greece, there has been a general agreement that citizen
participation is important (Kagan, 1987), but it is also hard to obtain (Dye, 2005).
Nevertheless, in solving the problems of urbanization, we need to consider how to
meaningfully involve citizens in the decisions that will be implemented in our regions. If
citizens are to accept the policies that are intended to control and solve the problems of
urbanization, they must have access to education, information, consultation, and they
must be allowed and encouraged to offer feedback, and be involved in planning and
mediation.

The problems associated with urbanization continue in spite of decades of
research and attempts to mitigate urban issues. While "most academic research . . . has
limited itself to describing the dire state of things" (Peirce, 1993 : 21) in our urban areas,
some solutions have been proffered (e.g. Bish and Ostrom, 1973 ; Greer, 1 962; Frieden,
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1966; Zimmerman, 1972; Willbem, 1974; Kolter; 1969; Altshuler, 1970). Regionalism
first arose as a solution to urbanization in 1920s (Wheeler, 2002). But it was not until the
1950s that regionalism began to find recognition - via grant funding and/or mandated
regional coordination - by the national government. National recognition of regionalism
reached a peak in the 1960s and 1970s, only to fall out of favor in the 1980s with changes
in federal grants programs (Atkins and Wilson-Gentry, 1992; Grigsby, 1996; Lester and
Lombard, 1997; Wheeler, 2002). Because regionalism is once again gaining ground in
the literature, it is the focus of the following chapters; the history of regionalism and its
structural vehicle, the council of government (COG), is explored along with the role of
the federal government in the regionalism of the 1970s.
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CHAPTER 4: TRADITONAL REGIONALISM AND COGS

In this chapter we explore the early motivations and attempts to achieve regional
cooperation. Because this research suggests that federal funding is the cause for the
reemergence of regionalism in the 1990s, and because federal funding played a major
role in the formation and decline of the early COG, we explore the history of early
regionalism and COGs in this chapter. This historical perspective serves to help us
understand the role of the federal government in the rise of today's regionalism and
provides perspective regarding the precarious position in which today's councils are
situated with their elevated dependence on federal funding. Wheeler (2002) provides a
summary of eras in regional planning and coordination. His eras and historical
perspectives are presented in Table 4.1.
Early Regionalism

From the 1920s, planners and city officials have sought formalized ways to
manage the negative externalities associated with burgeoning metropolitan areas and
segregated economic classes (Wheeler, 2002). Called ecological regionalism, this early
regionalism came in two perspectives: regionalist (Geddes, 1915/1949; Mumford, 1925,
1938; Sussman, 1976) and metropolitanist (Fishman, 2000). Regionalist thinkers focused
on urban decentralization "from a holistic and normative approach" while metropolitanist
thinkers held "the dominant establishment view (focusing) on pragmatic metropolitan
improvements" (Wheeler, 2002: 268). While early efforts are considered failed (Fishman,
2000), resulting in "disastrous urban renewal and public housing programs . . . (and)
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Table 4.1: Historical Eras and Perspectives of Regionalism
Era
Ecological regionalism
(early 20th century)

Key Figures
Geddes, Howard, Mumford,
MacKaye

Characteristics

Regional science (late 1940s
to present)

Isard, Alonzo, Friedmann

Neo-Marxist regional
economic geography (late
1960s to present)

Harvey, Castells, Massey,
Sassen

Developed analysis of power and social
movements within the region.

Public choice regionalism
( 1 960s to present; most
dominant in the 1980s)

Tiebout, Ostrom, Gordon,
Richardson

Analyzed region in terms of a free-market
version of neo-classical economics.

New regionalism

Calthorpe, Rusk, Downs,
Yaro, Hiss, Orfield, Katz,
Pastor

Concerned with the environment and
equity as well as economic development.
Focused on specific regions and the
problems of postmodern metropolitan
landscapes.

Concerned with groblems of the
overcrowded 1 9 -century industrial city.
Tried to balance city and countryside.
Relatively holistic, normative, and place
oriented approach.
Emphasized regional economic
development, quantitative analysis, and
social science methods.

Source: Adaptedfrom Wheeler, 2002.

help(ing) to create unforeseen problems with urban sprawl" (Wheeler, 2002: 268), later
efforts were more successful, although "success . . . has been mixed" (Grigsby, 1996: 53).
Wheeler notes that after World War II, economists and social scientists became
involved in regional planning, shifting the focus from one entirely centered on "questions
of urban form and physical planning toward concerns with regional economic
geography'' (268). This influence led to the use of "quantitative tools to explore economic
aspects of regional development" (268). Major thinkers of this perspective, called
regional science, looked at regional problems as primarily those of "resources and
economic development" (Friedmann, 1964: 497) and the need for regional planning to
further better economic ends (Isard, 1975 ; Friedmann and Alonso, 1961).
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The rise in Marxist regionalism coincided with the emergence of "regional
environmental agencies and initiatives" (Wheeler, 2002: 268). Marxist regionalism (e.g.,
Castells, 1 977; Harvey, 1 973) injected the notion of "power and social dynamics to
analyses of regional economic development" (268) into the regional science discipline. It
was about the same period of time (the 1 960s) that regional councils were established to
"provide at least a minimum of regional coordination" (268). Yet another discipline,
public choice (e.g., Tiebout, 1 956; Ostrom et al, 1 961 ), emerged to rationalize

"fragmentation of political authority within metropolitan regions on grounds of providing
individuals with a choice of tax and service levels in different jurisdictions" (269). This
approach adopts a hands-off, "laissez-faire" stance requiring "no ameliorative or remedial
action" to address the "intra-metropolitan inequities, central city decline, and negative
externalities" (Norris, 2001 : 568) associated with urbanization and sprawl.

Councils of Government

Urban planners and city officials have attempted to manage the provision of
infrastructure in the face of rapid population growth in a variety of ways, but councils of
governments (COGs) would become the central vehicle for regional planning and
coordination in the 1 960s and 1 970s (Wickstrom, 1 977; Atkins and Wilson-Gentry, 1 992;
Grigsby, 1 996; Mitchell-Weaver et al, 2000). The acceptance and success of early COGs
varied; most of the controversy surrounded the institutional form that regional
coordination should take (e.g., Barlow, 1 991 ; Coulter, 1 967; Danielson and Doig, 1 982;
Jones, 1 942; Savitch and Vogel, 1 996; Self, 1 982; Wood, 1 961). Early COG leaders had
to rely on consensus building to carry out their organization's mission as they had only
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the authority given them by their members (Atkins and Wilson-Gentry, 1992).
Additionally, GOG participation was voluntary, and the relatively affluent, ever
expanding suburbs were unwilling or unable to appreciate the impact that their success
had on the central cities (1992) - a reality that persists to this day (e.g. Bollens, 1997;
Norris, 2001; Olberding, 2002; Kelly and Riverstone, 2002). This dynamic changed in
the 1960s with the introduction of federal incentives that afforded COGs the necessary
authority and funding to formulate region-wide solutions for a variety of problems
(Grigsby, 1997). The historical eras of the COG are presented below, in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2: Life and Power Cycle of Regional Councils of Governments
Number of
Source of
Strength
Era
Focus
Strength
COGs
Fewer than 50 Very weak
1 940s - 1 950s
Contracts with Infrastructure
local
and problems
governments;
with rapid
growth
service fees
1 960s - 1 970s

669 ( 1976)

Strong to
Very Strong

Federal
Government

Equity and Urban
decline

1 980s

Gradual
Decline

Weak

States;
Contracts with
local
governments;
Service fees

Varied according
to state goals niche needs

1 990s - Today

550 ( 1 99 1 )
reduced to
450+ (today);
653 -including
MPOs (NARC,
2003)

Weak to strong
and possibly
gaining strength

Federal grants,
States, Service
Fees

Urban sprawl,
regional
economic
development eye on regional
competition

Source: Compiledfrom Atkins and Wilson-Gentry, 1992; Grigsby, 1997; Wheeler, 2002.
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The Formalization of COG Powers

Several pieces of legislation passed by Congress constituted the federal incentives
that led to the rise in COG power. Highway planning was moved from a local to a
regional scale with the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962 (Wikstrom, 1977). COGs
received sizeable funding to perform studies in the development of regional plans through
Section 701(g) of the Housing and Urban Development Act (1965). The Demonstration
Cities and Metropolitan Act (DCMA, 1966) gave many COGs the authority to review
applications for federal funding "for a wide variety of programs" (Wikstrom, 1977: 39).
It was Section 204 of the DCMA that had the greatest impact of the several
council-related acts passed during the 1960s (Wikstrom, 1977). This Section required that
local funding applications for nearly 40 federal programs first pass COG review
(Wikstrom, 1977: 41). This review requirement situated the COG in a powerful position
as it not only designed the regional plan, but it also determined whether local funding
applications were consistent with it (41). The array of programs subject to COG approval
included "airports, highways, hospitals, libraries, open-space land projects, sewerage
facilities and waste-treatment plants, transportation facilities, water-development and
land-conservation projects, and water-supply-and-distribution facilities" (41). Clearly, the
COG had moved into a power position and local governments were given equally
powerful incentives to establish and participate in regional efforts.

Regionalism in the 1970s - Top Down Authority

As a result of 1968's Intergovernmental Cooperation Act and OMB's A-95 grant
review procedures, nearly 100 federal programs required COG approval as a pre49

condition for grant funding by the -early 1970s (Wallis, 1994). Tying funds to regional
cooperation and planning contributed to a proliferation of new councils and changes in
mission for many of the existing councils. In 1950, fewer than 50 regional councils
existed in the United States; by 1976, there were 669 (Grigsby, 1996; Lester and
Lombard, 1998). Many single-purpose councils evolved to take on multi-service roles in
order to get in on the action (Wallis, 1994; Grigsby, 1996). Other COGs were absorbed
into larger organizations charged with coordinating regional land-use and economic
development (ACIR, 1973-4; Grigsby, 1996).
The expansion of COGs' formal authority meant greater demands on COG
leadership as they, on the one hand, had to satisfy federal agencies while, on the other
hand, had to maintain good working relationships with their constituencies, the local
governments in their regions (Lester and Lombard, 1998). State governments were very
often excluded from regional efforts. Excluded states were understandably upset that
federally funded regional bodies were developing plans that had substantial state-wide
impacts; a condition that raised some legitimate constitutional questions under federalism
(Lester and Lombard, 1998). On the local level, leaders had mixed feelings about the
expanded role of COGs. "While a few were supportive, others believed that regional
policies were implemented at the expense of the local constituency, or that important
local goals and agendas were being neglected for federal policy goals" (Riverstone and
Kelly, forthcoming). Nevertheless, federal grant funding proved too great a draw to
decline participation for the sake of these concerns.
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The Waning of Power: COGS in the 1 980s and Early 1 990s
Beginning with the Nixon administration, and blossoming with the Reagan
administration, was a position of official disinterest in regionalism leading to a
reemergence of state power in local-regional planning and development decisions.
Emphasizing the importance of state and local control in the provision of public services,
Reagan fundamentally restructured federal project grants. The Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act (198 1 ) eliminated 59 categorical grant programs. The many programs
were then combined into nine state-administered block grants (Lester and Lombard,
1 998: 1 45). "The responsibility for regional planning remained with the councils but the
power of the purse strings shifted to the states, which now set standards for block grant
recipients consistent with state, rather than federal, priorities" (Riverstone and Kelly,
forthcoming).
How states responded to their reclaimed authority varied. Some chose to facilitate
regional planning and cooperation; in a few cases COGs were given even greater funding
and authority than before (Lester and Lombard, 1998: 1 47). Most grant programs gave
states the option to decline participation in intergovernmental review, that is,
participation with regional COGs (Grigsby, 1996). By 1992, ten states had exercised that
option, a clear indication that the COG had fallen out of favor (Grigsby, 1996).
Although most COGs survived the decade after devolution, they were
fundamentally changed. Changes were, in large part, the result of their previous
dependence on federal funding leading to staff reductions and even changed missions
after devolution (55). "Too much reliance on federal funding . . . proved to be the
(A)chilles heel of regional councils" (55). While federal dollars comprised up to 75% of
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COG revenue in 1977, federal revenue to COGs fell to 45% by 1988 (Hartman, 1989).
Over the same period, federal programs that supported regionalism fell from 48 to 1 3
(Atkins and Wilson-Gentry, 1992). In order to survive, some revenue-starved COGs
changed their objectives to conform to state priorities. Others selected local niche needs
for which they would charge fees for the provision of services. Still others simply folded
(Atkins and Wilson-Gentry, 1992). By 199 1 , the number of COGs still in operation had
dropped 1976's high of 669 to 529 (Grigsby, 1996).
Changes in mission that occurred in 1980s mimic the original COGs' missions as
conceptualized by the planners of the 1950s (Atkins and Wilson-Gentry, 1992). Early
COGs survived by filling previously unmet region-specific needs. The federal incentives
of the 1960s encouraged COGs to coordinate the development of their region's physical
infrastructure while reducing the negative effects of rapid metropolitan growth.
Responding to cuts in federal support, regional councils that had once concentrated on
comprehensive planning efforts found that diversification of activities was, once again,
the path to survival (Grigsby, 1996).
Additionally, the bedrock of the local economy shifted during the 1980s as
businesses moved into the suburbs. New industries chose suburban areas for development
rather than central cities. This was no small shift. Most metropolitan growth in the 1980s
took place outside the central city (55). Unfortunately, regional policies that were
developed to alleviate the pressure proved politically unacceptable. Of these policies,
Swanstrom writes: " . . . (they) were basically redistributive: taxpayers as a whole, mostly
suburbanites, were asked to fund programs that would primarily benefit central cities"
(2001 : 480). The redistributive nature of the policies often made them a poor fit with their
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states as they are, by and large, unwilling to mitigate urban problems through state
funded programs (Peterson, 1995). "In time, it became exceedingly difficult for local,
state, and even federal officials to rally for the revitalization of the central city, as
suburban living and development had taken over the economy and gained the position of
dominant constituent base" (Riverstone and Kelly, forthcoming). This lack of central city
support played a role in the decline of the COG and continues to play a role in today's
regional efforts.
In response, COGs geared their missions to the needs of their sprawled
population. Now largely stripped of their power, COGs found themselves working at the
pleasure of their states (Atkins and Wilson-Gentry, 1992). Executive Order 12372
allowed COGs, if the states chose, "to serve as state-designated Clearinghouses . . . to
assure better coordination of federally assisted projects and to stimulate
intergovernmental cooperation in planning and development activities" (Henderson,
1990: 107). Other roles taken by COG leaders included the preparation of regional plans
and regional databases (107). Some took on state lobby activities and contract and
membership services, as needs arose (Grigsby, 1996: 55). COG missions in the 1980s and
early 1990s became region-specific, a circumstance which led them to be described by
one observer as "just another layer of bureaucracy" (Henderson, 1990: 107).

Regional Councils Today

Scholarly and applied interest in regionalism during (and since) the 1990s has not
included the role of regional councils. In fact, scholarly interest in regional councils all
but ended with the 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act and the consequent waning
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of COGs' formal powers. As a result, little has been written on COGs in the past 15
years, despite their experience and potential future role as the coordinating bodies for
regional efforts.
There is very little present-day literature on COGs, especially literature that
describes current missions and roles within the regional framework. One exception is a
survey that was sent to a random sample of COG directors to determine what today's
COGs are doing, to discover if existing COGs are the survivors of early regional
partnerships, and to ascertain directors' opinions on how their COGs have changed and
adapted to those changes over time (Kelly and Riverstone, 2002). It should be noted that
the Kelly and Riverstone research did not include MPOs, the "poster child" of the new
regionalism (Savitch et al, 1993; Downs, 1996; Peirce, 1993; Rusk, 1993; Orfield, 1997;
Cisneros, 1995; Lewis, 1998) as MPOs were not added to the National Association of
Regional Councils' roster until 2003, presumably in response to their growing role in
regional economic development and coordination.
Kelly and Riverstone's data revealed that today's councils are survivors of the
earlier regionalism movement as each was established as a traditional COG; all but one of
their survey respondents were created before the 1980s (2002). Today's COG continues
to frame its mission with the overarching tenets of regionalism and COG directors report
that stabilization of growth and equal distribution of public services between the central
city and suburbs remains their greatest economic and political challenge. Supporting
Atkins and Wilson-Gentry's (1992) earlier findings, Kelly and Riverstone found that the
shift in the sphere of influence from the federal to state governments has prompted COGs
to look for ways to deal with urban problems that do not involve large-scale regional
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solutions with redistributive effects. Rather, "many COGs have shifted their activities
away from region-wide planning and coordination to planning for a limited number of
programs and services- in some cases a single service" (Riverstone and Kelly,
forthcoming). This narrowing of focus hearkens back to the role of the early pre
empowered COG (Grigsby, 1996). Both the early COG and today's COG have had to
specialize in single-purpose services or technical efforts such as transportation planning,
elderly services planning, environmental planning, or clearinghouse functions in order to
attract funding and support from their constituent governments (Kelly and Riverstone,
forthcoming).
These findings do not bode well for what many regional scholars have assumed to
be the solution to regional problems, that is, multi-jurisdictional cooperation to improve
the economic position of the region by focusing on what is often its weakest link, the
central cities (Lennard, et al, 1997; Rusk, 1999; Ledebur and Barnes, 1993; Savitch, et
al., 1993). Because most economic growth continues to occur in the suburbs, and local
governments have supported (or, at the very least, not managed) this growth, council
priorities have focused on the needs surrounding expansion (Riverstone and Kelly, 2002).
As a result, the issues that plague our central cities remain under-addressed.
States remain in control of local economic growth and development policy, both
by their acts of commission (i.e., annexation laws, unfriendly requirements for
consolidation) and acts of omission (restrictions on growth, limitations on incentives to
new business, regional development revenue-sharing programs) (Norris, 2001). Still,
states and local elected officials have the potential to foment change within their spheres
of authority. Unfortunately, local officials often lack clarity in the benefits of regional
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economic cooperation, especially when they are asked to help sustain the central city
economy with no immediate benefit to their suburban town (Bollens, 1997). Moreover,
urban issues occur in an environment where state actors have little interest in making
long-term, costly investments in central city revitalization and where no federal
requirements force the relatively affluent suburbs to consider the impact of their growth
decisions on the central city (Riverstone and Kelly, 2002). Nevertheless, despite these
political barriers, there is evidence that regionalism is experiencing a revival. If states,
local officials, and even citizens do not see the necessity for regional cooperation, what is
driving this revival?
With the decline in regionalism, urban issues continued to mount. By the 1990s,
regionalism reemerged in the literature as well as in reality with an increase in numbers
of councils. Mitchell-Weaver (2000) cites three reasons for the rebound:
1.
2.
3.

The socioeconomic and fiscal disparities between urban centers and their
outlying areas had "reached a critical level" and demographic trends
promised things would only get worse.
Global economic competition threatened the economic base of c_entral
cities while suburbs and edge cities enjoyed new investments and
industrial growth.
Urban sprawl was undermining the "sustainability of the physical
environment of large urban communities" (851).

To address these and other problems, the new regionalism emerged in the literature
supporting the reformation of regional councils, or the re-use of existing councils, to
promote regional, rather than single jurisdiction, fragmented, solutions. To overcome the
political impediments to regional cooperation, the new regionalism calls for voluntary
cooperation where partners are equal actors. This research suggests that "voluntary"
cooperation is occurring, but because states and their regions are choosing to cooperate in
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order to qualify for federal funding, the federal government is introduced as a partner oftentimes a dominant partner. If a state's involvement with the federal government is
truly voluntary then it poses no problem under federalism. But if states are forced into a
partnership by grant conditions attached to large funding programs that cannot be
refused, such as transportation dollars, then the so-called voluntary partnership leans
heavily in the national government's favor (Derthick, 1970; Posner, 1998). This research
suggests that through mandates as conditions of grant funding and programmatic
prescriptions, the federal government has once again emerged as a powerful player in
regionalism calling into question the status of federalism. This research further suggests
that it was the implementation of new funding opportunities that led to the rise in the new
regionalism, much like it led to the rise in empowered councils of the 1970s. The
following chapter offers a discussion of the new regionalism and its variant disciplines,
the current theory supporting the need for regional solutions to urban problems.
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CHAPTER 5: NEW REGIONALISM AND THE 1990s: COOPERATIVE
GOVERNANCE?
Regionalism has been on the rise since the early 1990s. In an attempt to breathe
life back into intergovernmental cooperation, "scholars and advocates of the new
regionalism school have written a number of works calling for the creation of new forms
of regional governance in American metropolitan areas" (Norris, 2001: 1). New
regionalist scholars believe that urban problems will continue to spiral without some form
of regional coordination; the body of suggestions regarding approach generally falls
under the title 'new regionalism' as "these authors appear to have essentially the same
purposes in mind" (2001: 1). The commonality is that nearly all have the singular goal of
"shift(ing) the case of urban policy from the unstable terrain of values like equity and
fairness to the solid rock of economic self-interest" (Swanstrom, 2001: 480).
Stephen Wheeler noted that as of 2002, new regionalism had not been
systematically examined or defined (267). Norris also noticed the dearth of "explicit
definitions of regional governance" (2001: 559). In response to this lack of definition,
both Norris and Wheeler set out to explore the many ways in which new regionalism had
manifest. In the end, Wheeler's analysis of recent literature and recent planning
movements confirms Norris's (2001) contention that new regionalism is more than one
approach to solve the problems associated with urbanization; rather, it incorporates a
variety of approaches under the umbrella of new regionalism (2002).
Included in these approaches is the more spatially oriented variety, such as the
new urbanism, wherein movements such as smart growth, livable communities, and
sustainable development emerged. "In 1996, the CNU (Congress for the New Urbanism)
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members produced the Charter of the New Urbanism, which emphasized the need to
coordinate urban design changes at different scales, beginning with that of the
metropolitan region" (Wheeler, 2002: 269). Most planners of the new urbanism began by
focusing on growth management, later to be called "smart growth" (269). "Smart Growth
attempts to achieve the preservation and improvement of communities by conserving
manmade and natural resources, expanding the range of life choices, and regionalizing
decision making" (Jepson, forthcoming). This movement went national in the mid-1990s,
due in part to the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (1991) and its
successor, the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (1998; discussed later in
this chapter) (Wheeler, 2002). These Acts "helped catalyze more coordinated regional
planning by giving metropolitan planning organizations increased flexibility in funding
transit-supportive urban design and land use planning" (Wheeler, 2002: 269).
Normative arguments for regional policies include the need to focus on equity in
metropolitan regions. To that end, some have pushed for measures to equalize incomes
and tax disparities that often exist between central cities and their suburbs (Rusk, 1993;
Orfield, 1997). One solution was tax-sharing on a regional level (Altshuler et al, 1999),
not a politically popular offering. As an alternate solution, Rusk pushed for metropolitan
consolidation (1993), also not a popular choice. Whatever the solution, "a central thread
in new regionalist literature is that regional reforms will improve the economic
competitiveness of regions in the global economy. Ultimately, therefore, they are in
everybody's economic interest - from poor ghetto dwellers to wealthy suburbanites"
(Swanstrom, 2001: 480).
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Related, are the economic arguments for regional coordination. Central city and
suburb interdependency became part of the literature with Ledebur and Bames's (1993)
work, "All in it Together." Focusing on the critical importance of the central city to the
health of the entire region, these writers and others called for policies that would favor
the vitality of the central city (Savitch et al, 1993; Voith, 1992).
Prescriptions for how any of this should occur abound. David B. Walker compiled
types of intergovernmental arrangements according to the "degree of difficulty in
initiating and managing them" (Mitchell-Weaver et al, 2000: 864). That list has been
reproduced in Table 5.1, below. Those forms of intergovernmental cooperation that fall
into the "relatively easy'' and "moderately difficult" categories are those that are most
frequently attempted, for obvious reasons: ''The easiest are informal, non-binding and
contractural arrangements, as well as federal or state encouraged or mandated co
ordination" (Mitchell-Weaver et al, 2000: 864).
What makes one solution easy and another difficult seems to be the extent to
which a local government has to relinquish autonomy and the extent to which their states
or the federal government are supportive of the effort. State and/or federal support can
remedy the "two unsolved problems (associated with cooperation). First, who is going to
carry out the agreement and, second, what happens if even one or more of the parties
reneges?" (Norris, 2001: 560). The most difficult intergovernmental arrangements on
Walker's list include the one-tier variety, in which local governments relinquish authority
to one formal regional government, an arrangement that is rare and with few exceptions
"has not happened and does not appear likely to occur in Metropolitan America" (561).
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Table 5.1: Forms of Intergovernmental Cooperation According to Political
Difficulty
Relatively easy

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Informal co-operation
Interlocal service agreements
Joint powers agreements
Extraterritorial powers
Regional councils of government (COGs)
Federally encouraged single-purpose districts
State planning and development districts
(SPDDs)
8. Contracting from private vendors

Moderately difficult
1. Local special districts
2. Transfer of functions
3. Annexation
4. Regional special districts and authorities
5. Metropolitan multipurpose districts
6. Reformed urban county
Very difficult
1. One-tier consolidation: city-county and area
wide consolidation
2. Two-tier restructuring: federal structures
3. Three-tier reform: metropolitan-wide structures
Source: Adaptedfrom Walker (1987: 16).
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New Regionalism in Theory

Rather than adopt a top-down approach to mandate solutions to normative issues,
as did the regionalism of the 1970s, the new regionalism (Calthorpe, 2001; Downs, 1994;
Markusen, 1995; Orfield, 1997; Pastor et al, 2000; Rosenbaum and Mermel, 1995; Rusk,
1993,1999; Savitch and Vogel, 2000; Swanstrom, 1995, 2001; Wallis, 1994; Wheeler,
2002; to name a few) is concerned with creating partnerships "between existing levels of
government" to address "environmental, equity, and economic goals" (Wheeler, 2002:
267). Hank Savitch and Ronald Vogel write that the issues central to the new regionalism
agenda "are related to fiscal disparities, social segregation, environmental problems,
economic expectations, and questions about the extent to which government should try to
address these issues" (2000: 158-168). The fragmentation that has plagued regions for
decades should be replaced by "a more robust regional governance . . . more democratic
and broader regionalism that would elevate the level of intergovernmental discussions,
overcome the distorting effects of single mandate regionalism, and integrate
environmental, social, and economic policies" (Boudreau and Keil, 2001: 1707).
However, these concerns are not addressed as issues "of efficiency and equity (but from
the primary rationale of) regional economic competitiveness" (Norris, 2001: 558). In
other words, the extent to which practitioners are focused on these issues at all is to
achieve competition, not out of normative concerns.
Few argue against the need for some sort of regional coordinating body to address
regional issues, yet many urban scholars agree that the new regionalism is problematic in
its institutional/structural prescriptions (Bollens, 1997; Savitch and Vogel, 2000; Norris,
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2001; Olberding, 2002; Riverstone and Kelly, forthcoming). According to the literature,
COG leaders are extremely challenged in this effort:
•
•
•

•

Fragmentation prevents the formation of a "larger vision or
strategy. "(Bollens, 1997: 118)
"Cooperation is not sufficient to achieve regional governance."
Members can, and do, walk away when issues are tough. (Norris,
2001: 559-561)
Members may make agreements that they will not ultimately be
responsible for keeping. By committing the next office to an
agreement, the agreement may be broken, tied up in renegotiations,
et cetera. (Ibid.)
Agreements that are reached in council meetings may not be
acceptable to folks at home. (Ibid.)

Clearly, a non-partisan third party organization is best situated to gamer the coordination
and consensus-building necessary to develop and maintain a regional partnership;
perhaps the surviving regional councils of government are suited for the job with their
long experience in consensus building. However, state and local government leaders balk
at the prospect of relinquishing decision-making authority to regional decision-makers
(Norris, 2001). To address these concerns, new regionalists have adopted the concept of
governance as opposed to government.
Governance "conveys the notion that existing institutions can be harnessed in new
ways, that cooperation can be carried out on a fluid and voluntary basis among localities,
and that people can best regulate themselves through horizontally linked organizations"
(Savitch and Vogel, 2000). Nevertheless, horizontally linked organizations with no
formalized authority are "long recognized" as difficult to "achiev(e) and sustain ... "
(Olberding, 2002: 482). Indeed, as Norris points out, a clear definition of what form new
regional governance should take has been noticeably absent from the literature (Norris,
2001). He claims that this absence serves new regionalists because "to define regional
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governance in terms of overarching area wide structures of government would be to
relegate it to the boneyard of regionalism because such structures are nearly impossible to
establish today" (Norris, 2001: 559).
In spite of the barriers to voluntary regional cooperation, something has, in some
cases, breathed life back into councils since the early 1990s. Where piecemeal activities
served as means to survival post-devolution, some councils are finding their services
welcomed in their regions today. There are a number of reasons why this may be so, and
identifying the impetus for regional cooperation is an important first step to
understanding when, why, and how vital councils have flourished while others have not.
The following two sections offer discussions on where regional efforts have been
successful and where they have failed. Reasons for their various successes and failures
are discussed, as well.

What Drives Regional Cooperation?

There are several theories regarding why local governments participate in regional
efforts. One theory is that past positive interactions between municipalities increase the
likelihood that future regional partnerships will occur (Ostrom, 1998). Ostrom's norms of
reciprocity indicate that positive interactions and acts are met with positive responses
leading to a relationship of trust (1998). The cycle continues until reciprocal acts develop
into norms of cooperation.
Cooperative norms between local governments, private industry, and the citizenry
can lead to successful regional partnerships (Olberding, 2002). Understandably, areas that
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have "fragmented and competing local governments" may find it "more difficult" to form
regional partnerships (488).
Another factor that drives regional partnership formation is unmet needs (Coe,
1992; Huggins, 1992) such as "high unemployment or the loss of a large number of jobs"
(Olberding, 2002: 482). Limited resources can bring local governments together to solve
region-wide issues (Ehrenhalt, 1995). Researchers have found that large economic
differences between cities indicate a need for a regional approach (Olberding, 1997;
Nunn and Rosentraub, 1996; Hershberg, Magidson, and Wernecke, 1992). However, and
certainly unfortunately, those very same differences make regional partnerships difficult
to establish and maintain (Peirce, 1993; Dye, 1964).
Henry Cisneros points out that regional collaboration, in the form of special
districts, has been most successful when dealing things-regionalism. Still, cooperation is
hard to maintain. Developing partnerships to deal with people-regionalism is even more
difficult (1995: 39-40). This concept is discussed in the following section.
In addition to these reasons for regional cooperation - norms of reciprocity and
cooperation, and local needs that cannot be addressed by individual governments (job
losses, pollution, transit programs, lack of resources) - it is apparent that federal
intervention through funding, mandates, and various incentives and disincentives have
had an enormous impact on the formation of regional plans and councils as well as on the
purposes that regional councils serve. Without compelling need or funding on the table,
regional councils quickly become cumbersome to local government leaders who, as
voluntary participants, have real political problems when cooperating in efforts that do
not directly and immediately benefit their constituencies.
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Justification for participation is greatly simplified when councils have no choice
(regulations or mandates) and can transfer the "monetary . . . (and) political costs" to the
federal level (Derthick, 1970: 202); when there is the potential to solve a pressing, unmet
need; or when there is funding to be gained or lost. In fact, when federal funding is on the
table, local leaders that do not participate become "vulnerable to criticism for failing to
act - for 'failing to take advantage of federal funds"' (202). Moreover, regional
partnerships that are driven and maintained with federal funding are more likely to
remain intact even after federal purposes are served as councils are directed to new
federal goals. But this relationship is potentially dangerous to regional efforts because, as
was evidenced by Reagan's devolution, councils that depend on the federal government
are susceptible to the ebb and flow of Congressional allocations, a tide that shifts with the
political wind (Grigsby, 1996). Key to all of these reasons for participation is the
common element of urgency. The element of urgency - whether generated by desired
funding, need, or mandate - may be the key to cooperation among the players. Federal
funding, the great motivator, may keep the players at the table.

Potential Problems with Regional Cooperation
Regional solutions are least likely to find implementation when dealing with "the
heart of America's 'urban problem' - the new face of poverty . . .Inner cities have become
the warehouses of America's poorest citizens" (Cisneros, 1995 : 40). As a result, efforts of
people-regionalism, or cooperative efforts to deal with poverty, racism, education, and
other social issues are few. Norris notes that local governments will cooperate:
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with one another and with the private sector when they must (e.g.,
cooperative planning in order to receive federal transportation
dollars) and when it is otherwise in their self-interests to do so
(e.g., ad hoc law enforcement task forces to address crime sprees
that cross jurisdictional boundaries. (2001: 56 1)
In other words, cooperation occurs most easily around things-regionalism (Cisneros,
1995), or "systems maintenance issues, not around really tough lifestyle issues like
housing, education and social equity" (56 1).
Local leaders have been resistant to regional cooperation because it requires them
to relinquish some level of authority to an authoritative umbrella organization (Williams,
1967; Norris, 2001). This can prevent regional solutions even when a local government
faces an issue that cannot be achieved independently. Local actors view themselves as
representatives of their particular local government (Norris, 2001 ), rather than
representatives of a region. Local citizens elected them to their offices and their re
election depends on their remembering it. In absence of one of the incentives mentioned
in the previous section, local governments will likely continue their long history of
unwillingness to relinquish autonomy (Danielson, 1976; Downs, 1994; Williams, 1967).
Citizens have offered their own brand of resistance to regional efforts fearing a
loss of local control to a less personalized, larger authority (Norris, 2001). Suburbanites
have resisted for a number of reasons, not the least their desire to remain distant from the
workings and problems of the central city and other communities (Lyons and Engstrom,
1973; Lyons and Scheb, 1998). Many citizens cannot relate to the variety of problems
faced across a particular region, therefore, political will is difficult to establish (Norris,
200 1 ). And, certainly, enticing suburbanites to invest money in a declining central city is
a task of massive proportions, interdependence notwithstanding (2001).
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Political impediments, although the greatest barriers, are not the only reasons why
past regional efforts have proved challenging. Other challenges have included poor
planning and foresight in past regional efforts making future cooperation harder to come
by. Vogel writes of the construction of a cross-river bridge in the Louisville area.
Following an "elaborate study and review process" the MPO assigned to building
consensus on "a controversial and difficult transportation problem within the region"
managed to do so but without taking into account regional land-use planning (2002: 117).
"Ironically, the most profound impact of a new eastern bridge may be urban expansion
and sprawl in southern Indiana but this was not a factor when weighing the alternatives"
(119).
Clearly, regional cooperation has been problematic for a variety of reasons.
However, there are some cases in which regional cooperation has found success, mainly
in the transportation and environmental arenas. New regionalists have focused on these
areas of cooperation as proof that regional governance is a viable solution to persistent
region-wide issues (Edner and McDowell, 2002; Vogel, 2002).

Successful Regionalism: Transportation and Environmental Efforts

Regional partnerships have been at�empted in many arenas and over a number of
issues, to greater or lesser degree of success. Whether strengthened by need, crisis,
mandate, funding opportunities, or a history of cooperation, there are some arenas that
have enjoyed more success than others, transportation and the environment are two.
While need is certainly a factor leading to cooperation in these areas, federal intervention
through mandates and incentives might be the greatest impetus. "Transportation is one of
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the policy areas that has been a bellwether in characterizing the status of the federal-state
relationship" (Edner and McDowell, 2002: 7). Moreover, new regionalists have looked to
the transportation acts, the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (!STEA)
and the Transportation Equity Act {TEA-2 1), as a "crucial case" to "lead the way to
greater metropolitan coordination and cooperation. Not just in transportation planning,
but in other areas as well" (Vogel, 2002: 109).
Environmental cooperation, first approached through air quality efforts, has
brought regionalism to the table since the 1950s (Wheeler, 2002). While environmental
concerns have been ongoing since the 1800s, attempts to deal with them on a regional
scale are relatively new. The Clean Air Act and its amendments stirred regional
cooperation in the literature as air quality regions were mandated and regional agencies
were developed in order to achieve pollutant reduction requirements (Lieber, 1968;
Schueneman, 1977; Stem, 1982; Wachs and Dill, 1999). Additionally, the environment is
a feature in the transportation laws, !STEA and TEA-2 1.

Clean Air Act and Environmental Partnerships

The need to address air quality on a regional rather than local level was first
attempted in 1947 with Los Angeles' County Air Pollution Control District (Wachs and
Dill, 1999). It was not until 1967 that air pollution formally acquired a regional meaning
on the national level. President Lyndon B. Johnson sent a message to Congress that
"regional air quality commissions should be established, to enforce pollution control
measures in regional air sheds which cut across state and local boundaries" (Lieber 1968:
86). Johnson signed the Air Quality Act of 1967. The Act "required the Department of
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Health, Ed':lcation and Welfare to designate air quality control regions (AQCRs) on the
basis of factors such as jurisdictional boundaries, urban industrial concentrations, and
atmospheric areas" (Wachs and Dill, 1999: 310). The 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments
and the new AQCRs led to the growth of the "number and authority" of regional air
quality agencies (311).
Since the 1970s, all regions have experienced reductions in air pollutants despite
"significant growth in population and vehicle use" (315). Strong regional air pollution
control programs have arisen due to several factors, not least is the possibility of losing
transportation dollars or having an EPA plan imposed on the region, should federal
requirements not be met. Air control agencies found power in the stipulation that
"programs must be implemented by agencies with legal authority to enforce the adopted
measures" and that citizens can sue to enforce federal requirements "counteract(ing)
pressures from the regulated community to weaken plans and regulations" (316).
!STEA and TEA-21 strengthened regional environmental efforts by attaching
environmental interests to transportation funding as larger MPOs, those with populations
of200,000 or more, have been given "additional powers" through the allocation of
"surface transportation program (STP) and block grant funds" (Gage and McDowell,
1995: 136). ISTEA gave larger MPOs "more political clout" and "smaller MPOs in non
attainment areas may also be so endowed" (136).
Overall, regional efforts to control air pollutants have been successful. Agencies
have, for the most part, been able to control pollutants from stationary sources. The
largest sources of air pollution today include cars, trucks, and other mobile sources.
Solutions to reductions in vehicle pollutants generally fall outside of traditional air
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agencie�' control, however, leading to a potential decline in agency power unless affected
agencies can become creative in finding important roles for themselves. For instance, the
EPA and states have programs focused on the reduction of vehicle emissions,
such as inspection and maintenance programs and fuels, including
the formulation of gasoline and the introduction of alternative
fuels. . . .. Some air districts have entered this arena by adopting
programs to fund alternative fuel vehicles or rules that require or
provide incentives to purchase such vehicles. (Wachs and Dill,
1999: 318)
The power to make decisions in the last air pollutant frontier, vehicle emissions, has been
shared with MPOs.

Metropolitan Plannilig Organizations/Transportation
"Around the turn of the century, the clear goal was to get the farmer out of the mud. From
1956 on, the clear goal was to build the interstate system. There is no real goal now."
Richard Mudge, 1 994: 35-58.

Since 1991's !STEA and 1998's TEA-21, new regionalists have closely watched
the quasi-empowered MPOs as a potential model for governance (Vogel, 2002). Their
hopes that ISTEA and TEA-21 would lead to "greater metropolitan coordination and
cooperation, not just in transportation planning, but in other areas as well" has been
realized (109). In 2003, for the first time, MPOs were included in NARC's roster of
regional councils in the U.S. MPOs seem to have taken a leadership role in regionalism
as their purposes and powers have expanded under a variety of funding opportunities, not
the least of which is ISTEA and TEA-21 (Andrews, 1996). Many MPOs have used these
laws to deal with issues outside transportation, issues such as the social and economic
concerns of their regions (Lewis, 1998). Increased MPO power means, unfortunately, but
72

perhaps predictably, that states and MPOs seem to be at odds once again, at least partly
due to these federal initiatives (Andrews, 1996).

/STEA and TEA-21

By taking the sole decision-making power from state transportation departments
and forcing them to share that role with MPOs, ISTEA and TEA-21 uses "financial
incentives and disincentives" to foster transportation planning cooperation and
coordination on a regional scale (Vogel, 2002: 107-29). Planning not only involves
highway transportation, but transit, as well. States, in cooperation with MPOs, retain
jurisdiction over most program allocations, while MPOs are granted power to choose and
implement the projects that will be funded. Larger MPOs (with populations over
200,000) are given some sole allocation responsibility, such as "Surface Transportation
Program-Metro (STP-Metro) funds, and in some states, Congestion Mitigation and Air
Quality (CMAQ)4 and Enhancement (e.g., bicycle and pedestrian) funds in
"consultation" with state DOT" (Goetz, 2002: 87-105). MPOs are subject to "regular
certification process(es) intended to ensure adherence to statutory economic and
environmental performance measures, to principles of effective citizen engagement, and
to compliance with other applicable federal laws . . . " (Katz et al., 2003: 3).
TEA-21 further increased MPO allocation responsibilities. MPOs must prepare
two types of plans: a twenty-year plan and a three-year Transportation Improvement
Program (TIP) that must be resubmitted every two years. (Katz et al, 2003) It is in the
area of planning that MPOs find their greatest power. Rather than having direct funding
capability, MPOs produce the TIPs and 20-year plans that "identify projects for which
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STP "attributable funds" will be utilized" (Edner and McDowell, 2002: 14). A project
will not receive federal funding without being first included in an MPG-developed TIP
and a state approved Transportation Improvement Program (STIP). The ability to inhibit
the inclusion of projects is somewhat shared between the states and MPOs, although there
is some evidence that MPOs are doing more than "acquiring information, advising,
commenting, and proposing" (Lewis, 1998: 839-53).
MPOs have found power in their ability to steer the planning and implementation
processes. For instance, federal allocations for all transportation projects in a region will
be reduced if all localities in the region do not cooperate in planning efforts, a powerful
incentive for local governments to participate (Vogel, 2002). Additionally, the U.S.
Department of Transportation can reduce funding by 20 percent if the region falls out of
compliance with the MPO plan; this compliance certification is conducted every three
years (Vogel, 2002). The Transportation and Community and Systems Preservation
(TCSP) program "provided incentives for linking transportation and land use planning.
Another program, the Job Access and Reverse Commute (JARC) program, helped to
provide more transportation alternatives for low-income workers in metropolitan
markets" (Katz et al., 2003: 3). Clearly, there are strong incentives for local governments
and their states to cooperate with their MPOs.

Beyond Transportation
ISTEA and TEA-21 address more than transportation issues. "The(se) reform
statutes required transportation planning to move beyond simple mobility concerns and
take into account social, economic, and environmental outcomes" (Katz et al., 2003: 3).
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OfISTEA and TEA-21, researchers write: "(The) U.S. DOT became a player in welfare
to-work issues, brownfield programs, empowerment zones and enterprise communities,
housing, and other similar activities" (Edner and McDowell, 2002: 21). In a list of 16
factors comprising ISTEA's program planning requirements, transportation funding has
taken on meaning in areas such as "land-use, sustainable development, livable
communities, environmental justice, and anti-sprawl" (Edner and McDowell, 2002: 21).
Welfare concerns were included through job-access and job-planning programs. Edner
and McDowell point out that some MPOs already had a "strong social-service
constituency. . . [and TEA-21] further reinforced their multi-purpose regional agenda"
(2002: 22). For instance, the JARC program under TEA-21 "provides funds for capital
and operating expenses to support new or expanded transportation services that improve
access to employment and employment-related activities (e.g., training, childcare)"
(getgrants.ca.gov). Moreover, new players "clamored for access to the transportation
planning process . . . The potential for accessing federal transportation dollars, in addition
to HHS dollars, made players out of many of the traditional social-service agencies
involved in welfare" (Edner and McDowell, 2002: 22).
This expansion and reinforcement of MPO boundaries makes new regionalists'
interest in these transportation laws easy to understand. Although eligible for a wide
variety of federal programs, with ISTEA and TEA-21, regional councils were empowered
to function in multiple arenas, something that had not been possible for two decades. A
selection of projects funded under ISTEA and TEA-21 illustrating the wide scope of
eligible programs can be found in Table 5.2. It should be noted that this selection is not
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Table 5.2: Selected Projects Funded by ISTEA & TEA-21 (FY92-FY01)
State and Selected
Project
Program
AR
Trans Enhancements Historic Downtown Enhancements, $687, 165
Prgm. Railroad Depot Restoration, $640,005
Spring River Pedestrian Trail, $206,000
AZ
CMAQ Telecommuting and Teleconferencing Pilot Project, $ 1 ,320,000
Trans Enhancements Hotel Del Sol Restoration, $542,000
Prgm. Main Street Revitalization, Eloy, $594,000
CA
CMAQ Class 1 Bike/Ped Trail, $2,000,000
Eight miles of HOV lanes, $7,599,729
Trans Enhancements Arroyo Seco Bikeway, $3,800,000
Prgm. Pedestrian Crosswalk Enhancements, $5,400,000
Fruitvale Transit Village and Child Care Facility, $2,300.000
JARC Tamien Multimodal Station and Child Care Facility, $2,350,000
IL
Trans Enhancements Springfield Union Station Rehabilitation, $ 14,400,000
Prgm. Wheaton Park District Bike Plan, $2,35 1 ,000
The Schoolhouse Trail Development, $5, 143,000
IN
CMAQ Statewide Ozone Public Awareness Program, $320,000
Trans Enhancements Downtown Enhancement and Community Plan, $6 1 1 ,000
Prgm. Restoration of Nickel Plate Steam Locomotive #765, $435,000
West Baden Springs, Preservation Project, $939,500

KY

MD
NE

TN

Trans Enhancements Mountain Mission Hospital, $437,500
Prgm. Wickland Historic Site Acquisition, $375,000
Kentucky Center for African-American Heritage, $375,000
CMAQ Acquisition of 1 8 new LTR buses, $6,862,000
JARC Reistertown Plaza Metro Station Enhancements LCI Project and
Child Care Facility, $ 1 ,700,000
C¥AQ Gothenburg Viaduct, $434,297
Trans Enhancements Hastings Pioneer Spirit Trail, $624,997
Prgm. Nebraska Forest Service and Statewide Arboretum, $250,000
Main Street Historic Lighting, $ 1 6 1 ,521
"Back to the River" Comm. Project and Ped Access, $1 ,742,000
TSPP Downtown Access and Redevelopment Project, $28 1 ,230
CMAQ Ridesharing Commuter Club, $700,000
Riverside Loop Rail Extension, $700,000
Trans En. Prgm. Historic Casey Jones & R/R Museum, $ 1 , 1 25,000

Source: Suiface Transportation Policy Project's website: www.transact.org
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meant to be comprehensive, but is intended to demonstrate the scope of project areas that
are fundable under ISTEA and TEA-21.
The federal transportation law was scheduled for reauthorization in 2003 with
about $250 billion in new spending slated for the subsequent six years (Burwell, 2003).
The bipartisan bill met with a number of sticking points in the area of implementation.
The bills have been granted five short-term extensions; the most recent was an eight
month extension passed on September 30, 2004. Leaders will discuss a six-year
authorization in the 109th Congress.
Summary
"The essence of the grant system is that it entails the achievement offederal purposes by proxy. "
Martha Derthick, 1970: 197
Federalism, "as reflected in the transportation programs, has not been more uncertain and
ambiguous for over 200 years. " Edner and McDowell, 2002: 24.

Underlying MPO empowerment are important questions regarding the role of the federal
government in regionalism. Although today's federal grant-in-aid programs tend to be
more permissive than those of the 1970s, state and local governments remain heavily
restricted by conditions of grant funding. Edner and McDowell write of "competing
claims and counterclaims that there has been both grant reform and a shoring up of the
status quo in federal control" (2002: 8). ISTEA and TEA-21 are considered in this
"reformed" grant category as they attempt to promote regional cooperation while leaving
some control in the hands of the states (Lewis, 1998; Katz et al, 2003). Nevertheless,
grant conditions and key federal priorities maintain dominant positions as the locus of
agenda setting is moved from the state and local governments to the federal level. While
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projects are selected at the regional level, they are developed within the confines of the
federal agenda. Additionally, federal match requirements further encumber state and local
resources. Match requirements are increasingly being demanded in real dollars rather
than as in-kind contributions resulting in an even less flexibility in state and local
planning and decision-making (Shaver, 2005).
Local governments are weighing in on this on-going power struggle, calling for
their states to relinquish more control of transportation dollars to local governments
(MPOs), an action that would re-create, to a greater or lesser degree, the very same
federal to region relationship that doomed the earlier regionalism movement. The mayor
of Fort Worth, Texas, speaks on behalf of local government leaders:
This is not your typical state vs. local power struggle. This
is about what level of decision-makers - state
transportation bureaucracies or local elected officials - are
best positioned to respond to what the public is seeking.
Mayors, county executives and other local elected officials
believe it is time to recognize the limitations of states to
effectively engage the public on needed transportation
investments, and move on. (Barr, 2003: 3)
Calling for greater suballocation of federal funding, greater local control over
transportation resources through further empowerment of MPOs, increased federal
spending, and greater state accountability concerning the equitable distribution of
allocations, local governments and the Surface Transportation Policy Project, National
Association of Regional Councils, American Public Works Association, and several other
organizations are paving the way to a decreased state role in the transportation arena
(McCarty, 2003). If this happens, a power shift will occur giving the regional councils,
primarily MPOs, and the federal government heavy-handed control much like that
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experienced in the 1970s. Along with that power shift comes the Constitutional questions
of old, as well as a few others: How can regional plans and needs be best met if not by
local governments? Have the states failed in their responsibilities to the extent that a
reduction of power is warranted? Clearly, federal funding and mandates force action that
the states seem reluctant, unwilling, or unable to press.
The new regionalism calls for voluntary cooperation between existing
governmental entities. However, voluntary cooperation is never easy nor as voluntary as
one might hope. While need and cooperative norms can encourage regional efforts,
successful regionalism frequently involves some sort of federal carrot or stick. Federal
intervention has made possible a number of worthy multi-jurisdictional efforts such as the
development of our 46,000-mile Interstate highway system and efforts to control and
improve environmental conditions. These accomplishments would likely not have
occurred without top-down control. Nevertheless, the needs of states and regions are not
the business of the national government under the Constitution. But federal funding is an
enticing master that many states and local governments are unable or unwilling to refuse.
The danger is that federal priorities and goal may draw regional attention away from local
needs. Researchers note: "Even growth-management advocates, who regard new
highways as the root of problems, find transportation funding hard to resist" (Edner and
McDowell, 2002: 23). Further danger is in the possibility that states are ''voluntarily"
relinquishing their autonomy and power to the national government in exchange for much
needed grant funding. If states cannot refuse federal funding, and they often cannot
(Derthick, 1970; Posner, 1998), then there is absolutely nothing "voluntary" about the
federal-state-regional arrangements under regionalism.
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The United States has defined its form of government, its overarching structure,
as federalism. That state and local governments should retain control over their fates is a
closely-held belief and federal interference is problematic as it "at some point threaten(s)
to undermine the capacity of state and local governments to respond to the unique needs
of their publics" (Posner, 1998: 2). In the years since our country's inception, the federal
government has had to interfere in state affairs on numerous occasions to ensure that
important rights and freedoms are protected (Wright and Stenberg, forthcoming).
Nevertheless, even if federal intervention into regional issues is necessary for needed
changes to occur, federal agenda setting raises real constitutional questions. Even if
regions choose their projects, funding recipients are still beholden to the federal
government and its overarching goals (Derthick, 1970).
New regionalism's tenets, in themselves, raise few questions of federalism. But
because the new regionalism's voluntary cooperation requires a level of interaction that is
difficult, if not impossible to achieve (Norris, 2001), regionalism may only be possible
with greater federal intervention via grants-in-aid or mandates. Also, if we are to heed the
calls for greater devolution of discretion and resources from the federal government to
regional organizations we must take into account the implications of this shift in power
on federalism. One step toward understanding where regionalism is heading is to
examine existing regional councils' common objectives, funding sources, and basic
structures. By knowing these things, we can determine the status of today's regionalism
and the condition of new regionalism's poster child, the MPO.

80

CHAPTER 6: DATA AND METHODS

In considering the relevant questions for this study, four lines of inquiry emerge:
Regarding today's regional council, 1) How do we describe today's regional councils? 2)
What are their objectives? How empowered are these councils to accomplish their
objectives? Who represents the region as members of the board and how cooperative are
they? 3) From what sources do regional councils derive their funding? Does a particular
source of funding appear dominant? Is there a relationship between funding sources and
particular types of council? Finally, 4) To what extent are local citizens participating in
regional plans and activities? Is their participation being used in a meaningful way?

Data and Subject Selection

The majority of the data utilized in this study come from a 2003 survey of the
regional councils, located across United States. In an attempt to increase the response
rate, the National Association of Regional Councils (NARC), located in Washington,
D.C., implemented the survey on my behalf. NARC is widely considered the parent
organization for regional councils in the United States. Other data were derived from
Census records and follow-up telephone contacts with various council directors and
public officials.
Regional councils exist in a variety of forms. Their types and functions range
from broad, multi-purpose to single purpose organizations. The National Association of
Regional Councils recognizes some types of councils as most common and that
compilation is available on their Council Update Form which can be found as the first
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page of the. survey instrument located in Appendix B. Because there is a great deal of
functional overlap in these councils and their designations are not always intuitive, brief,
generalized descriptions of each designation is provided in Table 7.25, located in
Appendix C.

Survey Implementation

The survey was sent to regional council directors via the United States Postal
Service in October 2003; a follow-up postcard was mailed to non-respondents
approximately three weeks later. Under my direction, the survey was mailed to NARC's
entire roster, 653 regional councils. As an aside, 2003 was the first year that NARC
included MPOs in their membership. This caused their enrollment to jump from about
450 to about 650 in the span of several months (NARC). Of the two hundred and fifty
responses (a response rate of 38%), 59% were MPOs. A list of survey respondents can be
found in Appendix A. A full listing of regional councils is available from NARC.
As a collaborative effort, NARC agreed to implement my survey in their name in
return for a report of findings. Because the salary and benefits, and other questions of
interest to NARC are not relevant to this study, not all variables or survey questions are
discussed here. The membership update page and survey tool, excluding questions 22-34,
can be found in Appendix B.

Research Expectations
Councils ' Designations and Objectives: Since the early 1990s, the federal government

has increased funding opportunities for regional cooperation in transportation (see
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Chapter 4). Because this increase in federal funding for transportation corresponds with
the rise in regionalism in the literature as well as the increase in numbers of regional
councils, it is expected that councils that focus on transportation will be the most frequent
type. There are two measures to indicate type of council. The first measure is derived
from NARC's listing of council designations. The entire list can be found in Appendix B,
on the NARC "Member Information Update Form." Survey respondents were asked to
check all designations that applied to their particular council. Responses were coded as
dummy variables indicating that a council reported or did not report that designation.
Based on those responses, designations were collapsed into four broad categories:
environmental designations, transportation agencies, economic development agencies,
and social service agencies. Frequencies according to designation and designation
category will be provided.
The second measure used to indicate regional council focus was developed from a
survey question that asked council directors to indicate their first, second, and third most
important objective (Appendix B, Q2). For this expectation, only a council's top
objective will be utilized, as it is most likely to point to council type. Council directors
were provided a list of common objectives that was developed from the literature (e.g.
Wickstrom, 1977; Atkins and Wilson-Gentry, 1992; Grigsby, 1996) and the Kelly and
Riverstone survey (2002). Council directors were also provided space to write in other
objectives not listed. Responses for top objectives were collapsed into four objective
categories: environment, transportation, economic development, and social services. To
differentiate these categories from the designation categories established in the previous
paragraph, categories incorporating council designations will be referred to as d83

environment, d-transportation, d-economic development, and d-social services.
Categories that incorporate council objectives will be referred to as o-environment, o
transportation, o-economic development, and o-social services. Frequencies for all top
objectives, top objectives according to objective category, and top three objectives
according to individual council designation are provided in the research findings.
One would expect that councils would focus on objectives that are germane to
their designations. However, scholars have suggested that transportation funding under
ISTEA and TEA-21 has opened the door to other types of regional organizations, those
not traditionally associated with transportation (Edner and McDowell, 2002).
Nevertheless, it is expected that councils that have transportation designations (MPO,
RTPO, RTPA, etc.) will also be the most transportation oriented. A series of research
hypothesis are proposed:
Hl a: D-transportation councils are more likely to choose
transportation as one of their top three objectives than other
councils.
Hl b: D-economic development councils are more likely to
choose transportation as one of their top three objectives
than other councils.
H l c: D-environment councils are more likely to choose
transportation as one oftheir top three objectives than other
councils.
H l d: D-social services councils are more likely to choose
transportation as one of their top three objectives than other
councils.
To test H l a-d, a series of bivariate analyses will be performed using "cross-tabs" and chi
square (i') to test significance. Council designation categories (d-transportation, d84

To test H la-d, a series of bivariate analyses will be performed using "cross-tabs" and chi
square (-,:) to test significance. Council designation categories (d-transportation, d
economic development, etc.) will serve as the independent variables while o
transportation (for any of the councils' top three objectives) will serve as the dependent
variable.

Funding: Funding for regional efforts is hard to come by. Most states are reluctant to

fund regional efforts, local governments face political impediments in funding regional
projects and programs, and fees collected for service provision are sustainable sources of
funding for only a handful of objectives. The recent growth in regional efforts is likely in
response to federal interest in regionalism. Because of this, it is expected that all councils,
regardless of designation, receive more of their annual funding from the federal
government than from any other source.
To test this expectation, two measurement schemes were used. Survey recipients
were asked to indicate the percentage of funding that their council received the previous
year according to funding source (see Appendix B, Q9). The list of funding sources was
derived from the Kelly and Riverstone (2002) survey. Funding percentages are provided
for four source categories: federal, state, council members, and "other." "Other" is a
collapsed category that includes responses for revenues generated from fee-based
services, taxes, private donations, fundraisers, corporate sponsors, and write-in responses.
As a first measure, respondent's percentages were collapsed into six categories for each
source ("0%," "1-20%," . . . "81-100%"). Secondly, percentage means are created for
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respondent's answers according to top objective category (a-environment, o
transportation, a-economic development, o-social services).
It is expected that councils that focus on specific issues that are important to the
federal government will receive greater federal funding than other councils. So perhaps
one would expect environmental and transportation councils to have greater percentages
of federal funding than economic development and social services councils. Is there a
statistically significant relationship between a particular council objective category and
federal funding? To explore, mean percents and standard deviations are presented. A
series of hypotheses are proposed:
H2a: O-transportation councils are more likely to receive
larger percentages of federal funding than other councils.
H2b: O-economic development councils are more likely to
receive larger percentages of federal funding than other
councils.
H2c: O-environment councils are more likely to receive
larger percentages of federal funding than other councils.
H2d: O-social services councils are more likely to receive
larger percentages of federal funding than other councils.
To test, t-tests were performed to analyze the difference between federal funding mean
percents for each objective category. In these analyses, independent variables are top
objective categories and the dependant variable is the actual percentage of federal
funding reported by council directors.

Authority: We know that the COGs of the 1960s and 1970s had a high degree of authority
to accomplish their objectives, largely due to federal grant conditions. One might expect
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that today's councils that focus on federal programs and rely heavily on federal funding
will also have a higher degree of authority. One might also expect that councils that focus
on issues that are important to the federal government would also have higher levels of
authority to accomplish their objectives. Two questions are addressed here. First, is there
a statistically significant relationship between a council objective category and level of
authority? The following hypotheses are proposed:
H3a: 0-transportation councils are more likely to have
higher levels of authority than other councils.
H3b: 0-economic development councils are more likely to
have higher levels of authority than other councils.
H3c: 0-environment councils are more likely to have
higher levels of authority than other councils.
H3d: 0-social service councils are more likely to have
higher levels of authority than other councils.
The testing of these hypotheses is performed in a series of bivariate analyses
using "cross-tabs" and chi-square (i') test statistics. In these analyses, objective
categories are the independent variables and authority categories are the dependent
variables.
As a second research question, is there a significant relationship between federal
funding and council authority? Because federal funding has increased council authority in
the past, and may be doing the same today, a series of hypotheses are proposed:
H4a: The more federal funding a council receives, the more
likely a council will have final decision making authority.
H4b: The more federal funding a council receives, the more
likely a council will have taxing authority.
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H4c: The more federal funding a council receives, the more
likely a council will have the ability to punish
noncompliant local officials.
H4d: The more federal funding a council receives, the more
likely a council will have the authority to approve grant
applicants.
H4e: The more federal funding a council receives, the more
likely a council will have to be consulted on regional
issues.
Respondents were asked to indicate their level of authority according to their top
objectives. For each objective response a dummy variable was created to indicate the
level of authority that a council holds. For H4a-e, level of federal funding is the
independent variable, and types of authority are the dependent variables. A series of
bivariate analyses using "cross-tabs" and chi-square (i-) test statistics is performed
Citizen Participation: Finally, regarding citizen participation, it is expected that all

regional council directors will report that they offer regular opportunities for citizen
participation but that their satisfaction with actual participation will be rather low (Ross
and Levine, 2001; 200-01). The first expectation will be measured by producing a range
and mean for directors' responses regarding the number of times citizen participation
activities occur annually (Appendix B, Q19). The second expectation will be measured
according directors' Likert-scaled responses regarding their satisfaction with citizen
participation levels (Q20).
Acceptance of grant funding from the federal government often obligates the
grantee to offer certain types and frequencies of citizen participation. One would expect
that those that receive federal funding are more likely to offer regular, frequent
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participation opportunities to maintain compliance with grant conditions. Because citizen
participation is often a pre-condition for receipt of most federal grant funding, it is
expected that:
H5a: The more federal funding a council receives, the more
it will offer opportunities for citizen participation.
H5b: The more state funding a council receives, the more it
will offer opportunities for citizen participation.
H5c: The more council member funding a council receives,
the more it will offer opportunities for citizen participation.
H5d: The more "other" funding a council receives, the
more it will offer opportunities for citizen participation.
These hypotheses will be measured by bivariate analysis using "crosstabs" and chi-square
test statistics. In these analyses, councils' funding levels for each source are collapsed
into percentage categories (0%, 1-20%, etc.) serving as the independent variables, while
Likert scaled responses regarding frequency of opportunity for participation is the
dependent variable. Likert responses were collapsed into frequency categories (never,
yearly or biannually, quarterly, monthly, weekly +).
Because citizen participation is almost always required as a pre-condition for
federal grant funding (Lipsky, 1976: 198-199), and because the grantor generally directs
participation activity types and frequency, and the required type of participation
opportunity is generally public meeting, a forum in which attendance is often low, it is
posited that councils driven by the need to fulfill funding requirements are less satisfied
with citizen participation. Councils that are driven by funding requirements have shifted
the locus of their agenda setting from the regional to the national level. Because of that, it
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seems less likely that they will actively pursue other types of participation than what is
required to satisfy grant conditions. Conversely, councils that are funded by their
members or by other local sources, even their states, are more likely to desire and seek
real citizen participation in order to gather the information needed to make meaningful
differences and to remain a viable player in the regional arena. For these reasons, it is
hypothesized that:
H6a: The more federal funding a council receives, the more
satisfied the council director will be with citizen
participation.
H6b: The more state funding a council receives, the more
satisfied the council director will be with citizen
participation.
H6c: The more council member funding a council receives,
the more satisfied the council director will be with citizen
participation.
H6d: The more "other" funding a council receives, the
more satisfied the council director will be with citizen
participation.
The performance of a series of bivariate analyses using "crosstabs" and chi-square (··l)
test statistics will test these hypotheses. In these analyses, councils' funding levels are
collapsed into percentage categories (0%, 1-10%, etc.) by funding source category
(federal, state, council members, other) serving as independent variables while council
directors' Likert-scaled responses regarding satisfaction with citizen participation is the
dependent variable (Ql4).
Also, because officials are prone to involve citizens on only the lowest rungs of
Arnstein's Ladder of Citizen Participation (1969), rungs that involve tokenism or relative
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nonparticipation, it is expected that directors' responses to a survey item asking how they
use citizen input will show a high degree of tokenism (Q21: In what way is the public's
input used?). Results of this question will be reported. This expectation will also be
measured by examining the frequency and types of people that populate council boards
(Ql 1). It is expected that local government leaders dominate and that there is a low
occurrence of citizens and other non-governmental representation on council boards
(Ross and Levine, 2001, 200-01).
Do some types of councils have a higher occurrence of citizen board members
than others? The expectation is that councils that receive more of their funding from non
federal sources will have a higher incidence of citizen and non-governmental board
members. To that end:
H7a: The more that councils rely on federal funding the
less likely they are to include citizens on their boards.
H7b: The more that councils rely on state funding the more
likely they are to include citizens on their boards.
H7c: The more that councils rely on council funding the
more likely they are to include citizens on their boards.
H7d: The more that councils rely on other funding the more
likely they are to include citizens on their boards.
The performance of bivariate analyses using "crosstabs" and chi-square (x,2) test statistics
will be used to test these hypotheses. In these analyses, percentages of funding (collapsed
- 0%, 1-20%, 21-40%, etc.) by funding source category (federal, state, council members,
other) will be the independent variable. Board composition (Q l 1) is reported as actual
frequencies by category (local government leaders, chamber employees, concerned
91

citizens with no official ties, etc.). Frequencies are collapsed into dummy variables
indicating whether a council has citizens on board or not. Mean percents, standard
deviations, and chi-square values are presented.
Because one would expect that citizen board membership would occur more
frequently on council boards that address issues that are most important on the individual
level (social services), it is expected that councils that address these issues will have the
greatest frequency of citizen board members. Are top objectives related to citizen board
membership? For those councils that chose a social service objective as number one, we
would expect their community focus to foster a more inclusive relationship with local
citizens and the business community.
H8a: Councils that choose o-transportation as a top
objective are more likely to include citizens on their boards.
H8b: Councils that choose o-economic as a top objective
are more likely to include citizens on their boards.
H8c: Councils that choose o-environment as a top objective
are more likely to include citizens on their boards.
H8d: Councils that choose o-social services as a top
objective are more likely to include citizens on their boards.
These hypotheses will be tested by the performance of a bivariate analysis using
"crosstabs" and chi-square statistics. The independent variable is whether or not councils
chose the objective category as top objective. The dependent variable is also
dichotomous: whether or not there are citizens on the council's board. Additionally, a test
of association, Phi, is reported.
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CHAPTER 7: FINDINGS
Descriptives

Of the 653 surveys sent, 250 were returned for a response rate of 38%. Table 7.1
breaks down the total surveyed population and respondents according to the four United
States Census regions and nine divisions. As the table shows, respondents closely
represent the total population's distribution according to census region and division. The
vast majority (91%) of the responding councils were established before 1980 {N=225).
Nearly half the responding councils (48%) serve populations of less than 250,000
(N=232). An additional 38% serve populations between 250,001 and 1,000,000. The
remaining 14% serve populations greater than 1,000,000.
Thirty-three percent of the survey respondents serve fewer than 10 jurisdictions
(N=234). Forty-five percent serve between 11 and 50 jurisdictions, and 13% serve
between 51 and 100 jurisdictions. The remaining 9% serve more than 100 jurisdictions.
The number of jurisdictions served ranged from California's San Benito County Council
of Government's three to the Southwestern Pennsylvania Commission's 549 jurisdictions
spanning its 10 county region. Of those that serve 100 or fewer jurisdictions (92% of the
councils), the average number of jurisdictions served is 26.

Council Designations

Council directors were asked to identify their council by type. A list of common council
designations was provided and because many councils serve multiple functions,
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Table 7.1: Total Population and Respondents by Census Division
Total
Respondents
Population
Region
Division
% (N = 250)
% (N= 653)
New England
12.4 (3 1)
10. l (66)
Northeast
6.0 ( 1 5)
Mid Atlantic
6.4 (42)
E. N. Central
14.0 (35)
13.9 (9 1)
Midwest
1 0.4 (26)
W. N. Central
1 0.6 (69)
W. S. Central
8.0 (20)
10.6 (69)
South
S. Atlantic
22.0 (55)
22.8 (149)
E. S. Central
9.6 (24)
9.0 (59)
9.2 (23)
Pacific
7.7 (50)
West
Mountain
8.4 (24)
8.9 (58)
Note: Cell entries are the percent of councils' total population and survey
respondents that are located in each census region and census division.
(Numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies.)

directors were asked to indicate all that applied. Directors were also given the opportunity
to write in their council type if it was not listed. Table 7.2 provides a list of all council
types and respondents' distribution to each. The original list in the format presented to
recipients can be found in Appendix B on the NARC membership update form. A
descriptive table ofcommon council types and their common functions can be found as
Table 7.22 in Appendix C.
As Table 7 .2 indicates, the majority of councils identify themselves as
transportation, clearinghouse, and economic development councils. Fifty-nine percent of
the responding councils identify themselves as MPOs, transportation planning
organizations. Seventy percent of those MPOs have populations over 200,000, the cut-off
point for increased powers, including direct funding, under !STEA (see Chapter 5). Fifty
two percent of the total respondents identify themselves as Clearinghouses_ (CLEAR),
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Table 7.2: Res�onding Councils According to Unigue Designation
Council Types
Freg
Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO)
148
Regional Clearinghouse Function (CLEAR)
1 30
Designated Economic Development District/Agency (EDD/A)
111
Regional Transportation Planning Org/Agency (RTPO/A)
87
Revolving Loan Fund (RLF)
86
Regional Land Use Planning Responsibility (LUP)
80
Disaster Management - Emergency Response (OMER)
63
58
Area Agency on Aging (AAA)
Service Delivery Agency for Workforce Development (WIA)
54
Water Quality Planning Agency (WQPA)
44
Intermediary Re-lending Program (IRP)
35
Technical Assistance to Local Governments (TASST)
35
33
SBA Certified Development Company (SBACDC)
Designated Local Development District (LDD/ARC)
32
27
Clean Air Agency (CAA)
Regional Housing Authority (RHA)
22
21
Solid Waste District Service Agency (SWDSA)
17
Homeland Security (HSEC)
Public Transit System (Transit)
16
15
Growth Management Agency (GMA)
9
Environmental Program (ENV)
5
Substance Abuse Treatment (SUB)
5
Criminal Justice/Corrections (CRIM)
4
Community Action Agency (CAA2)

Percent
59
52
44
35
34
32
25
23
22
18
14
14
13
13
11
9
8
7
6
6
4
2
2
2

Notes: Frequency will not total 250 and 100% as respondents were instructed to "check all that
apply."
N = 250
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also identified as predominately transportation organizations, according to
clearinghouses' top objective. Forty-four percent of the survey respondents identify
themselves as economic development districts (EDD/A). Interestingly, 1 7 councils wrote
in Homeland Security as their council type, a new type of council designation, and a
direct result of the 2001 destruction of the World Trade Center Towers. There were no
councils that identified themselves as a Homeland Security Council in the Kelly and
Riverstone survey (2002).
Because many councils chose more than one designation, there is overlap among
them. In other words, an MPO might also be an RTPO, and a Clearinghouse, etc. To
demonstrate that overlap, a table was developed that offers the frequency in which each
type of council also indicated other council types. Due to the size and complexity of that
table, it can be found in Appendix C as Table 7.26. In sum, according to specific council
designations, transportation councils (in this case, MPO, CLEAR, and RTPO) are
dominant with economic development oriented councils (EDD/A and RLF) following.
Council designations were collapsed into four categories: d-environmental, d
transportation, d-economic development, and d-social services. Most designations readily
lent themselves to classification. For instance, Clean Air Agencies clearly belong in the
environmental category. For designations that were more difficult to classify (e.g.
clearinghouses, technical assistance to local governments, revolving loan fund agencies),
the dominant top objective for the entire designation was used to determine designation
category. Table 7.3 reports the classification of designations according to category.
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Table 7.3: Council Designations According to Functional Category
Council Designation Categories
D-Economic
D-Environment
D-Social Services
D-Transportation
Development
ENV; CAA;
AAA; WIA; CAA2;
EDD/A; DMER;
MPO; RTPO;
CDEV; Substance
WQPA; SWDSA
LDD/ARC;
RTPA; TRANSIT;
abuse; criminal
SBACDC; RLF;
CLEAR
services
IRP; GMA; LUP;
Technical assistance
to local govs
Note: Descriptions of designations are located in Appendix C, Table 7 .22

A research expectation was that transportation councils would be the most
frequent type. This expectation was measured by council designation category and the
results are presented below in 7.4. As the table shows, 95% of the survey respondents (N
= 250) identified themselves with at least one of the transportation designations; 72%
chose an economic development designation. Forty percent of the respondents chose a
social service designation, and 31% chose at least one designation that fell into the
environment category. In sum, according to individual designation and designation
category, transportation councils are the most frequently chosen type.

Council Objectives

Continuing to focus on the research expectation that transportation councils will
be the most frequent as a result of increased federal funding to regional councils in this
policy area, we tum to councils' top objectives. Council directors were asked to rank their
top three objectives with the number one indicating their most important objective, two
indicating their second most important objective, and three indicating their third most
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Table 7.4: Distribution of Council Designations

Responses According to Designation
Council Designation
Percentage
Category
Transportation
95%
Economic
72%
Development
Environment

31%

Social Services

40%

N = 247

important objective. The list of most common objectives was generated from the
literature and from the Kelly and Riverstone survey responses (2002). Directors were
given space to write in additional objectives. Table 7.5 shows council directors'
responses.
As Table 7.5 indicates, transportation tops regional councils' list of important
objectives. Fifty-two percent of the respondents chose it as their top objective and 77%
chose is as one of their top three most important objectives. Regional economic
development was the second most popular objective with 45% choosing it as one of their
top three.
Twenty-three percent of the respondents chose environmental issues (not
including air) as one of their top three objectives. Growth management, coordination of
multiple services, conformity to air quality standards, housing, and clearinghouse
functions followed with between 15% and 19% of the respondents choosing one of these
as their top three objectives.
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Table 7.5: Ranking of Councils' Top Three Objectives

Transportation Issues (TRANS)
Regional Economic Development
(RED)
Environmental Issues (ENV)
Growth Management (GMGM)
Coordination Multiple Services
(CMS)
Conformity/Air Quality (AIR)
Housing Issues (HOUS)
Clearinghouse Functions
(CLEAR)
Technical Asst. to Local Govts
(TASST)
Senior Services (SEN)
Community Development
(CDEV)
Land Use Planning (LAND)
Redevelopment (RDEV)
Solid waste management
(WASTE)
Transit (TSIT)
GIS Services (GIS)
Equity Issues (EQU)
Revitalization Central Cities

Most
Important

2nd Most
Important

3rd Most
Important

One of Top
3 Objectives

Frequency

Frequency

Frequency

Percent ofN

78

23

15

77

27

21

20

45

3
13

14
9

17
7

23
19

9

12

8

19

1
2

18
7

5

13

16
15

5

5

12

15

6

6

4

11

2

7

4

9

7

2

5

9

2
2

3
3

6
5

7
7

4

1

3

5

0

5
0

1

0

1
2
2

4
2
2

0

1

0

<1

Notes: Columns will not equal 1 50 (total N) as some respondents chose more than one top objective
and others did not indicate a second or third objective.
N = 1 50
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Council objectives were collapsed into four broad categories: a-transportation, o
environment, a-economic development, and a-social services. Table 7.6 reports the
classification of objectives according to category. For objectives not easily classified,
category placement was determined by consulting NARC, the literature (Cisneros, 1995;
Norris, 2001) and by personal interview with various experts in the field (Shaver, 2005;
HUD executive [Anon.], 2005).
A research expectation was that transportation councils would be the most
frequent type. This expectation was measured by council objective category and the
results are presented below in Table 7. 7. As presented, respondents' (N = 150) topmost
objective according to objective category is reported. As the table shows, 52% of the
survey respondents reported that their most important objective concerns transportation
issues. The next common top objective category (38%) was in the area of economic
development. Councils chose a social services objective as most important only 8% of the
time, and the environment was topmost only 5% of the time. In sum, according to
individual objectives and objective category, transportation remains the primary focus of
most regional councils.
Table 7.6: Distribution of Council Objectives According to Functional Category
Council Objectives Categories
0O-Social Services
O-Transportation O-Economic Development
Environment
Air quality,
Regional economic
Housing, senior
Transportation
environmental services, community
development, growth
Issues, transit,
management, coordination issues, waste
development,
clearinghouse
management
redevelopment,
of multiple services,
technical assistance to local
equity, revitalization
governments, land use
of central city
planning, GIS
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Table 7. 7: Distribution of Councils' Top Objective

Responses According to Category
Council Objective
Category
Transportation
Economic
Development
Environment
Social Services
N=

Percentage
52%
38%
5%
8%

1 50

Table 7.8: Distribution: Any one of Councils' Top Three Objectives

Responses According to Category
Council Objective
Category
Transportation

Percentage
83.3%

Economic
Development

70.7%

Environment

40.7%

Social Services

34.0%

N=

1 50

A look at respondents top three objectives confirms the lean toward transportation
as an objective focus. Table 7.8 presents the frequencies of responses for each objective
category according to whether that objective was chosen as one of a councils' top three.
A breakout of top three objectives according to council designation provides a more
detailed picture of who is doing what. The results of that breakout are reported below in
Table 7.9. For clarity, the top three objectives chosen by each type of organization (MPO,
CLEAR, etc.) have been shaded.
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Table 7.9: The Top Three Objectives of Regional Councils of Government

£�
z 1i

Council
yPC

� 0
§
0
E-< U

MPO

85

27

23,

16

13

2J ·

10

9

7

6

CLEAR

53

42

25

17

18

8

15

15

6

4

EDD/A

33

50

11

13

l7

3

10

13

6

RTPO

2�

21

7

5

8

3

6

4

RLF

· 23

JS

5

5

16

o

9

LUP

37

20

17

16

13

5

OMER

24

19

10

12

10

AAA

J6

18

6

5

10

WIA

1l

18

5

4

7

WQPA

20

lO

16

6

4

4

IRP

6

l4

0

4

0

TASST

16

. t2

3

4

6,

SBACDC

5

13

2

9

LOO/ARC

&

14

2

CAA

21

4

Total N that
choose x as one
of top 3

objectives

1 16

68

5

34

29

8

3

3

5

9

5

4

7

3

5

11

0

3

5

3

5

2

9

6

4

11

2

6

6

8

3

2

5

9

5

2

3

2

2

4

4

12

6

2

0

6

4

3

3

7.

0

0

5

2

2

3

4

2

2

4

4

3

4

0

0

2

4

2

3

7 .

0

3

2

3

3

2

2

29

24

21

21

16

0

13

0

78

5

2

0

61

0

0

0

0

32

3

5

0

45

0

48

0

36

2

0

2

O

2

0

2

10

0

0

28

0

0

0

22

0

0

24

0

16

0

21

0

0

0

0

0

3

0

13 1 1

0

2

0
6

85

2

7

2

2

2

2

2

0

0

0

0

14

3

0

0

0

0

17

0

0

0

21

8

6

3

3

1

Notes: Column totals represent the number of councils choosing the column objective as one of their top
three. Councils may have multiple designations (MPO, CLEAR, etc.). Row totals indicate the total councils
that reported their objectives by council designation.
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There were 150 councils that reported their top three objectives. The four most
popular types of councils - MPOs, Clearinghouses, EDD/EDAs, and RTPOs - chose
transportation and regional economic development as one of their top three objectives,
with transportation as frontrunner in each of these cases except for the EDD/EDAs. In the
case of MPOs, transportation was chosen as one of the top three objectives by nearly 96%
of the respondents- a clear leader over MPOs' second most popular objective, regional
economic development, which was reported as one of the top three by 30% of the MPOs.
Environmental issues and air quality/attainment tied for third with nearly 26% of MP Os
choosing it as one of their top three objectives. Transportation was most popular with
Clearinghouses, as well, with nearly 68% choosing it as one of their top three objectives.
Regional economic development crune in second with nearly 54% and environmental
issues came in third with 32%.
Overall, most agencies, regardless of type, follow the srune pattern: a high interest
in transportation and a secondary interest in economic development followed by, to a
lesser degree, environmental issues. Senior services, community development, land use
planning, redevelopment, equity, and revitalization of central cities lag far behind in
today's regional council agenda. This is interesting because a vast majority of these
councils were founded in the regionalism movement of the 1960s-1970s, a time in which
the focus was on controlled regional development from a normative standpoint.

The change from focus on equity and urban renewal to focus on economic
development to better position the region in the global economy is discussed extensively
in Chapter Five. As noted in that chapter, many scholars agree that this change is a
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central feature of the new regionalism, but others believe that in. addition to these goals,
equity, social segregation, and economic disparity should be a central concern for today's
regional efforts. This research does not hold promise for a more normative regional
approach as very few appear to focus on social issues, even those that self-identified as a
social service agency.
To determine if there are statistically significant relationships between particular
types of councils and a focus on transportation, a series of "crosstabs" were performed.
These hypotheses are proposed:
H l a: D-transportation councils are more likely to choose
transportation as one of their top three objectives than other
councils.
H l b: D-economic development councils are more likely to
choose transportation as one of their top three objectives
than other councils.
Hl c: D-environment councils are more likely to choose
transportation as one of their top three objectives than other
councils.
Hld: D-social services councils are more likely to choose
transportation as one of their top three objectives than other
councils.
For each crosstab, designation categories are the independent variables and o
transportation (for any one of top three objectives) is the dependent variables. The results
of these analyses are presented in Table 7.10, below.
For H l a, we reject the null hypothesis. According to this analysis, d
transportation councils are more likely to choose transportation as one of their top three
objectives than are other regional councils. The difference between d-transportation and
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Table 7.10: Bivariate Analrses: Focus on Transl!ortation hr Council Designation

Designation
Categories
Hla

Hlb

Hlc

Hld

TransEortation - One of ToE Three Objectives
Yes

No

N

Transportation

85.7%

14.3%

140

Not Transportation

42.9%

57.1%

7

Econ. Development

77.4%

22.6%

106

Not Econ.
Develo�ment

100%

0%

41

Environment

89.4%

10.6%

47

Not Environment

80.8%

19.2

99

Social Services

70.6%

29.4%

51

Not Social Services

90.5%

9.5%

95

r

Prob.

8.96

.003

11.09

.001

1.70

.193

9.60

.002

Note: Number in cells are the percentage of respondents that reported a transportation-related
objective as one of their to� three objectives.

non-transportation is 35%, a substantial, statistically significant difference. It should be
noted, however that the frequency of those that do not fall into the d-transportation
category is only 7, compared to the 140 that do fall into the d-transportation category.
Additionally, statistically significant results show that d-economic development (Hl b)
and d-social service councils (H ld) are less likely to choose transportation as a top
objective than other councils. Because of these findings, we can reject the null
hypotheses for H l b and d.
Further findings show that there is not a statistically significant difference in d
environment councils and all other councils when it comes to choosing transportation as
one of their top three objectives (Hl d). We fail to reject the null.
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In sum, d-transportation councils are more likely to choose transportation as one
of their top three objectives than other councils. An added point is that regional councils
claim to be d-transportation councils 95% of the time (see Table 7.4). Regional councils
claim transportation as their top objective 52% of the time (see Table 7.7); transportation
is one of their top three objectives 77% of the time.

Council Funding

Regional councils vary greatly in their total annual budget levels. Thirty-nine
percent (N=l 44) reported having less than $1,000,000 in resources, 30% reported having
between $1,000,000 and $3,000,000, and 31% report having more than $3,000,000.
Levels and sources of funding are reported in Table 7.11.
Survey respondents reported that most councils rely on the federal government for
a substantial part of their funding. Only six councils reported that they receive no federal
funding. These councils include two MPOs, two RTPOs, one LUP, and one EDD. In each
of these cases except one, the councils fund their operations through a combination of
state funding, fees for services, and council member contributions. In one case, 100% of
the council's funding is derived from council members. The remaining councils reported
a heavy reliance on federal funding. Forty-eight percent (N=133) reported that at least
61% of their funding comes from the federal government. Another 21% rely on federal
money for 41-60% of their revenues.
Council directors were asked to report the percent of their annual funding that is
provided by their states. The survey data show that 74% (N=134) receive no money from
their states; another 23% receive between 1-40% of their annual revenue from their
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Table 7.1 1 : Percentages of Funding by Source

Funding

Source of Funding
Federal
State
Council
Government Government Members
(N = 133)
(N = 135)
(N = 134)

Other
Sources
(N = 135)

0%

5% (6)

74% (99)

82% ( 1 1 1 )

34% (45)

1-20 %

9% ( 1 2)

1 6% (22)

1 3% ( 1 7)

35% (47)

2 1-40 %

1 8% (24)

7% (9)

2% (3)

1 9% (25)

4 1 -60 %

2 1 % (28 )

3% (4)

< 1% ( 1 )

8% ( 1 1 )

6 1 -80 %

32% (42 )

0% (0)

<1% ( 1)

4% (6)

8 1 - 1 00 %

1 6% (2 1 )

0% (0)

0% (0)

<1% (1)

Note: Numbers in parentheses are frequencies.

states. Council member contributions are relatively low, as well. Eighty-two percent of
the survey respondents receive no funding from council members and only 15% receive
between 1-60% of their annual revenue from council members.
Included in the "other" category are fees for services, once a dominant source of
funding for post-devolution councils (Atkins and Wilson-Gentry, 1992). Today, 78% of
regional councils (N=133) report that they receive no funding from fees. About 22%
report receiving between 1-60% of their funding from fees. No councils receive funding
from private donations, and nearly no councils receive funding from fundraisers. Mean
percents according to funding source are provided below, in Table 7.12.
Because federal funding has the greatest mean percent of all funding sources, it is
expected that all councils will receive more funding from the federal government than
from other sources. To explore this expectation, means and standard deviations were
generated for funding percentages according to source for each top objective category
{Table 7.13). These means reflect a higher percentage of federal funding for councils that
1 07

Table 7.12: Mean Percents According to Funding Source
Federal
(N = 134)
55 .52

Mean Percent
Standard Deviation

27.98

Funding Sources
State
Council
(N = 134)
(N = 135)
16.67
11.69
17.28

14.32

Other
(N = 134)
15.89
20.15

Table 7.13: Mean Percents: Sources of Funding bI Council To� Objective Category
Sources of Funding
Council
Members
State

Top Objective
Category

N

Federal

Transportation

70

65 .61
(24.33)

13 .64
(16.35)

9.15
(9.01)

11.89
(17.61)

Not
Transportation

63

45 .19
(27.33)

20.30
(17.74)

13 .14
(14.70)

20.65
(21.95)

Economic
Development

50

43 .80
(24.92)

23 .18
(18.42)

13 .48
(14.29)

20.56
(21.48)

Not Economic
Development

83

63 .25
(26.79)

12.95
(15.44)

9.57
(10.49)

13 .30
(18.98)

Environment

7

54.29
(30.24)

13 .29
(11.57)

6.43
(7.14)

11.71
(22.65)

Not
Environment

126

56.03
(27.64)

16.99
(17.56)

11.28
(12.33)

16.24
(20.11)

9

54.89
(3 8.27)

12.78
(15 .88)

11.33
(13 .38)

21.33
(23 .58)

124

56.02
(26.94)

17.09
(17.40)

11.01
(12.11)

15.62
(19.97)

Social
Services
Not Social
Services

Other

Note: Cells contain mean percents for funding sources according to councils' top objective
category. {Standard deviations are in Earentheses.}
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chose a-transportation as their top objective (about 66%) than the next objective
category, councils that chose a-social services and a-environment as their objective
category (about 55% in each case). In all cases, for all objective categories, federal
funding provided the greatest mean percent.
To determine whether federal funding has a statistically significant relationship
with a particular top objective category, an analyses of variance (ANOVA) test was
performed. In this analysis, independent variables are top objective categories (dummy
variable) and the dependant variable is the percentage of funding that council directors
reported receiving from the federal government. Four hypotheses are tested and results
from that t-test are reported in Table 7.14.

H2a: O-transportation councils are more likely to receive larger
percentages of federal funding than other councils.
H2b: O-economic development councils are more likely to receive larger
percentages of federal funding than other councils.
H2c: O-environment councils are more likely to receive larger percentages
of federal funding than other councils.
H2d: O-social services councils are more likely to receive larger
percentages of federal funding than other councils.
There was no statistically significant relationship between a-environment and a-social
service councils and federal funding. However, there is a statistically significant positive
relationship between a-transportation councils and federal funding, so we reject the null
hypothesis for H2a. There is also a relationship between a-economic development
councils and federal funding, however, this relationship is negative. So a-economic
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Table 7.14: Results of Analysis: Federal Funding
for Top Objective Categories

Federal Funding
t-stat
Sig.
.000
4.56

Transportation
Economic
Development
Environment

-4.165

.000

-.162

.872

Social Services

-.118

.907

development councils are less likely to receive funding from the federal government than
other councils. Both relationships are significant at the 0.00 level. But all councils rely on
federal funding more than other sources for their annual budget.

Council Authority

Councils were asked to indicate the level of empowerment that they enjoy
according to each of their top three objectives. The common types of authority that were
included in the survey were derived from the literature and the Kelly and Riverstone
survey of regional councils (2002). The actual survey question can be found in Appendix
B, Q6.
Levels of authority are considered to be strong to weak with final decision
making and taxing authorities being the strongest, punishment ability and grant
application approval categorized mid-scale, and mandatory consultation assigned the
weakest level of authority. The two options that are situated in the strongest category are
there for obvious reasons. The reasoning for positioning the two powers mid-scale might
not be as obvious. The argument for positioning grant application approval in this
110

category, rather than in the strongest, involves the potential for limited council
involvement in actually choosing local projects, initiating the application process, and
spending the allocation upon approval. Local governments may act as independent
applicants in many of these efforts with the need to clear the regional council hurdle as a
condition of funding.
The ability to punish those out of compliance with the regional plan was included
in the strong-weak category because punishment may be unofficial rather than part of the
official powers granted to the council. In other words, punishment may mean that a local
government's pet project is left out of the regional plan, or that leaders are left out of, or
minimally kept in, the loops of information and opportunity. Additionally, councils may
have funds that can be withheld from non-compliers in a discretionary manner. All of
these techniques of punishment are not available to every council and may or may not
work, anyway. Non-compliers are certain to have weighed the costs and benefits of their
actions, rendering the council's ability to punish a weaker power than those included in
the strong category.
Including mandatory consultation in the weak category is because there is no final
decision-making authority attached to such consultation and local governments may or
may not heed council advice. Other means to achieve objectives were written in by
council directors. Four mentioned using grant funding and reduction in membership dues
as incentives and two indicated that committee appointments and having a staff presence
on the board were important means to achievement of their objectives. And, certainly,
collaboration, cooperation, persuasion, and pressure are common tools used by all
councils.
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Council directors reported their levels of authority for each of their top three
objectives. The full table of responses by objective ranking can be found in Appendix C
as Table 7.27; a brief version is presented in Table 7.15. In this table, the top ten most
frequent objectives are presented along with the percentages of responses for each
authority.
In viewing the authority categories according to objectives, what becomes most
clear is that taxing and punishment are authorities not enjoyed by many. Also, it is
apparent that some enjoy greater authority than others. For instance, 53% of those
councils that chose transportation issues as any one of their top three objectives enjoy the
ability to make final decisions on transportation issues (N=l 07). For those that choose

Table 7.15: Authority According to To� Ten Objectives
Authorities

ToE Ten Objectives
N = 107
Transportation
N = 64

Economic Dev.
Environment
Growth Mgmt.

N= 31
N = 25

Coordination Serv.

N= 27

Conform/Air Qual.

N = 24

Final
decision
authority

Has
taxing
authority

Can
punish

Can OK
grant
funding

Must be
consulted

Yes %
53

Yes %
5

Yes %
11

Yes %
48

Yes %
55

44

7

11

37

56

34
32
36
75

3
3
4

4

6
10
16
8

27
42
28
67

58
61
60

46

5
37
58
N= 19
· 5
Housing
63
32
5
21
N= 19
5
Clearinghouse
58
27
55
0
0
N= 1 1
55
Senior Services
0
18
27
N= 1 1
0
45
Community Dev.
Note: Cell entries are percent responses per authority category for those that chose the independent
variable as one of their top three objectives.
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transportation as their top objective (N=73) the ability to make final decisions was even
greater at 63% (see Table 7.27 in Appendix C). Nearly half of these same councils (48%)
were authorized to OK grant funding applications and more than half (55%) were entitled
to consultation before local decisions were made.
Councils that chose regional economic development as one of their top three
objectives (N=64) were most empowered in mandatory consultation (58%) with final
decision-making authority (34%) and the ability to approve grant applications following
(27%). Directors of councils choosing environmental issues as one of their top three
objectives (N=31) were most powerful in the areas of mandatory consultation (61%),
grant application approval (42%), and final decision-making authority (32%).
Other notable points include air quality/conformity agencies (N=24) that have
strong final decision-making authority (75%) and strong grant application approval
authority (67%). Fifty-eight percent of the agencies that chose housing issues (N=l 9) as
one of their top three objectives claimed final decision-making authority and 55% of the
councils that deal with senior services (N=l 1) have final decision-making authority.
In order to determine if there is a statistically significant relationship between
level of authority and a top objective category, a series of "crosstabs" were performed.
Chi-square values percent according to response categories are presented. The hypotheses
being tested are:
H3a: 0-transportation councils are more likely to have
higher levels of authority than other councils.
H3b: 0-economic development councils are more likely to
have higher levels of authority than other councils.
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H3c: O-environment councils are more likely to have
higher levels of authority than other councils.
H3d: O-social service councils are more likely to have
higher levels of authority than other councils.
As indicated in Table 7 .16, o-transportation councils have statistically significant positive
relationship with two types of authority: final decision-making and approval of grant
applications. Final authority is the strongest type, allowing us to reject the null hypothesis
for H3a. The difference between o-transportation councils and non-transportation
councils in having final decision-making authority was 31%. The difference between o
transportation councils and non-transportation councils in authority to approve grant
applications was 37%. Both differences are significant and substantively impressive.
O-economic development councils have statistically significant relationships with
final decision-making authority and authority to approve grants, as well {Table 7.17).
However, for o-economic development councils, these relationships are negative,
meaning that they are less likely than other councils to have the significant authorities.
The difference between o-economic development councils and others is 31%. The
difference in o-economic development councils and other councils in authority to
approve grant applications is also 31%. Both indicate a substantive, negative relationship
between o-economic development councils and others in these authority categories.
There were no relationships found between any authority and o-environment or o
social service councils, causing us to fail to reject the null hypothesis for H3c and d.
Those results are presented in Tables 7.18 and 7.19. These results indicate that difference
o-environment councils or o-social service councils are no less or more likely than others
1 14

. Table 7.16: Results of Analyses: Authority According to Transportation Top
Objective Category

Authority
Final Decision Making
Can Tax
Can Punish
Approves Grants
Must be Consulted

Top Objective Category
Top Objective
Top Objective
Not Transportation
Transportation
(N = 74)
(N = 68)
62.2% (46)
30.9% (21)
5.4% (4)
2.9% (2)
5.9% (4)
12.2% (9)
59.5% (44)
22.1% (15)
55.4% (41)
54.4% (37)

t

13.91 ***
.532
1.680
20.41***
.014

Note: Cell entries are the percent of respondents in each category that self-reported having a particular

authority. (Numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies.)

•••p < 0.0 1 .

Table 7.17: Results of Analyses: Authority According to Economic Development
Top Objective Category

Authority
Final Decision Making
Can Tax
Can Punish
Approves Grants
Must be Consulted

Top Objective Category
Top Objective
Top Objective Not
Economic
Econ. Development
Development (N =54)
(N =88)
27.8% (15)
59.1% (52)
3.7% (2)
4.5% (4)
9.3% (5)
9.1% (8)
22.2% (12)
53.4% (47)
51.1% (45)
61 . 1 % (33)

i

13.17***
.059
.001
13.402***
1.345

Note: Cell entries are the percent ofrespondents in each category that self-reported having a particular

authority. (Numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies.)

•••p < 0.0 1 .
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Table 7.18: Results of Analyses: Authority According to Environment Top
Objective Category

Top Objective Category
Authority
Final Decision Making
Can Tax
Can Punish
Approves Grants
Must be Consulted

Top Objective
Environment (N=8)
37.5% (3)
1 2.5% (1)
1 2.5% (1)
25.0% (2)
62.5% (5)

Top Objective Not
Environment (N =1 34)
47.8% (64)
3.7% (5)
9.0% (12)
42.5% (57)
54.5% (73)

i

.040
1.434
.1 14
.956
. 196

Note: Cell entries are the percent of respondents in each category that self-reported having a particular
authority. (Numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies.)

Table 7.19: Results of Analyses: Authority According to Social Services Top
Objective Category

Authority
Final Decision Making
Can Tax
· Can Punish
Approves Grants
Must be Consulted
Note:

Top Objective Category
Top Objective Not
Top Objective Social
Social Services
(N =132)
Services (N =l0)
40.0% (4)
47.7% (63)
4.5% (6)
0% (0)
9.8% (13)
0% (0)
42.4% (56)
30.0% (3)
56. 1% (74)
40.0% (4)

.223
.475
1.084
.591
.969

Cell entries are the percent of respondents in each category that self-reported having a particular
authority. (Numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies.)
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to have a specific type of authority. In sum, very few appear to have the authority to tax
or punish non-compliers. O-transportation organizations are the most authoritative with
62% of these councils claiming final decision-making authority. O-economic
development councils follow with. Mandatory consultation is certainly the most common
form of empowerment, however, as noted above, it is also the weakest form.
One would expect that those councils that receive more funding from the federal
government and their states will also have the greatest authority to accomplish their
objectives. To test the relationship between funding sources and authority, the following
hypotheses are proposed:
H4a: The more federal funding a council receives, the more
likely a council will have final decision making authority.
H4b: The more federal funding a council receives, the more
likely a council will have taxing authority.
H4c: The more federal funding a council receives, the more
likely a council will have the ability to punish
noncompliant local officials.
H4d: The more federal funding a council receives, the more
likely a council will have the authority to approve grant
applicants.
H4e: The more federal funding a council receives, the more
likely a council will have to be consulted.
These hypotheses are tested by bivariate analyses using "crosstabs" and chi-square (x2)
statistics. In each case, authority type is the dependent variable and federal funding
according to actual percent of annual revenue is the independent variable. The results are
presented in Table 7.20.
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Table 7:20: Results of Anal�ses: Authority According to Federal Funding Level

Federal Funding

Authority
Final Decision
Can Tax
Can Punish
Grant Approval
Must Consult

Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No

% Mean
63.35 (26.67)
49.24 (27.17)
32.80 (29.03)
56.78 (27.42)
57.85 (31.47)
55.66 (27.46)
61.72 (25.67)
51.43 (28.61)
54.97 (26.75)
57.02 (29.18)

r

8.83
5.29
14.38**
10.54*
1.86

N = 132
47% (62)
53% (70)
4% (5)
96% (127)
10% (13)
90% (119)
43% (57)
57% (75)
56% (74)
44% (58)

* * *f S 0.0 1 ; **E < 0.05; *E S O. I O.

According to the data, there is not a significant relationship between level of
federal funding and final decision-making authority (H4a). So we fail to reject the null.
Councils that have final decision-making authority receive an average of 63% of their
funding from the federal government. Those that have the authority to approval of grant
applications (H4d) receive an average of 62% of their funding from the federal
government, a significant relationship at the 0.10 level. Those that have the authority to
approve grant applications average 62% of their funding from the federal government and
have a statistically significant relationship with federal funding at the 0.05 level.
Finally, there is no relationship between ability to tax and federal funding. Those
with the ability to tax average 33% of their funding from the federal government. These
data suggest that those that receive high levels of federal funding are more likely to have
the authority to approve grant applications than to punish, tax, or make final decisions
than other councils.
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Citizen Participation

Council directors were asked to indicate the frequency, mode, and level of
satisfaction with citizen participation opportunities. Fifty-seven percent of the responding
council directors (N=124) reported that they offer monthly opportunities for citizen
participation. Another 22% offer quarterly opportunities. Others offer participatory
opportunities twice per year (8%) and weekly (10%). In nearly every case, these
opportunities occur in the form of a public meeting (96%). In every case, directors
responded that citizen input is used in a planning or advisory capacity. When directors
were asked how they feel about current levels of citizen participation (N=143), 57%
reported that their current level of participation is "good" and 6% reported that it is
"excellent." Thirty-four percent reported that their level is "poor" or "not so good."
Because federal grant conditions often stipulate the frequency that a funded
council must offer citizen participation opportunities, it is expected that there will be a
positive relationship between federal funding and frequency of participation. Does the
frequency of citizen participation opportunities have a statistically significant relationship
with federal funding?
H5a: The more federal funding a council receives, the more
it will offer opportunities for citizen participation.
H5b: The more state funding a council receives, the more it
will offer opportunities for citizen participation.
H5c: The more council member funding a council receives,
the more it will offer opportunities for citizen participation.
H5d: The more "other" funding a council receives, the more
it will offer opportunities for citizen participation.
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To test these hypotheses, bivariate analyses using "crosstabs" and chi-square statistics
(Y:) were performed. We fail to reject the null for H5a. According to this analysis, there is
no relationship between federal funding and citizen participation opportunity frequency
(Y: = 22.90; df= 20; p = .294). This suggests that federal funding has no impact on the
number of times that councils offer citizen participation opportunities.
We also fail to reject the null for H5b (Y: = 5.89; df= 12; p = .922). There is no
relationship between state funding and frequency that citizens are offered opportunity for
participation. There is, however, a statistically significant relationship between council
member contributions and opportunity for participation (H5c). The relationship between
council member contributions is significant at the 0.05 level

(r = 33.66; df= 20; p =

.029). While 85% of the councils receive less than 20% of their funding from their
members, 12% of the respondents meet with citizens weekly, 59% meet with their
citizens on a monthly basis; 22% meet quarterly, and 9% meet yearly or biannually.
Finally, we fail to reject the null for H5d. There is not statistically significant relationship
between "other'' sources of funding and citizen participation (x2 = 15 .13; df= 20; p =
.769).
Because citizen participation is almost always required as a pre-condition for
federal grant funding (Lipsky, 1976: 198-199), and because the grantor generally directs
participation activity types and frequency, and the required type of participation
opportunity is generally public meeting, a forum in which attendance is often low, it is
posited that councils driven by the need to fulfill funding requirements are less satisfied
with citizen participation. Is satisfaction with citizen participation related to federal
funding?
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H6a: The more federal funding a council receives, the more
satisfied the council director will be with citizen
participation.
According to this analysis ("crosstabs" and chi-square), there is no relationship between
federal funding and council directors' satisfaction with citizen participation (x2 = 30.08; p
= .873). So federal funding has no impact on council directors' satisfaction with citizen
participation. Is there a relationship between satisfaction with citizen participation and a
source of funding other than federal?
H6b: The more state funding a council receives, the more
satisfied the council director will be with citizen
participation.
H6c: The more council member funding a council receives,
the more satisfied the council director will be with citizen
participation.
H6d: The more "other'' funding a council receives, the
more satisfied the council director will be with citizen
participation.
Again, "crosstabs" and chi-square (x2) test statistics were performed. Chi-square statistics
indicate that there is no relationship between level of satisfaction with citizen
participation and state or council member funding (x2 = 30.15; p = .560 and x2 = 24. 93; p
= .632, respectively). However, there is a significant relationship between other forms of
funding (collapsed variable (0%, 1-10%, etc.) that includes fees, taxes, private donations,
fundraisers and corporate sponsors). This relationship has a chi-square value of 57.31 and
is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. This relationship is difficult to describe as one
third of the responding councils receive no funding (33%; N = 134) from "other" sources
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and another 47% receive between 1 and 30% of their funding from "other" sources. Only
8% receive more than 50% of their annual revenue from "other" sources. Controlling for
the 0% response, 59% of the respondents (N = 88) indicated that participation levels were
"good" and nearly 32% reported levels that were "poor" or "not so good." Somers , d does
not produce a statistically significant level of association (Somers' d = -.068; p = .341).

Board Composition

Regarding frequency of board meetings, some boards meet as few as two times
per year; others meet as many as 26 times per year. The mean is 9.4 times per year with a
standard deviation of 3.56 (N = 144). Meeting 10-12 times per year is the norm for most
councils (62.8%).
Local government leaders are the most prevalent board members; 98% report
local leaders sit on their boards. Sixty-five percent of the council directors reported have
no citizens on their boards. Seventy-four percent of the survey respondents reported
having no business leaders on their boards and 69% of the directors reported having state
representatives (Table 7.21). Board memberships range from zero to 74 elected members
(mean = 18.9; s = 13.74) and zero to 68 non-voting members (mean = 8.69; s = 11.02).
The average number of board members according to representative category is presented
in Table 7.22, below.
Are some councils more likely to include citizens on their boards than others? The
expectation is that councils that receive_ more of their funding from non-federal sources
will have a higher incidence of citizen and non-governmental board members. To what
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Table 7.21: Regional Council Board Composition
Council Board Composition (N = 142)

Total N
N%

Local
Leaders
138

Citizens
50

Bsns
Leaders
37

97.9%

35.2%

26.1%

Special
State Reps Districts
43
22
30.5%

15.5%

Other
26
18.3%

Table 7.22: Regional Council Board Composition Means
Council Board Composition (N = 142)

Mean
S. Deviation

Local
Leaders
18.98

Citizens
2.77

Bsns
Leaders
1.54

14.14

6.05

3.63

Special
State Reps Districts
.99
.78
2.36

2.31

Other
.51
1.49

extent does source of funding affect whether or not a council allows citizens on its board?
To determine this, a series of hypotheses are proposed:
H7a: The more that councils rely on federal funding the
less likely they are to include citizens on their boards.
H7b: The more that councils rely on state funding the more
likely they are to include citizens on their boards.
H7c: The more that councils rely on council funding the
more likely they are to include citizens on their boards.
H7d: The more that councils rely on other funding the more
likely they are to include citizens on their boards.
To test H7a-d, a series of bivariate analyses using "crosstabs" and chi-square tests
were conducted. In each case, the dependent variable was a dummy variable indicating
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whether or not a council had at least one citizen as board member. Independent variables
include actual percentages of funding by source. Table 7.23 presents these analyses.
The results of the chi-square tests statistics indicate that there is a statistically significant
relationship between whether or not a council has a citizen on their board and federal and
council member funding; both are significant at the 0.05 level. So we reject the null
hypotheses H7a and H7c. We fail to reject the null hypotheses for H7b and H7d. There is
no relationship between state funding and other funding with citizen board membership.
Is there a relationship between objective category and whether a citizen is on a
council's board? In other words, are transportation (or economic development,
environment, or social service) organizations more likely to have citizens on the board
than others? For those that chose a social service objective as number one, we would
expect their community focus to foster a more inclusive relationship with local citizens
and the business community. Four hypotheses are proposed:

Table 7.23: Citizen Board Membership According to Funding Source

Funding Sources
Federal
State
Council
Other

Citizen on Board?
No (N = 87)
Yes (N = 44)
58.13
51.32
(29.57)
(23.70)
15.37
17.77
(17.13)
(16.03)
11.90
11.27
(16.67)
(8.30)
15.35
17.48
(21.11)
(18.61)

i

11.25*
3.82
6.39**
5.64

Note: Cell entries are mean percents of funding by funding source according to
citizen or no citizen on council board. (Numbers in parentheses are standard
deviations.)
* *p < 0.05; *p < 0. 10.
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H8a: Councils that choose o-transportation as a top
objective are more likely to include citizens on their boards.
H8b: Councils that choose o-economic as a top objective
are more likely to include citizens on their boards.
H8c: Councils that choose o-environment as a top objective
are more likely to include citizens on their boards.
H8d: Councils that choose o-social services as a top
objective are more likely to include citizens on their boards.
In order to test H8a-d, bivariate analyses using "crosstabs" and chi-square
statistics were performed. According to the data, there is not a statistically significant
relationship between o-social services as a top objective and citizen board membership.
Nor is there a relationship between o-environment as a top objective and citizen board
membership. So we fail to reject the null hypotheses, H8c and d (see Table 7.24).
There are relationships between o-transportation and o-economic development as
top objective, so we reject the null hypothesis for H8a and b. In the case of transportation,
only 25% of those that chose o-transportation as top objective also had citizens on their
boards. This is compared to 45.6% of those that did not choose o-transportation as their
top objective but did have citizens on their boards. That negative relationship is moderate
in strength according to the Phi statistic (-.213).
A moderate, positive relationship exists between o-economic development
councils as top objective and citizen board membership (Phi = .209). Councils that chose
o-economic development as top objective are more likely to have citizens on their boards
than other council objective categories. Only 27.6% of the councils that did not choose o
economic development as their top objective included citizens on their boards.
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Table 7.24: Results of Analyses: Top Objective According to Citizen Board
Membership

Citizen on Board?

Top Objective
Category

Yes

No

Transportation

25.4% (18)

74.6% (53)

45.7% (32)

54.3% (38)

48.1% (26)

51.9% (28)

27.6% (24)

72.4% (63)

57.1% (4)

42.9% (3)

Not Environment

34.3% (46)

65.7% (88)

Social Services

27.3% (3)

72.7% (8)

Not Social
Services

36.2% (47)

63.8% (83)

Not
Transportation
Economic
Development
Not Economic
Development
Environment

i

Phi

6.386**

-.213**

6.155**

.209**

1.513

.104

.350

-.050

Note: Cell entries are percent of respondents in each category that reported having or not having
citizen board membership. (Frequencies are in parentheses.)
• •p � 0.05

Summary of Findings

We have explored a lot of ground in chapter 7. To make things clearer,
summaries are provided according to five categories used above, and echoed below:
Council designations; Council objectives; Council Funding; Council Authority; and
Citizen Participation.

Council Designations

Regarding specific designations, MPOs were the most common; 59% of the
survey respondents reported being an MPO. Additionally, 52% reported being a
Clearinghouse. And 44% of the survey respondents identified themselves as EDD/EDAs
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(see Table 7.2). Unique council designations (MPO, EDD/EDA, CLEAR, CAA, etc.)
were collapsed into four categories (d-transportation, d-economic development, d
environment, and d-social services). Council directors were instructed to "check all that
apply." Ninety-five percent of survey respondents self-reported belonging to d
transportation; 72% self-reported an economic-development designation; 40% chose a
social service designation; and 31% chose an environment-related designation (Table
7.4).

Council Objectives

Unique council top objectives were collapsed into four categories: o
transportation; a-economic development; a-environment; and o-social services.
Transportation issues were chosen as councils' top objective 52% of the time and one of
the top three objectives 83% of the time. Regional economic development came next with
top choice 38% of the time and one of the top three 71% of the time. Social services were
chosen as top objective 8% of the time and one of top three 34% of the time. Finally,
environmental issues were first choice 5% of the time, and one of the top three 41% of
the time (see Tables 7.7 and 7.8). All unique council designations chose transportation as
one of their top three objectives (Table 7.9).
Council designation categories, d-transportation, d-economic development, and d
social services, show significant relationships with a-transportation as one of top three
objectives. For d-transportation, that relationship is positive, for the others, the
relationship is negative indicating that d-transportation councils are more likely to choose
a-transportation as one of their top three objectives than other councils and d-economic
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development and d-social services councils are less likely. Nevertheless, d-economic
development councils chose a-transportation as one of their top three objectives 77% of
the time and d-social service councils chose it 71% of the time. D-environment councils
were neither more nor less likely than others to choose a-transportation as one of their top
three objectives (Table 7.10).

Council Funding

Only six councils report that they receive no funding from the federal government
(N = 133). Forty-eight percent of the respondents report at least 61% of their funding

comes from the federal government and another 21% of the survey respondents rely on
federal funding for 41-60% of their annual budget (Table 7.11 ). State funding is scarce
for regional councils; 74% report receiving none and 1 6% report that 1-20% of their
annual funding comes from their states. None report receiving more than 60% from their
states.
Council donations are similar: 82% report no funding comes from their councils
and 13% report that 1-20% comes from their council members. "Other" funding including fees, taxes, donations, fundraisers, etc. - means more to councils. Although
34% report receiving nothing from these sources, 35% report that 1-20% of their revenue
derives from these sources and another 27% report that 21 -60% comes from these
sources (Table 7. 1 1).
Federal funding provides the greatest mean percent to all council top objective
categories (Table 7. 1 2). O-transportation councils (top objective only) receive an average
of 66% of their annual funding from the federal government and only about 14% from
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their states. O-economic development councils receive an average of 44% from the
federal government and about 23% from their states. O-environment councils receive an
average of 54% from the federal government and o-social service councils average 55%
from the federal government. These data indicate a heavy reliance by all council types
and objectives on federal funding, with, in most cases, much weaker contributions from
states, council members, and "other" funding sources (Table 7.13).

Council Authority

Levels and types of authority vary according to council top objectives. Almost no
councils have the ability to tax or punish in order to achieve objectives {Table 7.16-7.19).
Those that did report having these types of authority most frequently chose o
transportation or a-environment as their top objective.
The most frequently chosen authority was also the weakest level of authority, that
councils must be consulted on a top objective before action can be taken in the region.
The range among council top objective categories for "must consult" was 40-63%. The
ability to approve grant applications was claimed by 22-59% of the top objective
categories. The most powerful authority, final decision-making, was also the second most
claimed; 28% of the respondents in a-economic development, 38% in a-environment,
40% in o-social services, and 62% in a-transportation claim that they have final decision
making authority.
There is no significant relationship between federal funding and final decision
making authority, although those that have final decision-making authority average 63%
of their annual revenue from the federal government. However, those that have the
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authority to approve grant applications average 62% of their revenue from the federal
government, a significant relationship at the 0.10 level. There was a negative relationship
between the ability to punish and federal funding (0.05) and no relationship between
consultation and trucing authorities and federal funding (Table 7.20).
The data suggest that there is a heavy reliance on federal funding by all types of
councils with the greatest mean percent going to a-transportation councils (65.61).
Additionally, 62% of the a-transportation councils claim to have the most powerful
authority, final decision-making, compared to the social services, with 40% claiming to
be final decision-makers (most likely in housing via HUD grants, or in senior services).
O-transportation councils also claim a weaker authority, the power to approve grant
applications (59% claim this authority compared to the next highest percent; 30% of the
o-social services councils claimed this authority).
The data indicate that there is a statistically significant relationship between
federal funding and final decision-making authority and the ability to approve grants,
indicating that transportation councils (the most frequent type), with their high reliance
on federal funding and their higher levels of authority, have been empowered via the
federal government.

Citizen Participation

Most citizen participation is occurring in public meetings (96%), a mode that
likely signals a low level of meaningful participation. All directors report that citizen
input is used to plan or advise on future courses of action. More than half the respondents
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are pleased with current levels of participation. Sixty-three percent indicated feeling that
there is a "good" or "excellent" level of citizen participation on Likert scaled responses.
The data show no relationship between funding sources and frequency of citizen
participation opportunities. Nor is there a relationship between funding source and
director satisfaction with citizen participation levels. Regarding board composition, local
leaders, understandably, dominate council boards. While 98% of the survey respondents
report having local leaders on their boards, only 35% report having citizen board
members. The average number of local leaders is nearly 19, while the average number of
citizens is nearly 3. Business leaders average almost 2 per board, although only 26%
report having them at all (see Tables 7.21 and 7.22). Two funding sources appear to have
a significant relationship with the inclusion of citizens on boards: federal and council
member funding. For federal funding, the relationship with citizens on board is negative
and significant at the 0.10 level. Council member funding and citizens on board is a
positive relationship significant at the 0.05 level.
Those that claim o-transportation as their top objective were less likely to have
citizens as board members than those that did not choose o-transportation as their top
objective (25% and 75%, respectively). And those that chose o-economic development as
their top objective were more likely to have citizens on their boards than those that did
not choose o-economic development as their top objective (48% and 28%, respectively).
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CHAPTER 8: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This research set out to examine the role of the federal government in today's
regional councils. This is an important question as it has been suggested that "the
purported role of federalism as protector of state and local freedom and diversity from
central control has been undermined by the growing influence of the national government
on states and localities . . . " (Posner, 1998: 222). We know from past experience that
regionalism is hard to achieve, hard to maintain (Bollens, 1997; Norris, 2001; Olberding,
2002). We also know that federal involvement can both spur much-needed regional
action and cause serious problems such as distortions in state and local agendas and state
and local dependency on federal grant funding (Derthick, 1970; Posner, 1998). This
research did not set out to determine whether and when federal intervention is warranted,
but to determine the breadth and depth of current federal intervention as a first step to
understanding the role of federal funding as a motivation for regional efforts.
Three key research questions were posed:
1.

Is there evidence that federal funding is a political force that has prompted
the growth and strengthening in authority in today's regional councils?
To what extent are regional councils responding to and dependent on
federal funding? Is one council type or objective positively related to
federal funding?

2.

What level of authority is granted to those councils that respond to federal
funding or programs? How do council objectives relate to levels of
authority? Does a particular objective category enjoy more authority than
others? Is there a relationship between federal funding and a particular
type of authority?

3.

To what extent are citizens involved in regional efforts? Is there a
relationship between a particular funding source and participation?
Between a particular objective and participation? Are councils that receive
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more federal funding less likely to engage in meaningful citizen
participation?

Growth ofRegionalism since the 1990: New regionalism thinkers looked to ISTEA and

TEA-21 to provide a "crucial case" for regionalism (Vogel, 2002: 109), a renewed hope
that regional cooperation would take root, grow, and pave inroads into some of the
tougher issues faced by our modem metropolitan areas (Edner and McDowell, 2002). In
many ways, it has done just that. For example, today's regional councils are equal to or
greater in number than those that existed in 1976, COGs' heyday. In the past two years,
as a result of ISTEA/TEA-21, MPOs have gained regional council status (NARC), a
boost from their earlier role as unempowered research organizations serving their state
departments of transportation (Katz et al, 2003). That boost increased NARC's roster
from 450 (2001-2002) to 653 (2003). This is certainly comparable to the 669 that existed
in 1976 (Grigsby, 1996; Lester and Lombard, 1998).
Part of that growth can be attributed to the broad nature of federal funding
programs that support regionalism. Attesting to this, a variety of councils have found a
new source of funding via ISTEA/TEA-21 (Edner and McDowell, 2002) and other broad
spectrum programs under HUD, as well (HUD, 2005). For instance, the Department of
Housing and Urban Development's Community Development Block Grant (CDBG)
program is a significant source of funding for many regional councils, as well as
nonprofit and faith-based organizations in cities across the United States (HUD, 2005).
Programs such as CDBG and ISTEA/TEA-21 appear to have reached beyond their parent
organizations' stated missions (housing and transportation) to support some of the more
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traditional (and less politically saleable) efforts attempted openly by COGs in the 1970s
(Edner and McDowell, 2002). Some examples include daycares built with TEA-21
funding and homeless and battered women's shelters under CDBG. Asking to remain
anonymous, one HUD employee stated that HUD began their outreach program to
include quality of life issues in 1998. Its purpose has been to "infect the bureaucracy with
change." It, and other federal programs, have apparently taken great strides toward
accomplishing that goal. By offering broad-spectrum opportunities ensconced in larger
bills, federal grants programs appear to have brought power and change to regional
efforts.

Distortion: This enlargement of focus shows up in the data presented here. Where

transportation organizations are the likely recipient of transportation dollars, this research
suggests that all councils, to some degree, seem to be shifting their focus to transportation
- even those that have to stretch to do so. Perhaps this is to gain access to the new
regionalism-friendly pool of federal funding. Considering that 1) so few councils (10%)
are funded above 20% of their annual budget by their states, and 2) 69% of the survey
respondents reported receiving 41% or more of their annual budgets from the federal
government, and that 3) 95% of the respondents reported a transportation designation, it
is no great leap to suggest that even non-transportation councils are vying for the broad
spectrum grant opportunities offered by !STEA and TEA-21.
While today's "reformed" federal programs offer regions the opportunity to
identify significant projects for funding (Lewis, 1998; Katz, 2003), many federal grant
programs mandate conditions that seriously limit possible solutions (Posner, 1998). In
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order to increase chances for funding approval, it may be that state and local governments
distort their agendas to focus on projects that leaders believe will be found most attractive
by the funding agency, not necessarily to those that are most needed in a particular
region. One MPO planner stated: "We have many miles of bike paths, but most of the
year it's too cold to ride bikes. I don't know whose bright idea that was" (Anonymous,
2004). With ISTEA, many local government initiatives are simply left off regional plans
(Andrews, 1996).

Local Responsiveness: This research suggests that federal funding may promote

distortion in local agenda setting. Eighty-three percent of the responding councils
reported that transportation is one of their top three objectives and 52% reported that it is
their top objective. This apparent preoccupation with transportation occurs in every type
of council, whether categorized by designation or objective. While transportation issues
remain particularly troublesome to state and local governments, regional council
preoccupation with the issue, coupled with their heavy dependence on federal funding
and relative poor support from their states suggests that these councils may have distorted
their agendas in response to a funding opportunity. This is not without precedent. To
recall, the early COGs survived in the same manner after Reagan's devolution (Atkins
and Wilson-Gentry, 1992). Changing missions is a path to survival for many
organizations, not just regional councils. It would come as no surprise if many have
responded to transportation funding opportunities in their most recent attempt to survive.

136

Dependence on Federal Funding: Regional council dependence on federal funding is

significant for a number of reasons. First, it suggests a commitment on the part of the
federal government to regional cooperation that may be lacking on the state level. The
data show that 90% of the responding councils receive less than 20% of their funding
from their states; 74% report receiving no funding from their states at all. Conversely,
69% of the responding councils receive 40% or more of their funding from the federal
government. The low level of state funding for regional efforts suggests that many states
might not view regional cooperation as a viable solution for important issues in their
regions. Reasons for this are unclear, but almost certainly state autonomy, the political
problems associated with regional cooperation, and past bad relations between states and
regional councils play a role.
Second, a heavy dependence on federal funding would place regional councils in
a vulnerable position similar to that of the early COG. COGs of the 1970s relied on
federal funding for about 70% of their annual budget, a number that today's council is
creeping toward. As history has shown, leadership and policy changes on the national
level leave dependent regional councils vulnerable to reductions in federal allocations.
Councils that lose large portions of their funding have, in the past, been forced to change
or abandon missions in order to survive. Those that were not able to adapt have, in the
past, been forced to fold. For long-term commitments to regional cooperation,
commitment that is necessary for the successful implementation of many regional plans,
regionalism might be better served if funded by council members, states, or by some
other non-federal means. Unfortunately, such support is very hard to come by.
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Authority: Today's regional councils appear to not be the empowered organizations that

they once were. Nevertheless, those councils that are most prevalent (transportation
councils) and receive the most funding from the federal government (transportation
councils) also appear to be the councils with the highest degree of authority (final
decision-making authority). Fifty-two percent of regional councils are transportation
councils that receive an average of 66% of their funding from the federal government and
62% percent of those councils claim to have final decision-making authority. The greatest
concern here is that transportation money is difficult to refuse; states are forced to
relinquish some (in most cases) or most (in some cases) authority to regional entities in
exchange for federal funding for transportation efforts. (Let us not forget that the scope of
"transportation" has extended beyond the strict definitional bounds of the same.) That
authority comes directly from the federal government, an arrangement that creates a
questionable relationship under federalism, perhaps not so unlike the relationship
experienced between regions and the national government in the 1970s. The argument
that participation in federal grants programs is voluntary is weak ''when the federal grant
program is too large for the state and local governments to voluntarily tum down"
(Posner, 1998, 1 3).

Citizen Participation: One of the on-going barriers to regional cooperation is the lack of

citizen support (Norris, 200 1 ). Although a majority of regional councils report that they
offer public meetings on a monthly basis, and more than half of the council directors
indicated that they feel citizen participation levels are "good," 34% indicated that
participation levels are "not so good" or "poor" and 65% report that there are no citizen
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members on their boards. Citizen input that is gleaned from public meetings appears to be
used in a way that has been described as "tokenism" and "relative non-participation"
(Arnstein, 1969). Furthermore, the councils that are the most prevalent, the most
powerful, and the most federally funded, transportation councils, are also the least likely
to have citizens as board members (25% do). Even though council directors say that they
are generally satisfied with citizen participation, it appears that citizen participation is
mediocre.
In closing, "Transportation is one of the policy areas that has been a bellwether in
characterizing the status of the federal-state relationship" (Edner and McDowell, 2002:
7). Unfortunately, under this bellwether, as with the COGs of the 1970s, state and
regional council relationships have suffered with recent federal intervention (Howe,
1994). ISTEA and TEA-21 gave MPOs the power to choose the transportation projects
that should be funded in their regions, a decision that was previously dominated by the
state departments of transportation. Strained relationships between states and regional
entities can cause problems with agenda setting as states often control the information
that agencies need in order to formulate accurate and meaningful plans. If states and their
regional councils are at odds, information may be withheld or delayed (Howe, 1994).
Plans based on incomplete information benefit no one in the long term.
Some might argue that whatever the impetus for regional cooperation, any
regional cooperation is better than none at all. And certainly regional efforts can land in a
variety of places on the cooperation continuum, from totally voluntary to completely
mandated action. Where a council or program lands on the continuum is important when
considering how to maintain democratic integrity. For instance, for a council to function
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as part of our democratic system, regional plans and actions taken must reflect the desires
and needs of the participating local governments. Moreover, local governments must be
allowed the freedom to innovate, and the act of setting the regional agenda must include a
high level of citizen involvement. Can councils that rely heavily on federal funding meet
these criteria? Perhaps. Nevertheless, if federal involvement means distortion in state or
regional agenda setting, erosion of regional council and state relations, or that states lose
power as they did in the 1970s, there are constitutional flags that raise which cannot be
ignored under federalism.

Suggestions for Future Research

While councils of government were largely ignored in the literature following
devolution and even into the 1990s with the reemergence of regional cooperation framed
as the new regionalism, regional councils are making their way back to the regional stage
as powerful players. This work is the first known attempt to explore federal funding as
the motivation for today's regional efforts and much remains to be studied. Because the
data harvested from the survey used in this research was limited by its exploratory nature,
a follow-up study could be conducted to delve deeper into the questions posed here. For
instance, for councils claiming multiple objectives, what percentage of their funding goes
to each objective by funding source? Since most councils claim transportation as one of
their top three objectives, it would be worthwhile to know when transportation became
important to each council, whether directors feel that this focus is counter to their original
or on-going missions, and whether they feel that this focus on transportation was adopted
as a means to survive.
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In addition, other lines of research include a follow-up study to determine how
regional councils and their states respond to future increases and decreases in federal
funding (will regional councils again fold or will states increase their support?) and
whether regional councils show signs of longevity in the face of those fluctuations. Will
regional councils continue to grow in number? In authority? Will they continue to focus
on federal goals or will regionalism become rooted as necessary agents for successful
competition in our global economy? Finally, since it is so difficult to achieve support for
the revitalization of central cities, equity, and other tough lifestyle issues (Cisneros,
1995), it would be worthwhile to determine how and to what extent regional councils are
making progress in these areas.
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APPENDIX A: REGIONAL COUNCILS IN THE UNITED STATES :
SURVEY RESPONDENTS

1 60

Survey Respondents and their Demographic Characteristics

Council
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3
4
5
6
7
8
9
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ABAG
SACOG
SJCOG
MCAG
CFCG
SBCAG
AMBAG
CSBCOG
TCAOG
KCAOG
MCG
MTC
UAACOG
PPACOG
NFRMPO
REGION9
PACOG
DRCOG
CRCOG
GBRPA
CCRPA
SCRCOG

Census
Division

State
AK

AL
AL
AL
AL
AL
AL
AL
AL
AL
AL

AR

AR
AR

AZ
AZ
AZ
AZ
AZ

CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA

co
co
co
co
co
co

CT
CT
CT
CT

Region
Square
Miles
586412
3287
6 1 50
5352
1250
2072
250
20 1 8

1
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
4
4
4
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2

270000
233300
461 034
26837 1
1 64848
223350
340000
32244 1
350000
1 55444
75840
1 65986
86000
50000
450000
3300000
23 1 062
1 60026
73000
16500000
2596400
1936006
6 1 3500
220000
826550
410285
750000
56000
379000
1 36108
87000

3670
4895
1 600
6584
24 14

16
15
12
17
8

76000
57932 1
350000
8007 1
1 30000
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29
6
7
15

720000
300000
1 60562
550000

6000
2737
3768
1400
4839
1 396

7
7
7
7
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Population

1
42
63
44
9
7
5
15
8
13
6
44
7
4
52 1
28
16
6
3
1 94
100
28
8
7
16
9
20
3
9
5
5

1 87
4302
9 14
130
47000
9200
10087
5 522
525
38000
6932
6 1 90
1440

2
2
2

Jurisdictions
Served

43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91

SECCOG
SWRPA
COGCNV
WINCOG
CRERPA
VCOG
HVCEO
LHCEO
MWCOG
DKMPO
NFRC ·
WFRPC
SFRPC
BCMPO
NCFRPC
ECFRPC
TCRPC
ARPC
PBMPO
CFRPC
POLKTPO
SARASOTA
BMPO
NPCOG
HERNANDO
SWFRPC
ARC
SEGARDC
CORARDC
CSRARDC
NEGRDC
CGRDC
LCRDC
SGRDC
NGRDC
ARTS
CFRDC
ECIA
REGION12
MIDAS
UERPC
INRCOG
NWIPDC
ECICOG
DMAMPO
Al 5RPC
NIACOG
SAGEID
REGIONIV

CT
CT
CT
CT
CT
CT
CT
CT
DC
DE
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
GA
GA
GA
GA
GA
GA
GA
GA
GA
GA
GA
IA
IA
IA
IA
IA
IA
IA
IA
IA
IA
ID

ID

7 .
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2

559
225
3 10
330
80
3 37
403
301 7
596
4443
6026
400
7000
3606
504
2200
5082
20 10
1 3 12
1 557
2044
477
3000
4990
5700
5700
3260
4400
2612
6000
1679
3465
3456
3 1 63
4804
3799
500
4000
4482
2 1 770
1 1 500
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20.
8
13
9
9
4
10
11
18
21
34
42
67
5
43
6

250000
354000
7662 1
60000
80000
2 1 2248
80457
4425794
1 30495
1234000
850000
3200000
1 600000
450000
1 5 97306

28
38
30
6
9
17
27
1

1 100000
666380
483000
6 1 0000
500000
493 1 80
1 39249

64
32
60
60
66
39
24
58
20
10

3400000
152268
435000
435000
43 8300
542976
250364
352000
200000
335000

72
64
67
56
60
87
74
18
88
75
10
42

200000
86907
1 0 1 1 65
86000
2 1 3 1 99
140838
3 85384
395200
142800
1 33820
535652
165000

92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
1 00
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
1 10
111
1 12
1 13
1 14
1 15
1 16
1 17
118
1 19
120
121
122
1 23
124
125
126
127
128
129
1 30
131
1 32
1 33
134
1 35
1 36
1 37
138
1 39
140

ECIPDA
BEARRC
WCDC
BSRC
TRICORPC
SCIRPDC
TRRCPO
MCRPC
WCINEDD
NIRCC
DMMPC
EUTSMPO
NKDPC
SKRPC
BIGSANDY
KIPDA
GRADO
NKADD
LTADD
PEADD
BRADD
CRPC
MAPC
SRPEDD
BRPC
MVPC
NMCOG
BMC
TCCSMD
MSRC
HCPCME
ATRC
SEMCOG
NWM
GCMPC
WMSRDC
ECMPDR
SMC
KATS
BCATS
RS
ROCOG
METROC
MRPO
OFRPC
BoonRPC
NMRCOG
OTO
MARC

ID
ID
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL

IN
IN
IN
IN

KS
KS
KY
KY
KY
KY
KY
KY
KY
LA
MA
MA
MA

MA

MA
MD
MD
MD
ME
ME

MI
MI
MI
MI
MI
MI
MI
MI
MI

MN
MN

MO
MO
MO
MO
MO
MO

1 9240
2072
2695
2770
1797
2750

2
2
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
3
3
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
4
7
7
7
7
7
9
9
9
7
7
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

2403
1 733
400
748
1 6200
7656
1988
2058
1681
3342
3933
4000
5386
1406
808
946
280
200
2200
1000
1 1 93
1698
4542
6400
655
2973
171 1
576
216
660
4602
3407
1 598
2643
3782

163

9
7
48
46
25

1 5988 1
8272
1 89000
41 7741
347387
122434

41
4
4
8
18
100
5
1 28
34
62
35
33
36
61
101
27
32
15
9
6
3
3
39
4
232
10
33
120
15
51
17
7

224203
433359
1 1 8769
21 1000
98000
2076 1 3
160532
1 03660 1

38
196
34
21
27
42
9
1 24

127000
2600000
138207
80265
75600
70627
365000
1 7465 86

40 1488
248250
215519
255225
82 1 154
3066344
597294
1 34953
320000
290000
2300000
28 1000
94258
5 1 79 1
70000
4800000
250000
436141
334550
289820
250000
95000

141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
1 50
151
1 52
1 53
1 54
1 55
1 56
1 57
158
1 59
1 60
161
1 62
1 63
1 64
1 65
1 66
1 67
168
1 69
1 70
171
1 72
1 73
1 74
1 75
1 76
1 77
178
179
1 80
181
1 82
1 83
1 84
1 85
1 86
1 87
1 88
1 89

TRPDD
NMPDD
WESTP
KERRTAR
CFCOG
HUAMPO
PTCOG
FMMETROCOG
BMMPO
OCBMAPA
SNDD
NRPC
UVLSRPC
SRPCSMPO
LAKESPC
SNHPC
SJTPO
RTCWC
TMPO
CNYRPD
STCPDB
LCLGRPB
NOCTC
CDRPC
ITCTC
STWPDB
MORPC
BHRDD
TMACOG
AMATS
OMEGA
CCSTCC
NCRPC
NEFCO
INCOG
LMPO
LCOG

ewe

MCCOG
MWVCOG
RVCOG
DURPC
SEDACOG
SPC
SAPDC
NPRPDC
WATS
MCRPC
RISPP

MS
MS
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
ND
ND
NE
NE
NH
NH
NH
NH
NH
NJ

NV
NV
NY
NY
NY
NY
NY
NY
NY

OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OK
OK
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
PA
PA
PA
PA
PA
PA
PA
RI

6
6
9
9
9
9
9
3
3
3
3
7
7
7
7
7
8
2
2
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
4
4
1
1
1
1
1
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
7

· 4379
2827
1638
2 1 02
2949
280

47
26
28
5
41
7

261 880
143 1 22
348084
1 94307
345545
146000

500
390
2353
42 1 9
325
1 1 75
543
1 1 00
489

1 50000
947 1 9
7073 10
100738
1 95788
1 00592
1 3669 1
106486
252837

7600
2151
6300
816
2200
400

6
5
44
87
12
30
18
30
13
68
3
8
1 52
3
5
1
83
20

3 1 5000
53000
780000
209020
240000
34 1 367
794293
1 00000

1 861
3676
2240
958
50 1 90
400
497
2067
5000
60
461 0
3968
6696
2629
4442
3833
6367
7 1 12
4 1 65
5432
448 1 9
672
1000

42
8
71
33
1 12
22
27
1 27
50
1
26
27
5
42
15
352
11
549
6
266
1
35
39

1424335
255000
800000
704848
598000
145000
1 28852
1 1 84622
760000
92057
328 1 50
230000
49500
438450
265250
5300000
662738
2656007
47 1596
729000
120000
120293
1000000

500
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1 90
1 91
1 92
1 93
1 94
1 95
1 96
1 97
1 98
1 99
200
20 1
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
21 1
2 12
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
22 1
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
23 1
232
233
234
235
236
237
238

SCACOG
WRCOG
SLRCOG
SPC
USCOG
GRATS
CRCOG
SATS
CMIDLAND
SECOG
FDALG
SWTNDD
MUAMPO
NAMPO
KRTPO
WMMPO
NCTCOG
AACOG
CTCOG
BVCOG
ATCOG
SETRPC
PRPC
CAPCO
HOTCOG
SABCMPO
LMPO
BMPO
DETCOG
SPAG
SUAG
BRAG
WFRC
HRPDCMPO
NVRC
RICHMOND
CRATERODC
RVARC
RRRC
RUTLANDRPC
CCRPC
CVTRPC
TRORC
CCMPO
ACRPC
PSRC
CWCOG
WCOG
BENTON

SC
SC
SC
SC
SC
SC
SC
SC
SC
SD
SD

TN
TN
TN
TN
TN

TX
TX
TX

TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
UT
UT
UT
VA
VA
VA
VA
VA
VA
VT
VT
VT
VT

VT
VT
WA
WA
WA
WA

3835
2900
2529
682
2990

9
9
9

9

9
9
9

2276
295

9

9
3
3
6
6
6
6
6
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
2
2
2

7 1 63
4000
2883
976
130
10800
1 1 354
6540
5 1 24
6400
2207
26000
8563
56 1 1
1250
1 90
300
9790
1 3737
1 7432
9 143
2907
1 304
2 1 65
2323
1 640
1 933
969
539

9

9
9

9

9
9
7
7
7
7
7
7
1
1
1
1

900
544
6000
1452
2 1 80
42 1 6
165

49
17
8
3
30
7
25
11
40
86
43
17
20
5
4
230
102
37
31
10
45
95
54
5
4
42
70
4
42
62
16
14
9
10
9
10
27
19
23
27
18
21
75
22
10
18

1 028656
289644
2099 14
1 05640
2 1 5739
3 80000
2899 14
1 82000
59625 3
2 1 32 14
1 1273 1
242763
1200000
4 1 9830
50000
5725000
1 807868
345 1 8
267085
3 1 09 1 1
385900
405249
145 1437
308693
1400000
242000
1 86000
355862
37787 1
5278 1
1 50000
1 3 8 1 778
1 592900
1 800000
87357 1
427032
264000
1 30000
61000
14657 1
63276
35000
1489 1 6
35289
3387500
98700
1 75000
253 1 68

239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250

SEWRPC
NRPC
BAYLAKERPC
SWWRPC
NCWRPC
MRRPC
SATS
JAMPO
RIPDC
RVIIPDC
KYOVA
CMPO

WI
WI
WI
WI
WI
WI
WI
WI

WV
WV

WV

WY

5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
9
9
9
2

2689
10615
5433

1 54
10
1 85

9300
5936
55

250
218
8

3000

33
31
5
2

1243
1 82
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1 950000
1 80782
564845
14062 1
420000
302257
58732
230000
200356
68202
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NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REGIONAL COUNCILS
Member Information Update Form
Name of Regional Council/MPO
Mailing Address _______________________
City ___________ State _______ Zip ________
Phone

------------FAX ----------------

Email ------------- Website ------------Executive Director __________ Chairman :r-----,.-"T"

-.---Pleare mclude
-,-,tl.,.,,tlr-..--ss...,..1oner
-,-;-Ma
e _....,C.,..a1TIU
)U', Jwge, etc.

Dir. of Transportation _________ Dir. of Environment _______
Board Composition ______
Voting Members

Non-Voting Members

Number Jurisdictions Served _____ Region Size ______ (Sq. miles)
Population ______ Full Time Staff ____ Part-Time Staff ___
Regional Council Year _____
Activities: (Please Check all that Apply)
D

MPO - Metropolitan Planning Organization

D

RLF - Revolving Loan Fund

D

RTPO - Rural Transportation Planning
Organization

D

IRP - Intermediary Relending Program Fund

D

CAA - Clean Air Agency

D

EDD/EDA - Designated Economic Development
District

D

WQPA - Water Quality Planning Agency

D

LDD/ARC - Designated Local Development

D

SWDSA - Solid Waste District Service Agency

District

D

RHA - Regional Housing Authority

WIA - Service Delivery Area for Workforce

D

OMA - State-Designated Growth Management

D

Agency

Development
D

AAA - Area Agency on Aging

D

SBACDC - SBA Certified Development

D

LUP - Regional Land Use Planning
Responsibility

Company

D

D

CAA2 - Community Action Agency

OTHER ACTIVITIES:

D

Environmental Program
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CLEAR - Regional Clearinghouse Function

PLEASE FOLLOW THE DIRECTIONS GIVEN WITH EACH QUESTION. IF YOU ARE UNSURE HOW TO
ANSWER, PLEASE LEA VE THAT QUESTION BLANK.

1.

SOME REGIONAL COUNCILS FOCUS ON ONE OBJECTIVE, SUCH AS TRANSPORTATION
PLANNING OR WATER QUALITY, WHILE OTHERS FOCUS ON A VARIETY OF ISSUES. PLEASE
INDICATE IN THE SP ACE PROVIDED THE NUMBER OF OBJECTIVES THAT YOUR COUNCIL
ADDRESSES. -----

2.

NARC HAS COMPILED A LIST OF THE MOST COMMON OBJECTIVES TO REGIONAL COUNCILS.
USING THE LIST PROVIDED, PLEASE RANK ORDER YOUR COUNCIL'S TOP THREE
OBJECTIVES WITH II l " INDICATING THE MOST IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE AND 1 1 3 11
INDICATING THE THIRD MOST IMPORTANT. IF YOUR COUNCIL MANAGES A SINGLE
OBJECTIVE, PLEASE INDICATE ONLY THAT ONE OBJECTIVE.
SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL AND MANAGEMENT
__ EQUITY ISSUES
HOUSING POLICIES
TRANSPORTATION ISSUES
ENVIRONMENT ISSUES
REDEVELOPMENT
__ DISSEMINATION OF REGIONAL INFORMATION (CLEARINGHOUSE)
GROWTH MANAGEMENT
COORDINATION OF MULTIPLE SERVICES
REVITALIZATION OF CENTRAL CITIES
REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
OTHER
OTHER
0THER

----------------------------------------------------

3.

HAS THE RANKING THAT YOU JUST ASSIGNED CHANGED DURING YOUR TENURE AS
DIRECTOR? (PLEASE CIRCLE YOUR ANSWER.)
1
2
3

NO
YES
NOT SURE
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3A.

IF YOU ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 3, PLEASE INDICATE WHICH OBJECTIVE{S)
CHANGED AND CIRCLE WHETHER THE OBJECTIVE WAS INTRODUCED DURING YOUR
TENURE, BECAME MORE IMPORTANT TO YOUR COUNCIL, OR BECAME LESS IMPORTANT.
CHANGED OBJECTIVES
(PLEASE WRITE IN BELOW)

HAS BECOME
LESS
IMPORTANT

WAS
INTRODUCED

N OT SURE

3

4

1

2
2

3

4

1

2

3.

4

1

4.

HAS BECOME
MORE
IMPORTANT

THE FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF ACTIVITIES IN WHICH REGIONAL COUNCILS ROUTINELY
ENGAGE. PLEASE RANK THE LIST BASED ON THE AMOUNT OF TIME YOUR COG SPENDS ON
EACH ACTIVITY. LET " l " INDICATE THE MOST IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE AND YOUR
HIGHEST NUMBER INDICATE THE LEAST IMPORTANT.
FUND RAISING
CONSENSUS BUILDING - CITIZENRY
CONSENSUS BUILDING - MEMBERS
COMMUNITY EDUCATION
LONG-TERM PLANNING
WHAT TYPE OF PLANNING?
0RGANIZING MEETINGS AND EVENTS
LOBBYING
REPORTING ACTIVITIES AND RESULTS
CONSULTATION WITH LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
DIRECT DELIVERY OF SERVICES
OTHER ____________________
OTHER
0THER

-----------

--------------------

--------------------

5 .-

HAS THE RANKING YOU JUST ASSIGNED' CHANGED DURING YOUR TENURE? {PLEASE
CIRCLE YOUR ANSWER.)
l

2
3

NO
YES
NOT SURE

1 70

6.

REGARDING YOUR TOP THREE OBJECTIVES, PLEASE CONSIDER THE CHART BELOW AND
CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY.

MY COUNCIL • • •

HAS FINAL
DECISIONMAKING
AUTHORITY

MUST BE
CONSULTED ON
ISSUE

HAS TAXING
AUTHORITY TO
ACHIEVE GOALS

I

2

3

4

5

I

2

3

4

5

I

2

J

4

5

OBJECTIVE I
OBJECTIVE 2
OBJECTIVE 3

7.

ARE THERE OTHER TOOLS AVAILABLE TO YOUR COUNCIL THAT HELPS YOU ACHIEVE
YOUR GOALS THAT WERE NOT LISTED ABOVE?

1

2

8.

CAN PUNISH
CAN OK GRANT
THOSE WHO DON'T
FUNDS OR
COMPLY WITH
APPLICATIONS FOR
REGIONAL PLAN
THIS OBJECTIVE

NO
YES

WHICH TOOLS?

-------------

MANY TIMES A NEED IS BROUGHT TO A REGIONAL COUNCIL FOR RESOLUTION WHEN
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FIND THAT THEY ARE UNABLE TO DEAL WITH THE MATIER
INDIVIDUALLY. WERE ANY OF YOUR TOP THREE OBJECTIVES BROUGHT TO YOUR
REGIONAL COUNCIL DUE TO AN IDENTIFIED NEED THAT COULD NOT BE RESOLVED BY
INDIVIDUAL LOCAL GOVERNMENTS?

1

2
3

NO
YES
DON'T KNOW

IF YES, DO YOU FEEL THAT THIS NEED HAS ENCOURAGED CONTINUED
COOPERATION BETWEEN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS?

l

2

3

4

5

DEFINITELY WOULD NOT HAVE COOPERATED
PROBABLY WOULD NOT HAVE COOPERATED
NOT SURE
PROBABLY WOULD HAVE COOPERATED ANYWAY
DEFINITELY
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I

T

R• c_
RV
.___________________;____s_
RB
_
o_s_
oU
URE
..;.,_AN_
____
E_
s _______......;;,,.____......
_C______
T_

9.

LISTED BELOW ARE COMMON SOURCES OF REGIONAL COUNCIL FUNDING. WHILE
THINKING ABOUT LAST YEAR'S BUDGET, PLEASE ESTIMATE THE PERCENT OF YOUR
BUDGET THAT COMES FROM EACH SOURCE. PLACE A ZERO IN THE BLANK IF YOU DO NOT
RECEIVE ANY FUNDING FROM A PARTICULAR SOURCE.
__ YOUR STATE (NOT INCLUDING FEDERAL BLOCK GRANTS)
__ THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (INCLUDING BLOCK GRANTS TO STATES)
__ COUNCIL MEMBERS (MEMBERSHIP DUES, CONTRIBUTIONS� ETC.) ..
PRIVATE DONATIONS
FUND RAISERS
DESIGNATED TAXES
CORPORATE SPONSORS
FEE-BASED SERVICES TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND OTHERS
OTHER ____________
OTHER ____________

1 0.

HAS THIS PERCENT DISTRIBUTION CHANGED DURING YOUR TENURE? (PLEASE CIRCLE
YOUR ANSWER.)

1
2
3

_-1..,.
T+

NO
___
YES
NOT SURE

WHAT YEAR WAS DID THIS CHANGE OCCUR?

IF YES, WHAT CHANGE DID YOUR COUNCIL EXPERIENCE?

11.

WE ARE INTERESTED TO LEARN ABOUT YOUR BOARD COMPOSITION. USING THE LIST
PROVIDED, PLEASE TELL US HOW MANY OF YOUR BOARD MEMBERS APPLY TO EACH
CATEGORY.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LEADERS
STATE REPRESENTATIVES
EMPLOYEES OF OTHER COUNCILS
CONCERNED CITIZENS WITH NO OFFICIAL TIES
BUSINESS LEADERS
CHAMBER EMPLOYEES
OTHER

-----------

12.

HOW MANY TIMES DOES YOUR BOARD MEET ANNUALLY? ----
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13.

IN THE PA�T, HOW HAS ATTENDANCE BEEN AT YOUR COUNCIL'S MEETINGS?

1
2
3
4
5
14.

FEWER THAN 25% USUALLY ATTEND
25 - 49% USUALLY ATTEND
50 - 75% USUALLY ATTEND
MORE THAN 75% USUALLY ATTEND
NOT SURE

REGARDING YOUR REGION'S PARTICIPATING MEMBERS, HOW SATISFIED ARE YOU WITH
THE LEVEL OF COOPERATION THAT YOU EXPERIENCE? ·.

1
2

3
4

5

NOT SATISFIED AT ALL
SOMEWHAT SATISFIED
NOT SURE
SATISFIED
VERY SATISFIED

15.

IN YOUR REGION, HOW MANY REGIONAL INITIATIVES WERE IMPLEMENTED BY LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS IN THE PAST FIVE YEARS? _____

1 6.

WERE ANY OF THESE INITIATIVES NOT REQUIRED OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT THAT
IMPLEMENTED THEM?

1
2
3

17.

NO
YES
NOT SURE

HOW MANY? ___

HOW ACCEPTING D O YOU FEEL THAT YOUR CONSTITUENT GOVERNMENTS ARE OF YOUR
COUNCIL'S INVOLVEMENT IN REGIONAL ISSUES? (CIRCLE ONE.)

1

2
3
4

5

NOT ACCEPTING AT ALL
SOMEWHAT ACCEPTING
NOT SURE
ACCEPTING
VERY ACCEPTING

1 73

C ITIZEN PARTICIPATION

1 8.

HAVE YOU FOUND THAT THERE ARE OPPORTUNITIES FOR CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN
YOUR COUNCIL'S ACTIVITIES? (CIRCLE ONE.)

1

2
3

1 9.

NO
YES
NOT SURE

IF YOU ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 1 5,- IN WHAT WAYS DO CITIZENS·PARTICIPATE? · ··
(PLEASE WRITE YOUR ANSWER BELOW.)
HOW OFTEN DO THESE OPPORTUNITES OCCUR? --------

20.

HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THE CURRENT LEVEL OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION? (CIRCLE
ONE.)
1
2
3
4
5

21.

POOR LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION
PARTICIPATION LEVEL NOT SO GOOD
NOT SURE
GOOD LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION
EXCELLENT LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION

IN WHAT WAY IS THE PUBLIC'S INPUT USED? (PLEASE WRITE IN SPACE BELOW.)

PLEASE USE THE REMAINDER OF THE PAGE TO COMMENT ON ANY OF THE ABOVE QUESTIONS OR
TOPICS. AGAIN, YOUR RESPONSES ARE COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL. THANK YOU.

QUESTIONS 22-34 PERTAINED TO SALARY AND BENEFITS OF COG DIRECTORS AND FTES
AND ARE NOT RELEVANT TO THIS STUDY.

1 74

APPENDIX C: ADDITIONAL TABLES

175

Table 7.25: Regional Council Types and Descriptions
Council Type

Des·cription

MPO - Metropolitan
Planning Organization

A metropolitan planning organization is an organization of primarily local
elected officials who provide a forum for local decision-making on
transportation issues of a regional nature. The federal government requires
that an MPO be designated for each urbanized area with a population
greater than 50,000. This designation must be agreed on by the governor
and the units of general purpose local governments that together represent
at least 75 percent of the affected population (including the central city or
cities as defined by the Bureau of the Census). www.dot.wisconsin.gov

RTPO - Rural
Transportation Planning
Organization

Rural Transportation Planning examines travel and transportation issues
and needs in non-metropolitan areas. In metropolitan areas over 50,000
population, the responsibility for transportation planning lies with
designated Metropolitan Planning Organizations; in small communities
and rural areas there is no one official body designated to undertake
transportation planning. In some states, planning for these areas is
undertaken by the State Department of Transportation. In other states these
functions are performed by Rural Planning Organizations or local
governments. www.fhwa.dot.gov

EDD/EDA - Designated
Economic Development
District

Any federally designated agency responsible for regional economic
development planning and collaboration with various private and public
sector agencies to accomplish a coordinated strategy and an ongoing
economic development program for the region.

LDD/ARC - Designated
Local Development District

The LDDs' most important role is to identify priority needs oflocal
communities. Based on these needs, the LDDs work with their board
members and other local citize.ns to develop plans for their communities'
economic development, to target and meet the most pressing needs, and to
build community unity and leadership. www.arc.gov

WIA - Service Delivery
Area for Workforce
Development

Agencies created under the Work Investment Act. These agencies seek to
support workforce development and local economic development by
providing business and industry with a well-trained workforce. Adapted
from www.wdcspokane.com/About/about.html

AAA - Area Agency on
Aging

Regional councils that act as advocates for the population over 60.
Services are coordinated for senior citizens using state, federal, and local
resources to assess the needs of the elderly, coordinate the needed
services, keep the elderly informed of current events affecting them, and
act on their behalf to maintain their independence and quality of life.
Adapted from www.alarc.org/aging/index.html

SBACDC - SBA Certified
Development Agency

The SBA defines Certified Development Companies as non-profit
corporations set up to contribute to the economic development of their
community or region. They serve their communities by financing business
expansion needs. There are approximately 290 CDCs nationwide, each
one covering a specific area. www.lehighvalley.org/
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Table 7.25: Continued
Council Type

Description

CAA2 - Community Action
Agency

Community Action Agencies (CAAs) are nonprofit private and public
organizations established under the Economic Opportunity Act of 1 964 to
fight America's War on Poverty. Community Action Agencies help people
to help themselves in achieving self-sufficiency. Today there are
approximately 1 ,000 Community Action Agencies in the United States.
www.communityactionpartnership.com

Environmental Program

Councils organized to deal with environmental issues from water quality
to forestation practices.

RLF - Revolving Loan
Fund

Revolving Loan Funds (RLF) are designed to assist new and/or expanding
businesses. RLF are focused on the difference in an entrepreneur's
financing and what is needed to make deals work. Gap financing through
an RLF assists in making a deal reality and thereby creates new
employment opportunities. Adapted from www.alarc.org/development/

IRP - Intermediary
Relending Program Fund

An agency established to act as an intermediary, accepting loans from
government agencies and relending those funds to final recipients, usually
for economic development, community development, or the creation of
job opportunities.

CAA - Clean Air Agency

Agencies that were formed as the result of the 1 967 Clean Air Act (RCW
70.94). These agencies are responsible for enforcing federal, state and
local outdoor air quality standards and regulations.

WQP A - Water Quality
Planning Agency

Agencies responsible for monitoring the quality of drinking water and/or
surface water in a region.

SWDSA - Solid Waste
District Service Agency

Agencies responsible for the disposal of solid waste including recyclables,
hazardous waste, and general waste.

RHA - Regional Housing
Authority

Agencies committed to providing a range of programs and services, all
geared toward increasing the supply of safe, sanitary and affordable
housing and community development on the state and national level.
Adapted from www.alaska.net
Agencies that are assigned responsibility by their states to deal with issues
associated with sprawl.

GMA - State-Designated
Growth Mgmt Agency
LUP - Regional Land Use
Planning Responsibility

Agencies responsible for an area's land use plan including sustainable
development; control of sprawl; farmland, natural resource, and open
space preservation; vehicular and pedestrian connectivity, etc.

CLEAR - Regional
Clearinghouse Function

Agencies responsible for disseminating reports, statistical data, etc.
concerning their region for the purposes of economic development, land
use planning, jobs creation, or any variety of uses and purposes.
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Table 7.26: Distribution of Council Types Among Regional Councils i� the United States
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Table 7.27: Level of Authority According to Objective Ranking and Tn�e

To:e Three Objectives
1 st
Transportation 2nd
Issues
3rd
N = 107
Total N
%
1 st
Regional
2nd
Economic
3rd
Development
Total N
N = 64
%
1st
Environmental 2nd
3rd
Issues
Total N
N = 31
%
1 st
2nd
Growth
3rd
Management
Total N
N = 25
%
1 st
Coordination
2nd
of Multiple
3rd
Services
Total N
N = 27
%
1 st
Air Quality
2nd
Conformity I
3rd
Attainment
Total N
N = 24
%
1 st
2nd
Housing
3rd
Issues
N = l9
Total N
%
1 st
2nd
Clearinghouse
3rd
N = l9
Total N
%

Final
decisionmaking
authority
Yes
46
4
7
57
53%
6
7
9
22
34%
0
5
5
10
32%
0
6
3
9
36%
6
3
3
12
44%
0
14
4
18
75%
1
3
7
11
58%
1
3
2
6
32%

Can punish
noncompliers

Has trucing
authority

Can OK
grant
funding

Must be
consulted

Yes
9
0
3
12
1 1%
1
1
2
4
6%
0
3
1
3
1 0%
1
1
2
4
1 6%
1
2
0
3
1 1%
0
1
1
2
8%
0
0
1
1
5%
0
0
1
1
5%

Yes
4
0
1
5
5%
1
1
0
2
3%
0
1
0
1
3%
0
1
0
1
4%
1
1
0
2
7%
0
0
1
1
4%
0
0
1
1
5%
0
1
0
1
5%

Yes
43
5
3
51
48%
6
4
7
17
27%
0
7
6
13
42%
1
4
2
7
28%
2
2
6
10
37%
1
14
1
16
67%
0
2
5
7
37%
0
0
4
4
21%

Yes
40
10
9
59
55%
17
11
9
37
5 8%
1
10
8
19
61%
7
5
3
15
60%
4
7
4
15
56%
1
8
2
11
46%
1
4
7
12
63%
1
2
8
11
58%
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Table 7.27: Continued
Final
Can OK
Can punish
Has taxing
Must be
decisiongrant
nonauthority
consulted
making
compliers
funding
authority
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
ToE Three Objectives
0
1
0
1
2
1 st
0
1
Senior
0
3
3
2nd
0
1
Services
2
1
0
3rd
N = ll
0
3
0
6
6
Total N
27%
0%
0%
55%
55%
%
0
1
1
1
0
1 st
0
1
0
1
2nd
0
Community
0
1
0
1
3
Development 3rd
0
3
0
5
N = ll
2
Total N
0%
27%
45%
0%
1 8%
%
0
1
0
0
1
1 st
0
2
1
1
1
2nd
Land Use
0
2
3
0
1
3rd
Planning
N= 9
0
4
1
5
3
Total N
0%
44%
1 1%
33%
56%
%
Note: Cell entries are frequencies that respondent chose a particular authority according to their
first, second, or third most imEortant objective.
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